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8 Chapter 1 
Background 
In a number of countries such as the Netherlands, the UK and Australia, regulators 
of healthcare quality have been criticized after high-profile incidents such as the 
Bundaberg hospital scandal in Australia [1, 2], the Mid Staffordshire NHS 
Foundation Trust scandal [3, 4] in the UK and the ‘baby Jelmer’ case in the 
Netherlands (more information in the following paragraph) [5]. Governments are 
facing problems concerning organizational failures, public confidence in regulators 
and accountability of regulators, and society is calling for stricter supervision in 
cases where healthcare providers fail to comply with quality standards [6-8]. 
There are several factors underlying the problems that regulators face. Firstly, 
when information about the work of regulators becomes public, it often relates to 
cases where something went wrong. On the one hand, regulatory agencies interact 
with institutions, businesses and professionals rather than members of the public. 
Therefore, the public profile of regulatory agencies may be low and the general 
public may not find them very interesting [9, 10]. On the other hand, regulators 
tend to be more publicly visible in times of crisis [9, 11]. Scandals and incidents 
(and the media interest in them) may have endangered public confidence in 
healthcare and its regulation [6, 9]. Secondly, the criticisms focus on the policies of 
the regulators, who are thought to be responding too mildly to incidents and to 
healthcare providers who are not meeting standards. Those policies are not 
created by chance, but the underlying reasoning behind those policies is mostly 
based on the theory of ‘responsive regulation’ [12].  
Thirdly, complaints by patients are an important topic of discussion; in a 
number of countries, there have been comments about regulators after patients 
reported that their complaints were being ignored and they were left frustrated [3, 
4, 13-16]. However, in many cases it is not the regulator’s statutory task to handle 
complaints by individuals. 
Nevertheless, evidence from a small body of research suggests that society has 
other views and expectations of the role of the regulator concerning health and 
safety risks than governments or healthcare professionals [9, 17]. There seems to 
be a discrepancy between the public’s and patients’ perspectives and that of the 
regulator. Simultaneously, regulators in various countries and different sectors 
have expressed greater commitment to involving the public and informing them 
more about their regulatory policies [8, 18-21]. 
This thesis therefore assesses the discrepancies and similarities between the 
values and expectations of the public and the theories, concepts and policies of 
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healthcare quality regulation, as well as what this implies for the alignment of the 
two perspectives. This knowledge is needed in order to effectively assess different 
approaches for involving the public in regulatory policies.  
 
This general introduction addresses important theoretical concepts and ideas 
underlying regulation and its related issues, patient involvement and patients’ 
complaints, followed by a description of healthcare quality regulation policies and 
related issues in the Netherlands. The goal, relevance, research questions and 
outline of this thesis will be addressed at the end of this chapter. First, though, the 
Dutch ‘Baby Jelmer’ case is described, the case that in particular was the main 
driving force for this study. This individual case reflects the problems concerning 
the Dutch regulator over the past few years, but is also comparable to other 
incidents in the Netherlands and elsewhere. 
 
The Dutch ‘Baby Jelmer’ case 
Baby Jelmer, the second of premature triplets, was born on 2 May 2007 in a Dutch 
hospital. He underwent surgery and permanent brain damage was diagnosed 
several days later. The hospital reported this, as a notifiable adverse event, to the 
Dutch Healthcare Inspectorate. As usual, the Inspectorate asked the hospital to 
investigate the event and inform the Inspectorate about the results. It took almost 
6 months before the results came and the Inspectorate sent a reminder to the 
hospital. In November 2007, the report and results came. In December 2007, 
Jelmer’s parents informed the Inspectorate of what had happened to their child in 
the hospital, because they had a large number of questions. 
In January 2008, the Inspectorate decided to start its own investigation because 
there were too many ambiguities in the hospital’s report. On 6 December 2010, 
more than 3.5 years after Jelmer’s surgery, the Inspectorate issued a report. This 
report met with criticism from the hospital in question and the anaesthesiologists 
involved, though the parents agreed with it. The Inspectorate withdrew that report 
because it contained inaccuracies and replaced it on 14 July 2011 with a new 
report, without consulting Jelmer’s parents. The parents disagreed with the second 
report. 
The total time taken by the Inspectorate to handle this case since the 
notification in May 2007 was more than four years. A special commission was 
appointed to investigate the incident and the role of the Inspectorate in the case 
[22]. Furthermore, two other commissions were appointed to investigate the 
methods of the Inspectorate with respect to reports by members of the public and 
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the internal organization of the Inspectorate. The commissions all concluded that 
the lead times for handling reports from the general public were too long and that 
the Inspectorate lacked empathy towards the public. Furthermore, they concluded 
that there are uncertainties about the role of the Inspectorate with regard to 
reports by members of the public [13, 23]. 
Jelmer’s parents also contacted the National Ombudsman. In cooperation with 
a national TV programme, the Ombudsman called for people to report their 
experiences with the Inspectorate, which resulted in a list of 334 complaints from 
the public and national media exposure. The conclusions were that the 
Inspectorate did not take patients and their complaints serious enough, and was 
too reticent in taking actions. The Ombudsman stated that there is a discrepancy 
between the (limited) interpretation of the Inspectorate’s task and the image that 
the public have of the Inspectorate [16]. 
However, those criticisms were not shared by everyone. The Inspectorate claimed 
that it is not its task to handle complaints by individual patients, unless the 
problems are structural or very severe and the question was raised of whether it is 
desirable that the Inspectorate should take on that role. 
Nevertheless, the Inspectorate and political circles initiated several efforts towards 
improvement. The Inspectorate’s policies were re-examined and an advice point 
for members of the public with complaints about healthcare was set up [24]. 
 
Theories, concepts and policies of regulation 
 
The emergence of state regulation 
As described earlier, exposure of regulators is often related to incidents. The focus 
on incidents and the state regulator’s role has grown over recent decades. 
Classical studies on risk management and risk perceptions of society describe 
the development of a risk society [25, 26]. New or ‘modern’ threats are a result of 
the nature of our society; they are not external threats, but the threats are a 
product of our actions or our social systems, being problems that are produced 
within the society. Whereas many (natural) hazards that previously threatened 
people have largely been averted, people are not going to feel safer, partly because 
of the growing attention paid to incidents in society and the media. 
The management of risks in society is an important issue in many western 
countries. In the nineteenth century, on recognizing that some risks could only be 
fought collectively, governments gained a greater role when damage occurred. In 
General introduction 11 
this precautionary culture, it was seen as the task of government and politics to 
identify social risks and to take measures [27].  
Over the last few years, there have been ongoing debates about the 
assumption that the government should cover all risks and the related tendency (in 
the case of incidents) to start by looking for someone to blame [28]. Also in the 
media and in political debates, there is not only a great deal of attention paid to 
the occurrence of incidents, but especially to the question of who is (legally) 
responsible for the incident or should be called to account. In addition to 
addressing the immediate cause (e.g. producer or supplier), the role of the public 
regulator is under the microscope, where the focus on the responsibility of the 
origin and prevention of risks is shifting from the supervised party to the state 
regulator. In other words, the regulator is not only seen as a referee of guilt and 
penalty assessment, but also as a subject of investigation. Attention is moving from 
the proprietor or person responsible for the whatever went wrong to the inspector 
who should or could see and prevent it [29,30]. This also could mean that 
regulators will increasingly have to be transparent and account for their work [31].  
 
In healthcare, the idea that the state has an important role in monitoring the 
quality of care was also not always obvious. In the past, healthcare was regulated 
predominantly by professional self-regulation [32], for instance referring to the 
Hippocratic oath. The thinking about changing risks meant that risks were not 
considered and addressed from a professional context, but increasingly from a 
management and governance one [30], shifting from prevention towards proactive 
risk thinking and from criminal justice towards administrative governance [33]. In 
addition, medical scandals in the UK, Australia and New Zealand from the 1990s 
contributed to ending medical professionals’ long-standing model of self-regulation 
by their peers and encouraged the shift towards external or state regulation [34, 
35]. 
 
Governmental regulation: responsive regulation 
Regulators are often criticized for their soft approach and their reliance on the 
regulated party’s ability to make improvements. However, the decisions regulators 
make are not determined by chance. There are several assumptions that underlie 
those policies. 
Because of limited capacity and scarce resources, more flexible and responsive 
ways of regulation were sought [6]. Therefore, internationally, regulation in various 
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industries such as healthcare, finance and the environment is based on the theory 
of ‘responsive regulation’ from Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) [12, 36]. Although 
other academics have developed other theories, this theory is still the most 
influential [37]. 
The basic idea is that the parties being regulated are considered to be 
trustworthy and intrinsically motivated by social responsibility. The mere presence 
of a regulator can already have effects and compliance is more efficiently enhanced 
by cooperation and gentle persuasion instead of harsh sanctions. According to the 
theory, strategies of regulation should be flexible, in synergy with the context of 
those being regulated, and based on dialogue. Regulation based on trust will 
improve quality of care more effectively, whereas regulation based on distrust 
arguably only leads to more sanctions and therefore more demand on the 
regulator’s capacities and ultimately to higher costs to society [12]. Single 
regulatory strategies are seldom effective. Weaknesses of one strategy can be 
complemented by the strengths of another. A wide array of strategies such as 
monitoring performance indicators and targets, incident reporting systems, and 
more strict measures such as criminal penalties should together contribute to the 
effectiveness of regulation [12, 38]. Regulatory compliance is encouraged by using 
cooperation, persuasion, inspection and enforcement notices in the first instance, 
and secondarily by applying heavier measures in the case of riskier behaviour. This 
vision is often described as ‘high trust, high penalty’ [12]. This strategy corresponds 
to the international trend of government functions changing from the old 
‘commanding and controlling’ to ‘steering not rowing’, where responsibilities are 
shifted from the government to the field and new governing mechanisms are 
introduced such as marketization of public sectors [6, 32, 39-42].  
 
However, calls are being heard from political circles and society - often after 
incidents – and through the influence of the media, for a more punitive or vertical 
style of regulation than the responsive or cooperative style. The attention paid to 
regulation increases when incidents occur. Budget cuts, deregulation and 
marketization are embraced when everything goes well, but when things go wrong, 
there are calls for more and stricter regulation. This is also known as ‘the regulation 
paradox’ [29]. 
Making a choice somewhere on the continuum between the two control style 
‘extremes’ fits with the ‘high trust, high penalty’ idea of responsive regulation, for 
which the approach selected depends on the situation. The choice of approach by 
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the regulator is then a question of proportionality and the situation; balancing 
between different approaches of regulation. 
 
Tripartism 
Another important component of the theory of responsive regulation is 
‘tripartism’, which is proposed as a mechanism for empowering public interest 
groups and decreasing the risk of regulatory capture. Capture is a form of political 
corruption that occurs when a regulatory agency acts in the interest of the 
regulated party instead of the public´s interest. Furthermore, tripartism is thought 
to prevent conflicts of values between the different stakeholders.  
In tripartism, a public interest group participates as a third group in the 
regulatory process: it is given power by being granted access to all the information 
that is available to the regulator, and by being offered a seat at the negotiating 
table for enforcement and compliance [8, 12, 14, 43-45]. It is also seen as a 
democratic way of regulation by giving the public a voice. In addition, there are 
merits not only for the public, but also because it is considered to be a strategy for 
implementing laws and regulations that have already been defined. Under 
tripartism, public interest groups could add substantially to the capacity of 
regulators to monitor outcomes. The eyes and ears available for verification are 
multiplied. If tripartism succeeds in building trust and honest communication, all 
players will be better able to recognize what the others (for instance regulator and 
regulated party) are doing and when they are cooperating [46]. In many countries, 
involvement of the public in regulation is on the policy agenda [38, 47-50]. These 
developments can also be seen in the light of a larger trend of democratization in 
healthcare as described in the following paragraphs. 
 
Democratization in healthcare 
 
In regulatory policies, as well as in the broader arena of healthcare, it is becoming 
more and more widely recognized that patients should have a more distinct role in 
the system. 
In Western countries, healthcare systems have been changing rapidly over the 
last decades. Healthcare is the particular area where changes, reforms and new 
technologies are implemented. Challenges of an aging society and rising costs lead 
to institutional changes in healthcare systems such as the introduction of 
competition mechanisms. The market is supposed to be a new governing 
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mechanism [40, 41, 51]. 
Those reforms in healthcare systems that are ongoing worldwide demand 
changes to the roles of the actors, including patients. Governments aim to develop 
policies and legislation to strengthen people’s rights as part of the emancipatory 
developments in large parts of Europe and the USA to empower various groups 
within society, e.g. women, homosexuals and patients [52]. Patient participation 
and active patient choice are thus promoted [32, 39].  
In the new systems, patients are encouraged to choose their care providers and 
‘vote with their feet’. This selection process will encourage providers to compete 
for patients by improving their quality and decreasing their costs, which eventually 
helps ensure the quality, efficiency and equity of healthcare [53]. For patients to be 
able to actively choose the best provider, they need to be informed about the 
quality of providers. This means that quality information needs to be transparent. 
Insurers, care providers and regulators too are expected to play a role in 
contributing to this transparency [39]. Transparency however has both positive and 
negative consequences. Transparency may encourage confidence in the care on the 
part of the public, because it provides insights into the level of quality of 
healthcare. On the other hand, maximum transparency about problems in 
healthcare may mean that a more negative picture than necessary of care may be 
drawn and a negative picture of regulators may emerge. This is also called the 
‘information paradox’: the more visible the work of the regulator, the greater the 
extent to which abuses and incidents get publicity [54]. Nevertheless, partly due to 
the Internet and new technologies such as health apps on smartphones, patients 
are getting more and more access to information about the quality of care, as well 
as more access to their own health information than ever before, putting them 
more and more in the driver’s seat. 
Other forms of democratization in healthcare at the macro or micro level are 
the contribution of patients in decision-making processes at national and local 
levels, including developing guidelines or policies and setting research agendas, as 
well as regulating and improving the quality of care [8]. The latter will be described 
in more detail below. 
 
Democratization in healthcare quality regulation 
Following the developments described above, it has been argued in several studies 
that patients and their experiences and complaints have been largely ignored in 
patient safety management [55-58]. Current patient safety approaches possibly 
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tend to reflect a narrowly clinical perspective that excludes non-clinical or non-
disease-specific aspects of care that patients find important [57-62]. 
Regulators of healthcare quality in various countries are struggling with 
criticisms, often articulated by the media, for not taking patients and their 
complaints and information seriously [4, 8, 16, 63]. Public participation in 
healthcare quality regulation may be a solution for helping regulators overcome 
those criticisms, meet society’s needs and expectations, and enhance their public 
accountability [8, 12, 14, 43-45, 49].  
Furthermore, it has been stated that patients can add value to safety 
management by providing ‘soft intelligence’, information about blind spots that 
care providers are unaware of [7]. It has also been shown that patients, especially 
those who suffered harm, are not only able but also in a very good position to 
observe their safety and identify contributory factors [64]. In addition, the value 
that information extracted from patients’ complaints adds to other sources of 
information about healthcare quality has been proven in other research. It was 
shown that different reporting systems such as incident reporting, patient 
complaints and malpractice claims all produce substantially different, incomplete 
but complementary, pictures of patient safety. Moreover, the traditional 
monitoring system (clinical adverse event reporting) only represents a small part of 
the picture. Underreporting is a major issue, as sometimes 95% of the adverse 
events are not reported [65]. 
For those reasons, public participation in regulation is an important item on the 
policy agenda in several European countries [21, 50, 66, 67]. However, little is yet 
known about what the best ways are for involving patients in the regulation of 
healthcare quality. 
 
Approaches for including patients 
There are various approaches for including patients in regulation policies, such as 
using patient satisfaction surveys (the traditional method) or newer approaches 
such as searching for patients’ comments on social media [68-71]. 
Generally, patient satisfaction surveys such as Consumer Quality Indices (CQI) 
are used for incorporating the patients’ perspective in regulation policies. A strong 
point of surveys is that a large group of patients can be reached.  
Social media (including Facebook, Twitter and rating sites) have been shown to 
be a promising source of information complementing traditional information 
sources and providing unique insights into healthcare quality [68, 70, 71]. Large 
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amounts of comments can be found on social media. For instance, on Twitter, an 
average of 500 million tweets are sent a day [72]. A wide variety of topics in 
healthcare are discussed on Twitter, such as experiences with staff, processes and 
facilities. Most of the comments are positive, so it provides a mechanism for 
positive feedback to healthcare staff and demonstrates good performance by 
providers [71]. Furthermore, research has shown that high ratings for care 
institutions on Yelp were statistically significantly correlated with lower mortality 
for myocardial infarction (MI) and pneumonia, and fewer readmissions [73]. Other 
research has shown that searching on Yelp also reveals novel themes that are not 
included in surveys [74]. Another new way to strengthen the patients’ perspective 
that is still in an experimental phase is to involve them as ‘mystery guests’ during 
inspections and regulatory visits to care providers [8, 18]. 
 
Patients’ complaints 
Another way to include patients in regulatory policies is via their complaints. As 
described, the way regulators deal with patients’ complaints is an important point 
of discussion and the main reason for this study. Including patients and their 
complaints in regulatory policies can be seen as a form of participation. Patients 
may have the option of reporting their information about healthcare to regulators 
by filing complaints (if the regulator has set up a complaints’ desk). There are 
however differences between countries in what role patients’ complaints currently 
have in healthcare quality regulation. In Finland for example, patients can file 
complaints with the healthcare quality regulator, which then judges the legitimacy 
of the complaint [75, 76], while in other countries such as the UK, Australia and the 
Netherlands, individual complaint handling is not the primary task of the regulator. 
Signals derived from individual complaints are often used to monitor the 
performance of individual care providers [8, 20, 63]. Nevertheless, research has 
shown that most patients who lodge complaints with various complaints bodies 
expect the same of the procedure. They want something to change as a result of 
their complaint. However, they often think that nothing has changed as a result of 
their complaint [63, 77-83]. 
In this study, patients with complaints, their expectations and experiences, and 
the regulator’s responses to them are used to gain more understanding about the 
patients’ and regulator’s perspectives. Complaints are a form of ‘voice’ that fits 
within the idea of public participation and democratization in healthcare. Studying 
this could generate information about what it would mean and what is needed for 
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regulators if they want to involve patients in their work. Furthermore, it could help 
regulators improve their responses to complainants, as that was what they were 
originally criticized for. It could point out more specifically where the problems lie. 
To summarize, there are a number of possibilities –  not limited to the ones 
described – for including patients in regulatory policies. However, patient 
participation in regulation is not self-evident and it goes hand in hand with several 
dilemmas and bottlenecks. This thesis aims to contribute to this discussion and to 
improve the relationship between patients and regulators by studying the patients’ 
perspective and assessing it against regulatory perspectives. 
 
The Dutch situation 
 
The studies in this thesis have been carried out within the Netherlands. The Dutch 
situation regarding regulation of healthcare quality will therefore be described 
below. 
In the Netherlands, regulation of healthcare quality is carried out by the Dutch 
Healthcare Inspectorate (IGZ). 
Since 1996, the Care Institutions Quality Act (KWZ) has stipulated that the 
responsibility for quality of care lies primarily with the care provider. This includes 
ensuring that healthcare providers give the patients the right to complain. The idea 
behind the law was that “Quality of care [...] is not so much the product of the 
requirements the law imposes on a provider but of the way the latter has shaped 
the care process [84].” The objective is that the standards for ‘responsible care’ are 
defined and developed by the professional field. Healthcare providers are expected 
to establish quality systems that monitor quality performance and send this 
information to the Inspectorate. The Inspectorate assumes that care providers 
have the intrinsic motivation to do this properly, based on the principle of ‘high 
trust, high penalty’ from the theory of responsive regulation. The choice of 
imposing measures is based on the severity of the problem and the attitude of the 
care provider [54]. 
Responsiveness, i.e. the extent to which the Inspectorate succeeds in 
anticipating to the healthcare practice that it supervises, plays an important role in 
the effectiveness of regulation. This responsiveness is necessary as the decisions 
and measures taken by the inspectors must be incorporated into the local care 
practices if they are to lead to improvement [85]. This responsiveness is also 
possible because most inspectors (at the time of the study) came from the field 
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that they supervise. Inspectors at the IGZ have worked for an average of 12 years in 
an executive, management or scientific position in healthcare before joining the 
IGZ [86, 87]. There could therefore be a question of whether the professional 
perspective dominates within the Inspectorate’s work. 
 
Complaints and regulation in the Netherlands 
From a statutory perspective, the Dutch regulator has no immediate task regarding 
complaints and problems of individual patients and members of the public. The 
Inspectorate handles complaints only when there is a serious threat to the health 
or safety of the patient or when the complaint indicates a structural problem [88]. 
At the time of this study, the Inspectorate supervised compliance with the Clients’ 
Right to Complain Act, which requires care providers to have an easily accessible 
complaints facility for patients. That task is primarily administrative in nature and 
thus not aimed at satisfaction of individual members of the public. However, the 
past few years have shown that society and politics have other expectations than 
the Inspectorate could fulfil, as is shown in the Baby Jelmer case [16, 55, 89, 90]. 
The case also shows the Inspectorate’s struggle in meeting those expectations 
while at the same time carrying out its statutory task. 
In addition, the Inspectorate has repeatedly had negative coverage in the 
media, and there was criticism of the actions taken by the Inspectorate [22, 91-94]. 
Sometimes the Inspectorate was accused of too much reliance on the ability of the 
care provider in question to resolve its own issues, which was again the case with 
Baby Jelmer [5, 15, 16]. 
In 2001, the advisory group Abeln gave the recommendation that the 
Inspectorate should be positioned as an organization “of the Minister, focusing on 
providers, but mainly acting in the interests of the public, for the public” [94]. 
During the years that followed, while several other incidents occurred in which the 
Inspectorate’s role was criticized, the Minister urged the Inspectorate to make 
improvements in this area. In 2012, the Minister decided to start a contact point 
for complaints where patients can go with their complaints that can provide them 
advice about other options for their complaint [24]. In its latest policy plan for 
2016-2019, the Inspectorate planned to give the public a greater role in its policies. 
Another important priority is public transparency about its own work [19]. 
Furthermore, a new law concerning quality of care and complaints handling 
(Wkkgz) is being introduced in the year of writing (2016),  aiming to improve 
patients’ satisfaction with complaint handling. 
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Goal, relevance and outline of this thesis 
Little research has been performed into society’s views and expectations of the 
regulation of quality of care. The aim of this study is to use the developments 
described to uncover potential discrepancies between legislation and policy and 
the views and expectations of the general public on regulation of quality of 
healthcare. Furthermore, the views, expectations and experiences of patients with 
complaints aimed at the Inspectorate are explored and a tool is developed for 
systematically analysing and using complaints for regulatory purposes. The overall 
goal is to improve the alignment of the perspectives of the patients and the 
regulators, and to assist regulators in responding to, involving and using patients 
and their information within their policies. The challenge is to effectively define the 
relationship between the regulator and patients. 
This research was carried out within the Academic Collaborative Centre on 
Supervision, where researchers from four research institutes cooperate with the 
Inspectorate. This gives the Inspectorate the possibility of proposing research 
questions that occur in its own practice. The problem that is investigated in this 
study is a societal problem that cannot be classified exclusively in a single specific 
research area. Furthermore, this study was affected by various political and societal 
movements which therefore demanded a pragmatic and dynamic approach in 
which the actual steps to be taken were not established beforehand. This allowed 
the study to support regulation in practice but also contribute to the scientific body 
of evidence. 
 
Research questions  
 
We formulated the following research questions: 
Research question Chapter 
What are the similarities and discrepancies between the 
public’s/patients’ perspectives and the regulator’s perspective? 
2, 6 
What are the implications for incorporating the patients’ perspective 
in the inspectorate’s work, and what are the advantages and 
disadvantages? 
6,7 
What are the implications for improving the responses of regulators 
to patients and their complaints and how can regulators make 
effective use of complaints? 
3, 4, 5 
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This thesis is divided into 7 chapters:  
 
1. Introduction 
2. The public’s voice about healthcare quality regulation policies. A 
population-based survey.  
The aim of this study was to explore possible discrepancies between public 
values and opinions and current healthcare quality regulation policies. 
3. Patients’ perspectives on the role of their complaints in the regulatory 
process. 
This study explores what patients who made complaints expect to achieve 
in the process of healthcare quality regulation. 
4. Including patients’ complaints in healthcare quality regulation systems: 
testing the reliability of a taxonomy. 
We aimed to provide a taxonomy for healthcare quality regulators for 
encoding complaints, and to empirically test that taxonomy to determine 
its reliability. 
5. Classifying patients’ complaints for regulatory purposes: a pilot study 
This study seeks an answer to the questions of what information can be 
extracted by analysing patients’ complaints about all healthcare sectors 
received by the regulator and what can be learned from this from a 
regulatory perspective. 
6. Is there a mismatch between the perspectives of patients and regulators 
on healthcare quality? A survey study 
Patient’s complaints often involve non-clinical subjects such as 
communication or organizational problems, while regulators evaluate 
complaints based on clinical standards. This study examines whether 
patients’ expectations of and experiences with reporting their complaint 
to the regulator are influenced by the subject their complaint is about. 
7. General discussion 
 
Data collection 
A questionnaire was submitted to 1500 members of the Dutch Healthcare 
Consumer Panel. This panel is representative of the Dutch general population in 
terms of age and gender. Questions were developed around central ideas 
underlying healthcare quality regulation policies. 
Interviews were conducted with 11 people who had submitted a complaint to the 
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Dutch Healthcare Inspectorate. Based on the interview results, a second 
questionnaire was sent to 343 people who had submitted a complaint to the 
Inspectorate between August 2012 and November 2012 and 653 people who had 
submitted a complaint between April and August 2013. An existing taxonomy for 
the analysis of complaints in healthcare was developed further into a taxonomy 
that is applicable to a wide array of healthcare sectors and for use by healthcare 
quality regulators. Various statistical analyses were carried out using the data. 
 
Outline of this thesis  
After this general introduction, Chapter 2 provides an exploration of the opinions 
and expectations of the general Dutch public of regulation of healthcare quality. 
The chapters that follow then focus on patients who reported complaints to the 
regulator. Chapter 3 is an exploration of the expectations and experiences of 
patients with complaints who turned to the regulator. Chapters 4 and 5 concern 
the utilization of complaints for regulatory purposes. A taxonomy was developed 
and tested for its reliability, and it is explored what information complaints provide 
on an aggregated level. Finally, Chapter 6 investigates if the perspectives of 
regulators and patients mismatch and how this can be addressed. 
The results of the study are summarised and discussed in view of earlier 
findings, theory and methods in Chapter 7. In addition, implications for practice 
and further research are formulated. 
This thesis is based on five articles about the studies performed. Some overlap 
between the chapters is inevitable as every chapter was written to be read as a 
stand-alone article in its own right. 
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In the wake of various high-profile incidents in a number of countries, regulators of 
healthcare quality have been criticised for their ‘soft’ approach. In politics, 
concerns were expressed about public confidence. It was claimed that there are 
discrepancies between public opinions related to values and the values guiding 
regulation policies. Although the general public are final clients of regulators’ work, 
their opinion has only been discussed in research to a limited extent. 
The aim of this study is to explore possible discrepancies between public values and 
opinions and current healthcare quality regulation policies. 
 
Methods 
A questionnaire was submitted to 1500 members of the Dutch Healthcare 
Consumer Panel. Questions were developed around central ideas underlying 
healthcare quality regulation policies. 
 
Results 
The response rate was 58.3 %. The regulator was seen as being more responsible 
for quality of care than care providers. Patients were rated as having the least 
responsibility. Similar patterns were observed for the food service industry and the 
education sector. Complaints by patients’ associations were seen as an important 
source of information for quality regulation, while fewer respondents trusted 
information delivered by care providers. However, respondents supported the 
regulator’s imposition of lighter measures firstly. 
 
Conclusions 
There are discrepancies and similarities between public opinion and regulation 
policies. The discrepancies correspond to fundamental concepts; decentralisation 
of responsibilities is not what the public wants. There is little confidence in the 
regulator’s use of information obtained by care providers’ internal monitoring, 
while a larger role is seen for complaints of patient organisations. This discrepancy 
seems not to exist regarding the regulator’s approach of imposing measures. A 
gradual, and often soft approach, is favoured by the majority of the public in spite 
of the criticism that is voiced in the media regarding this approach. Our study 
contributes to the limited knowledge of public opinion on government regulation 
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policies. This knowledge is needed in order to effectively assess different 





In the wake of various high-profile incidents such as the Mid Staffordshire NHS 
Foundation Trust scandal in the United Kingdom, several countries including the 
Netherlands have faced comparable organisational crises and problems with 
achieving political goals such as public confidence in healthcare, legitimacy and 
accountability of regulators in healthcare [1–7]. The criticisms expressed in the 
media, by politicians and by patient organisations are often directed at the 
regulators’ cooperating approach in cases where healthcare providers fail to 
comply with quality standards. Furthermore, it is claimed that regulators fail to 
respond to patients’ complaints [4, 7]. 
Although it is often recommended to involve the public as they are the final 
clients of the regulator’s services [8, 9], their opinions on regulatory policies have 
only been discussed in research to a limited extent. The main research question in 
this study is therefore whether there are discrepancies between the values and 
opinions of the public and the current values of policies and strategies for 
regulation of healthcare quality, and if so, what are these discrepancies? The Dutch 
situation is used as a case study. 
The next paragraph addresses important theoretical concepts underlying 
regulation, followed by a description of healthcare quality regulation policies and 
related issues in the Netherlands. We then explain the methods used in this study, 
followed by the results and discussion. 
 
Responsive regulation 
Internationally, regulation in various industries such as healthcare, finance and 
environmental businesses is based on the theory of ‘responsive regulation’ of Ayres 
and Braithwaite (1992) [10, 11]. The basic idea is that the parties being regulated 
are considered to be trustworthy and intrinsically motivated by social 
responsibility. According to this theory, strategies of regulation should be flexible, 
in synergy with the context of those being regulated, and based on dialogue. 
Regulation based on trust will improve quality of care more effectively, while 
regulation based on distrust arguably only leads to more sanctions and therefore 
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more capacity on the part of the regulator and ultimately to higher costs to society 
[10]. Single regulatory strategies are seldom effective. Weaknesses of one strategy 
can be complemented by strengths of another. A wide array of strategies such as 
monitoring performance indicators and targets, incident reporting systems, and 
more stricter measures as criminal penalties should together contribute to the 
effectiveness of regulation [10, 12]. Regulatory compliance is encouraged by using 
cooperation, persuasion, inspection and enforcement notices in the first instance, 
and secondarily by applying heavier measures in the case of riskier behaviour. This 
vision is often described as ‘high trust, high penalty’ [10]. This strategy corresponds 
to the international trend of government functions changing from the old 
“commanding and controlling” to “steering not rowing”, whereby responsibilities 
are shifted from the government to the field and new governing mechanisms are 
introduced such as marketisation of public sectors [4, 13–17].  
 
Another important component of the theory is ‘tripartism’, which is proposed as a 
mechanism for empowering public interest groups and decreasing the risk of 
regulatory capture. Furthermore, tripartism can prevent conflicts of values 
between the different stakeholders. In tripartism, a public interest group 
participates as a third group in the regulatory process: it is given power by being 
granted access to all the information that is available to the regulator, and by being 
offered a seat at the negotiation table for enforcement and compliance [3, 10, 18–
21]. In many countries, involvement of the public in regulation is on the policy 
agenda and different approaches are being considered, such as using the 
experiences of the public at large [5, 12, 22–24].  
 
However, research has shown that public interest in regulatory agencies is limited, 
as is the public visibility of these agencies [25–27]. Low public interest may not be a 
great problem, as these agencies interact primarily with the industry rather than 
with the general public. However, regulators often do tend to become visible to the 
public in times of crisis [27, 28]. Scandals and incidents and the accompanying 
media attention can have a direct influence on the regulators’ reputation [28–30], 
and may possibly jeopardise public confidence in the industry and its regulation [4, 
7, 31]. Although regulation is often defined as “sustained and focused control 
exercised by a public agency over activities that are valued by a community” [32, 
33], research shows that in risk cases involving for instance genetically modified 
food or radioactive waste, the public does not regard the government regulator as 
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having the same values as themselves [34]. This also implies that it is important for 
ensuring the legitimacy, public accountability and transparency of a regulator and 
for involving the public in regulation policies that the values of regulatory policies 
are consistent with the values of communities. Differences between the values and 
opinions of the public and the current values of policies and strategies for 
regulation and underlying ideas of the theory of ‘responsive regulation’, are the 
main focus of this article. 
 
Dutch healthcare quality regulation policies 
In the Netherlands, the healthcare system was reformed into a regulated market 
system in 2006 [35]. Before the introduction of this reform, two types of healthcare 
quality regulation could be distinguished: state regulation and professional self-
regulation. Since the competition mechanisms were introduced, the market was 
supposed to be a new complementary governing mechanism and the state’s 
function followed a more decentralised approach [17, 35, 36]. In this system, the 
focus on patient choice and transparency of quality of care has increased [13, 15–
17].  
Since the introduction of the Quality Act (1996), care providers have been given 
more responsibilities and are supposed to develop quality standards. The Dutch 
Healthcare Inspectorate monitors performance against these standards (more 
information about monitoring and enforcement strategies in Table 1). However, 
the Netherlands has also seen several high-profile incidents in healthcare that led 
to concerns in society and a heated political debate about the Inspectorate [18, 36–
39]. It was argued that the Inspectorate failed to respond to emerging signals 
including patients’ complaints and it should have enforced the rules more strictly, 
because its actions had been too hesitant and trusting of care providers who were 
not complying with quality standards. Members of the Dutch House of 
Representatives spoke of “the debate representing the gap between the public and 
politics, but in miniature”. It was stated that the public and their complaints 
deserve more attention and should be involved in regulation policies [40]. In the 
Netherlands, those problems regulators experience are not unique to the 
healthcare sector. State regulators in the food service industry and education 
sector face similar incidents and reputational losses [41]. Therefore, this article 
aims to provide a broader picture of public values and opinions about state 
agencies and their role in risk regulation. 
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Table 1 Regulation and enforcement instruments of the Dutch Healthcare 
 Inspectorate 
In the Netherlands, the Dutch Healthcare Inspectorate is the body appointed by the 
government to supervise and regulate quality of healthcare. It is an independent part of the 
Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sports. The Inspectorate pays regular visits, which become 
more frequent if care providers do not comply with quality standards. Both care providers 
and the public can report incidents or lodge complaints. However, the Inspectorate’s 
statutory tasks mean that it cannot handle complaints by individual patients unless the 
complaints are structural or very severe 
Information about the quality of care is collected and analysed to signal potential risks. 
Information sources include the following: 
- System based supervision (monitoring of internal quality systems and 
governance arrangements) 
- Performance indicators 
- Reporting of incidents (by the public or care providers) 
- Detection of prosecutable facts 
- Thematic supervision 
The Inspectorate is authorised to use the following regulation and enforcement 
instruments: 
- Advice and incentives (consultation, campaigns); 
- Corrective measures (impose improvement plans, strengthened monitoring); 
- Administrative measures (command, advice to the Minister to issue a direction, 
penal sum, administrative fine); 






We developed questions reflecting the concepts of the theory of ‘responsive 
regulation’, ‘high trust, high penalty’, and ‘tripartism’. 
Firstly, in order to explore public opinion about the concept of ‘responsive 
regulation’ and the role and position of the state regulator with respect to the 
regulated parties and other stakeholders, we developed questions about the 
responsibilities of professionals, the government and other quality-of-care 
stakeholders. We included equivalent questions concerning quality regulation in 
the food service industry and in education, in order to assess whether public 
The public’s voice about healthcare quality regulation policies 35 
opinion is unique to the health sector or if it represents more common attitudes 
regarding responsibility. The Dutch Inspectorate of Education is part of the Ministry 
of Education, Culture and Science. 
The Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority is part of the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs. They also base their regulation policies on the theory 
of ‘responsive regulation’ [42, 43]. 
In each sector, seven stakeholders were represented: the state regulators 
(Dutch Healthcare Inspectorate, Dutch Inspectorate of Education, Netherlands 
Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority); users (patients, students and their 
parents, and consumers); executive roles (care providers, teachers, and personnel 
who prepare food); direct colleagues of the executive roles in the three sectors; 
managers in the three sectors; ministers (Minister of Health, Welfare and Sports, 
Minister of Education, Culture and Science, Minister of Economic Affairs); and the 
European Union. For each stakeholder, respondents were asked to select an 
answer on a five-point scale, where one meant no responsibility and five meant full 
responsibility. 
The other questions focused mainly on regulation of quality of healthcare by 
the Dutch Healthcare Inspectorate. The concept of ‘tripartism’ was explored by 
enquiring about the patients’ responsibility for quality of care and the role patient 
information should have in monitoring healthcare quality. The questions also 
included existing information sources used by the Inspectorate, such as complaints 
from members of the public, complaints from care providers, and quality 
information supplied by the care providers themselves. In addition, sources for 
collecting information that are currently not used by the Inspectorate were 
included, such as searching the Internet for complaints. 
Furthermore, the concept ‘high trust, high penalty’ was operationalised into 
questions focusing on what respondents considered to be good methods for 
regulating the quality of care. Respondents were asked what sanctions the 
Inspectorate should impose when care providers fail to provide adequate quality of 
care. Possible sanctions ranged from soft measures such as ‘double-checking the 
care institution’ to stricter measures such as ‘closing the care institution’. Possible 
answers were ‘totally disagree’, ‘disagree’, ‘neither disagree nor agree’, ‘agree’ and 
‘totally agree’. The questionnaire was assessed by a permanent committee with 
delegates from several stakeholder organisations in healthcare such as of the 
Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sports, the Healthcare Insurers Board, and the 
Federation of Patients and Consumer Organisations. Their feedback was used to 
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finalize the questionnaire. 
 
Panel 
The questionnaire was submitted in February 2013 to a sample of 1500 members 
of the Dutch Healthcare Consumer Panel. The Dutch Healthcare Consumer Panel at 
that time consisted of approximately 6000 people aged 18 and older. A sample of 
1500 persons that is representative of the Dutch population was drawn from the 
Healthcare Consumer Panel. The composition of the sample was compared with 
the general population in the Netherlands based on data from Statistics 
Netherlands [44], in order to make it reflect the composition of the Dutch 
population. Membership of the panel lasts for a maximum of 5 years. Members can 
quit at any time. New panel members are sampled from the general population 
and selected on basic characteristics needed to keep the panel representative for 
the Dutch population. This renewal also ensures that members do not develop 
specific knowledge of healthcare issues and that questionnaire fatigue does not 
occur. Questionnaires can be received by post or through the Internet, based on 
the preference of the member. To increase the response rate, two electronic 
reminders and one postal reminder were sent to members who had not responded 
yet. The Dutch Healthcare Consumer Panel is registered with the Dutch Data 
Protection Authority (no. 1262949) [45]. 
 
Ethics statement 
Our study complied with the Helsinki Declaration where applicable. According to 
the Dutch ‘Medical Research involving human subjects Act’, neither obtaining 
informed consent nor formal ethical approval for this study was required [46]. No 
medical interventions were involved and the impact of the questionnaires on daily 
life was considered minor and thus the welfare and rights of the panel members 
were protected. Panel members were free to answer the questions or not. 
 
Statistical analyses 
In order to obtain a ranking of responsibility of the seven stakeholders in the three 
sectors, mean scores for responsibility were calculated. For each sector (health- 
care, education and food service) respondents could rate responsibility on a five-
point scale for each of the seven stakeholders. Differences between responsibility 
scores of groups of stakeholders were analysed by creating pair-wise comparisons 
using the Wilcoxon signed rank test [47]. 
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For the other questions, about information sources and methods of regulation, 
the first two and last two answer categories were combined. Those results are 
presented descriptively. 
Background characteristics of the study sample were compared to the 
characteristics of the Dutch population. Data on the Dutch population was 
obtained from Statistics Netherlands. Research on consumer behaviour shows that 
younger and more highly educated respondents have more critical attitudes 
towards services [48]. Therefore, differences in age categories, education levels 
and the extent to which respondents knew about the Inspectorate were therefore 
tested by chi-squared tests. This was not possible for ethnicity because almost all 
respondents were from Dutch origin. 
P-values of <0.05 were considered to be significant. The data was analysed 





In total, 875 respondents returned the questionnaire (response rate: 58.3 %). 
Almost half of the respondents were female (47.7 %). They ranged in age from 18 
to 87, with a mean of 51.4. More than half (57.6 %) of the respondents had a 
medium level of education. The study sample is ethnically less diverse than the 
overall Dutch population. See Table 2 for the study sample characteristics 
compared to the characteristics of the general Dutch population. With the 
exception of educational level and ethnicity, the sample is comparable to the Dutch 
population. 
The majority (76.3 %) of the respondents of the Dutch Consumer Panel 
reported some degree of knowledge of the Inspectorate’s work, and about one in 
ten respondents indicated that they knew exactly what the Inspectorate does. The 
remaining 14.6 % admitted a lack of knowledge. Additional analysis showed that 
respondents who are currently working or previously worked in healthcare (30.2 %) 
were significantly more likely to report knowing, either to some extent or very 
precisely, what the Inspectorate does. 
Respondents rated the Inspectorate to bear most responsibility for the quality 
of healthcare, assigning it a significantly higher score than care providers (Table 3). 
Next in ranking came the care providers, the minister, managers, colleagues of care 
providers, and finally the European Union. Patients were rated to bear the least 
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responsibility for quality of healthcare, and this result was statistically significant. 
The same applies for students and their parents in the educational setting and 
consumers in the food service industry. The education sector showed 
approximately the same order of responsibility of stakeholders as healthcare, 
except for the positions of the managers and the minister being reversed. 
Significant differences were found between the Dutch Inspectorate of Education 
and teachers, but not between teachers and managers. In the food service 
industry, both the personnel who prepared food and the food sector managers 
were rated as bearing slightly more responsibility than the Netherlands Food and 
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Respondents were asked what information sources the Inspectorate could best rely 
on to monitor healthcare quality (Fig. 1). The majority of respondents (93.2 %) 
agreed (totally or partially) that the Inspectorate could best rely on the complaints 
of patient associations. In addition, a large majority (87.1 %) agreed (totally or 
partially) that the Inspectorate should visit all care providers. In addition, the 
respondents’ opinion was that the Inspectorate should rely on sources such as 
complaints of care providers (87.3 %) and members of the public (85.3 %). Fewer 
respondents (approximately half) agreed (totally or partially) that the Inspectorate 
should rely on information provided by care institutions themselves, whereas 23 % 
were of the opinion (totally or partially) that it should not. 
Respondents were asked what measures the Inspectorate should take in cases 
of poor care (Fig. 2). If a healthcare provider delivers poor care, the majority 
indicated that the Inspectorate should double-check the care institution (96.4 %) 
and provide recommendations for improvements (93.9 %). In addition, about 70 % 
of respondents agreed (totally or partially) that the Inspectorate should publish 
poor care delivery on its website. With respect to other possible regulatory 
measures, allowances should be made for the fact that between 20 and 48 % of the 
respondents answered indifferently (‘neither disagree nor agree’). Slightly more 
than half of the respondents indicated that the Inspectorate should issue a fine 
when poor care was provided. Furthermore, 53.3 % of the respondents agreed 
(totally or partially) that the Inspectorate should temporarily take over the 
management of a poorly performing care institution. Slightly more than a quarter 
of all respondents indicated that the healthcare institution should be closed if it 
provides poor care. 
We analysed whether there were differences in the answers given by different 
age groups, educational levels and knowledge about the Inspectorate. Some 
significant differences were found. Less highly educated and older respondents 
tended to agree more often on some questions that the Inspectorate should 
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For instance, respondents in the two older age groups and those with a low or 
medium level of education agreed more often that the Inspectorate should advise 
patients in cases of poor care delivery to go to another care institution and inform 
the media than respondents from the other groups did (p = 0.000-0.001). 
Furthermore, less highly educated respondents agreed more often that the 
Inspectorate should search the Internet for complaints about care providers than 
respondents from the other groups did (p = 0.02). In addition, less highly educated 
respondents agreed more often that the Healthcare Inspectorate should issue fines 
in cases of poor care delivery than more highly educated respondents (p = 0.03). 
Lastly, respondents who admitted a lack of knowledge about the Inspectorate’s 
work, tended to answer indifferently more often on some questions. 
 
 
Figure 1 Evaluation of sources for monitoring healthcare quality by the 
 Dutch Healthcare Inspectorate according to respondents of the 






0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
…rely on information provided 
by care institutions themselves
…search the internet for 
complaints about care 
institutions
…rely on the complaints of 
members of the public
...personally visit all care
institutions
…rely on the complaints of 
care providers
…rely on the complaints of 
patient associations
To monitor quality of healthcare the Inspectorate could 
best…
(Totally) disagree
Neither disagree nor agree
(Totally) agree
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Figure 2 What the Healthcare Inspectorate should do when a care 
 institution delivers poor care according to respondents of the 





This study aimed to explore the opinions and values of the public regarding 
healthcare quality regulation policies, analysing the Dutch situation as a case study. 
Similarly to other countries such as the UK, the Netherlands had some high-profile 
incidents in which the regulator failed to respond to various emerging signals, 
including patients’ complaints. These led to concerns about public confidence in 
healthcare and the regulator. Internationally, political visions on governance and 
regulation are changing from centralised to decentralised approaches and 
responsibilities are being shifted from the government to the field [4, 13–17]. In 
the Netherlands, this changing vision resulted in the introduction of the Quality Act 
in 1996, which made care providers primarily responsible for the quality of care. In 





0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
... close the care institution
... advise patients to go to
another care institution
... inform the media
... temporarily take over the
management of the care
institution
... issue the care institution a
fine
... publish this on its website
... provide recommendations
for improvements
... double check the care
institution
When a care institution delivers poor care, the 
Inspectorate should…
(Totally) disagree
Neither disagree nor agree
(Totally) agree
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basis of which the regulator monitors performance [17, 36]. This vision fits with the 
theory of responsive regulation, in which regulators entrust those being regulated 
to take their responsibilities [10]. This study shows that the majority of the public 
partly support this idea: the public assigned a high degree of responsibility to care 
providers. However, a fundamental discrepancy became apparent: the 
predominant rhetoric of decentralisation of responsibilities was not supported and 
the majority of the public seem to have little confidence in the internal monitoring 
of quality by care providers and the use of this information for regulation. Other 
studies also found that a large proportion of the public assign responsibility for 
promoting safety and preventing medical errors in healthcare to state agencies [31, 
49]. Moreover, this study shows that there is a generalised idea among the public 
that the state regulator has a prominent role, as the same patterns were observed 
for the food service industry and the education sector. Apparently, according to the 
majority of the public, the internal monitoring of quality and safety of healthcare 
cannot simply be left to the goodwill of the care providers. Nevertheless, although 
some differing opinions were found among older and less well-educated 
respondents, the majority support the regulators’ gradual approaches of imposing 
measures to care providers who fail to comply with quality standards, as proposed 
by the theory of responsive regulation [10]. Thus, the majority prefer a greater 
responsibility and an active role by the regulator with regard to gathering 
information but not a stricter approach with regard to imposing measures for the 
state regulator. 
It has been stressed in several studies that more democratic approaches to 
regulation, such as ‘tripartism’, might overcome the conflicts of values that are 
important to the different stakeholders [3, 10, 18–21, 23]. On the one hand, the 
majority of the public attach importance to complaints of patient associations as a 
source of information for regulation. This is an interesting finding, as questions 
have been raised in several European countries about how patients’ complaints 
should be valued and have a place in the regulatory process, and public 
participation in regulation is an important item on the policy agenda [2, 3, 5, 18, 24, 
36, 37, 40]. The use of patients’ complaints can be seen as a reduced form of 
tripartism whereby services become more responsive to and learn from their users. 
Actually, The Mid Staffordshire Public Inquiry showed that inferences about general 
patient safety can be gained from individual complaints. Moreover, in this case, 
individual complaints even indicated dramatic systemic failures [2]. A voice for the 
patients provides information about ‘blind spots’ that care providers are unaware 
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of; this is also called ‘soft intelligence’ [7]. In this respect, it should be investigated 
what value complaints could have for regulation of healthcare quality and what 
those who report complaints to regulators themselves expect from their complaint 
in the process of healthcare quality regulation. On the other hand, patients were 
also considered to bear least responsibility for quality of care by the public in this 
study. This might undermine the goals of the reform of marketisation in healthcare 
towards more ‘active patient choice’ and more responsibility for patients. 
Furthermore, the role of patient organisations and their expected role of par- 
ticipating in decision-making processes might be at stake [3, 12, 13, 22]. In addition, 
it might indicate that the majority of the public do not favour intensive or active 
methods of ‘tripartism’ in the regulatory process, but instead support more 
collective forms of participation. This suggestion requires further research, which 
should include the public’s and patient’s perspectives. 
 
Strengths and weaknesses 
One strength of this study is its large study sample. However, the response rate 
was moderate which may have caused non-response bias. This sample is 
comparable to the Dutch population in terms of age and gender, although not with 
respect to educational level. With respect to the different background variables, we 
analysed differences in answers. Some significant differences were found in the 
answers of older and less highly educated respondents. This means that different 
opinions of subgroups among the public can exist. This should be taken into 
account when involving the public in regulation policies. 
It is striking that a considerable proportion of the respondents answered 
indifferently. This was also apparent in other studies on public perceptions of the 
Inspectorate [25, 26]. The regulator might be a ‘low interest good’, its visibility 
might be low, or respondents might have too little knowledge to answer the 
questions. However, less than 1 % answered indifferently on all items of Figs. 1 and 
2, so this does not mean that the public have no opinions or expectations about 
healthcare regulation. Furthermore, people might have or might gradually develop 
more general or common-sense ideas about the Inspectorate and its 
responsibilities, especially when it attracts media attention. Lastly, it remains 
unsure whether the same questions about healthcare, food service industry and 
education sector have equal connotations to the respondents. Therefore, the 
outcomes with respect to the comparison of the three sectors should be 
interpreted cautiously. 
The public’s voice about healthcare quality regulation policies 47 
Conclusion 
 
Many countries face problems of public accountability, legitimacy and transparency 
of regulators. To tackles these issues, it is important that the values of regulatory 
policies are consistent with the values of the public. This study shows that there are 
discrepancies and similarities between public opinion and regulatory policies. A 
gradual, and often mild approach with regard to imposing measures to failing care 
providers, is favoured by the majority of the public in spite of the criticism that is 
voiced in the media regarding this approach. However, the majority of the public 
do not support decentralisation of responsibilities of the regulator. This applies not 
only to healthcare, but also to other industries. Furthermore, the majority agree 
that the patients’ voice and especially their complaints should play a pivotal role in 
regulatory policies. Moreover, a form of collective participation by the general 
public or patients in the regulatory process can potentially overcome the conflict in 
values between the public and regulatory policies. It also provides information 
about ‘blind spots’. It would be worthwhile to explore which specific forms of 
involvement of the public are most suitable while taking into account differing 
opinions of subgroups, as this would provide a valuable addition to the quality 
information delivered by healthcare providers. Our study contributes to the limited 
knowledge of public opinion on government regulation policies. This knowledge is 
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Governments in several countries are facing problems concerning the 
accountability of regulators in health care. Questions have been raised about how 
patients’ complaints should be valued in the regulatory process. However, it is not 
known what patients who made complaints expect to achieve in the process of 
health-care quality regulation. 
 
Objective 




Interviews were conducted with 11 people, and a questionnaire was submitted to 
343 people who complained to the Dutch Health-care Inspectorate. The 
Inspectorate handled 92 of those complaints. This decision was based on the idea 




The response rate was 54%. Self-reported severity of physical injury of complaints 
that were not handled was significantly lower than of complaints that were. Most 
respondents felt that their complaint indicated a structural and severe problem 
that the Inspectorate should act upon. The desire for penalties or personal 
satisfaction played a lesser role. Only a minority felt that their complaint had led to 
improvements in health-care quality. 
 
Conclusions 
Patients and the regulator share a common goal: improving health-care quality. 
However, patients’ perceptions of the complaints’ relevance differ from the 
regulator’s perceptions. Regulators should favour more responsive approaches, 
going beyond assessing against exclusively clinical standards to identify the range 
of social problems associated with complaints about health care. Long-term 
learning commitment through public participation mechanisms can enhance 
accountability and improve the detection of problems in health care. 
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Introduction 
 
In a number of countries, high-profile incidents in health care have led to critical re-
examinations of the roles of regulators. Governments are facing problems 
concerning organizational failures, public confidence in regulators and 
accountability of regulators [1-7]. One widely discussed incident is the Mid 
Staffordshire Trust hospital scandal in the UK. In this case, several regulatory 
agencies including the government failed to respond to various emerging signals 
including patient complaints. Major lapses in health-care quality remained 
unnoticed, and mortality rates increased between 2005 and 2009 due to appalling 
care [3, 4]. It was concluded that ‘complaints were not given a high enough priority 
in identifying issues and learning lessons’ [4]. The approach taken by the regulator 
gave the appearance of looking for reasons for not taking action rather than acting 
in the public interest. Public confidence in the regulator and the health-care system 
could therefore not be maintained [4, 8]. Other countries such as New Zealand, the 
USA and the Netherlands are facing similar problems with public confidence, and it 
has become more important that there should be reform in safety cultures that 
deal with public demands for greater accountability from health services and 
regulators [5,9,10]. Furthermore, political attention for the use of information from 
patients, including complaints, and improving public participation in regulatory 
processes has increased [6, 8, 11, 12]. This development can be seen in the way 
that increased attention is now being paid to reinforcing patient’s positions in 
health care [13]. 
Complaints by patients in general and utilization of such complaints for 
regulating health-care quality are much debated topics in many countries. 
However, we were concerned to note that no research has been performed on 
what patients with complaints expect from a regulator. 
 
This article therefore aimed to seek an answer to the following questions, using the 
Dutch situation as a case study:1 
• What is the subject and nature of complaints submitted by patients to 
the Dutch Health-care Inspectorate? 
1 This study was carried out independently of the Dutch Health-care Inspectorate. Cooperation was 
provided by the Inspectorate through selecting and contacting complainants for this study, to protect 
their privacy 
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• How do patients with complaints rate the severity of the physical harm 
that has been carried out? And are differences observed between 
patients whose complaints were and were not handled by the 
Inspectorate? 
• What outcome do patients who submitted complaints to the 
Inspectorate expect from the complaint handling, and are there 
differences between the aforementioned groups (handled and not 
handled)? 
• Are those expectations met? 
 
The following sections address the theoretical concepts underlying regulation 
policies, current policies in the Netherlands regarding complaints about regulatory 
processes, followed by the Methods, Results, Discussion and Conclusions. 
 
Theoretical framework: regulation, public participation and complaints 
Internationally, the ‘responsive regulation’ theory of Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) 
is the basis for regulation policies in various industries such as finance, 
environmental businesses and health care. This theory assumes that the 
relationship between the regulator and regulated parties is based on co-operation 
and trust. Regulation based on distrust would only lead to more penalties being 
imposed and therefore requires more capacity on the part of the regulator and 
ultimately leads to higher societal costs. Regulatory compliance is encouraged 
firstly by using more lightweight measures such as persuasion and secondly by 
applying more weighty measures in the case of riskier behaviour by the regulated 
parties. This principle is also known as ‘the stick or the carrot’ [14]. Another 
important element of the theory is ‘tripartism’, whereby a third group such as 
patients or consumers is involved in the regulatory process.  
This is proposed as an approach for empowering public interest groups by 
giving them a voice and letting them participate. This ought also to enhance the 
legitimacy and accountability of a regulator. Furthermore, it could prevent 
regulatory capture and value conflicts between different stakeholders [1, 14-17]. 
The use of patients’ complaints for regulatory purposes can be considered as a 
form of tripartism in which the services learn from their users. Research has 
already shown that complaints can add value to regular regulatory monitoring 
systems [18-20]. 
When comparing different complaints procedures with different goals such as 
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individual complainant satisfaction or disciplinary complaint procedures, 
complainants seem rather unanimous in what they expect of the procedures. For 
most people, it is important that their sense of justice is restored and that the 
problem is prevented from recurring [21-24]. However, the majority of 
complainants believe that no changes are made in response to their complaint [21, 
22, 25]. 
 
Complaints in the Dutch regulatory system 
Internationally, changing political views on approaches to governance and 
regulation have resulted in shifts from centralized to decentralized systems, with 
governmental authorities retreating and leaving responsibility to those in the field 
[2, 13, 26]. In the Netherlands, those changing views resulted in the adoption of the 
Quality Act in 1996, placing responsibility for healthcare quality primarily with care 
providers. This responsibility also includes handling individual complaints from 
patients about health care. The Dutch Health-care Inspectorate is an independent 
part of the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sports and is mandated to supervise 
and regulate health-care quality. The Inspectorate supervises compliance with 
obligations imposed by legislation, assuming that care providers have an intrinsic 
motivation to act rationally and socially responsibly, according to the theory of 
responsive regulation [14]. It is possible for patients to register complaints about 
health care with the Inspectorate. The statutory tasks of the Inspectorate do not let 
it give individual judgments about complaints. Instead, it uses complaints for 
general risk analyses. Complaints are only eligible for handling by the Inspectorate 
and further investigation when complaints meet the following specific criteria: 
severe deviation from the applicable professional standards by professional or 
other employees within the institution, severe failure or the absence of an internal 
quality system at an institution, severe harm to health or a high probability of 
recurrence of the problem [27]. If the complaint meets one of the criteria, the 
Inspectorate firstly entrusts the care provider in question to investigate the 
problem, which is in line with the theory of responsive regulation. If necessary, the 
Inspectorate starts its own investigation. If the complaint does not meet any of the 
criteria, the Inspectorate must ensure that the complainant receives information 
about other options for obtaining a judgment [27, 28]. 
The Inspectorate receives approximately 1400 complaints by patients each year 
of which the majority are not handled by the Inspectorate, given its statutory task 
[28]. However, as in the UK, it was argued that the Inspectorate does not take 
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patients and their complaints seriously and does not value patients’ complaints as 
signalling deeper problems [2, 4, 29-31]. It was stated in political debates and by 
the Dutch ombudsman that the patients and their complaints deserve more 
attention and should be involved in regulation policies to reflect patients’ needs 
[29-31]. Previous research demonstrated that the Dutch general public also agreed 
that patients’ complaints should be an important source of information for 





In this study, existing questionnaires developed in previous studies among 
complainants at complaint boards and disciplinary boards were used to develop a 
new questionnaire. Interviews were conducted with complainants at the 
Inspectorate to examine whether those questionnaires were applicable to this 
target group. 
 
Development of the questionnaire 
The questionnaire that was developed was mainly based upon questionnaires used 
in previous research about expectations and experiences of complainants in health 
care (to complaint boards and disciplinary boards) [33-35]. The design of those 
questionnaires was driven by the theory of procedural, distributive and 
interactional justice [36]. Information from the interviews was used to adjust the 
questionnaire specifically to the characteristics of the regulator. Interviews were 
conducted with people who had made a complaint to the Inspectorate to identify 
whether the questionnaires would also apply to this setting. The Inspectorate 
contacted a sample of 25 people with complaints about a wide variety of health-
care sectors, who could then voluntarily sign up for the interviews with the first 
author. Eleven people signed up. During five interviews, a second interviewee 
participated. In total, nine males and seven females were interviewed. Subjects of 
the complaints were hospital care, ambulance services, mental health care, 
pharmacy, care for disabled and nursing homes. Respondents could indicate their 
preference for the interview location. Most chose to be interviewed at their home. 
Three interviews were conducted by telephone. The interview consisted of open 
questions using a topic list. Questions were focused on the complaint itself, the 
reasons for submitting the complaint to the Inspectorate, the expectations and the 
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experiences when reporting to the Inspectorate. Interviews lasting 30–100 min 
were recorded with permission of the interviewee. After the interview, the 
recordings were listened again, and a summarizing report was made and sent to 
the interviewee for approval. New themes derived from the interview reports were 
added to the questionnaire. New themes included for instance expectations 
regarding measures that lie within the competence of the Inspectorate as opposed 
to complaint boards, health-care sectors other than hospitals and subjects that can 
be complained about (e.g. complaints procedure of complaint boards at hospitals). 
Face validity and content validity were assessed by submitting the questionnaire to 
two of the people who had been interviewed previously and three employees 
working at the complaints desk of the Dutch Health-care Inspectorate, because of 
their experience with communicating with patients with complaints. 
The questionnaire contained three domains: 
(i) characteristics of the person and complaint (subject and severity of physical 
injury); (ii) peoples’ motives and expectations when reporting to the Inspectorate; 
and (iii) what is achieved by reporting. Severity of physical injury caused by the 
situation the complaint was about was measured on a 5-point scale (1 = no physical 
injury, 2 = slight physical injury, 3 = severe physical injury, 4 = permanent physical 
injury, 5 = death). The questions about expectations were in the form of 
statements for which respondents could indicate how important the specific 
statement was to them. Subsequently, respondents were asked to what degree 
they felt that these statements actually applied (experiences). People’s 
expectations making the complaint (from ‘not important’ to ‘most important’) and 
experiences with the reporting (from ‘no’ to ‘yes’) were measured on a 4-point 
scale. According to the theory of responsive regulation, milder to more severe 
measures that could be taken by the Inspectorate were included to assess whether 
respondents agree with the stick or carrot approach. Examples of the questions 
about the expectations are ‘I made my complaint to the Inspectorate because I 
wanted to improve quality of care’ or ‘I made my complaint to the Inspectorate 
because I wanted the care provider in question to be punished’. Subsequently, 
examples of the questions about experiences are ‘Making my complaint to the 
Inspectorate led to the quality of care being improved’ or ‘Making my complaint to 
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Selection of the study population 
The questionnaire was sent to all 343 people who submitted a complaint to the 
Inspectorate between August 2012 and November 2012. 
Several inclusion criteria were formulated as follows: 
• The complaint has to be submitted by a member of the public/patient, 
not a care provider. 
• The complaint must be about health care (so general questions or 
complaints about the Inspectorate itself were excluded). 
• Handling of the complaint must be closed from the perspective of the 
Inspectorate, and the complainant had to have been informed about 
the closure by letter, so as to minimize the risk of respondents 
assuming that their response would have an impact on how their 
complaint would be dealt with. 
 
An employee of the Inspectorate ensured the complaints met the inclusion criteria. 
As described earlier, the Inspectorate is expected to only handle complaints by 
members of the public when they are severe or structural. Therefore, based on the 
information from the Inspectorate, two groups could be distinguished within the 
sample in advance: members of the public whose complaints were handled by the 
Inspectorate (n = 92, 27%) and those whose complaints were not handled by the 
Inspectorate (n = 251, 73%), because of the considerations mentioned earlier. 
Two reminders were sent. After this, the response rate was modest (47%). A 
substantially abridged questionnaire was sent by post to non-responders; 29 
respondents dropped out because their addresses were incorrect, the person had 
moved, or the person was deceased. The response is shown in a flow chart (Fig. 1). 
 




























The protocol for this study was submitted to an external Medical Research Ethics 
Committee for formal ethical approval. This committee concluded that formal 
ethical approval for this study was not required according to Dutch law, as the 
study does not involve a medical intervention. Privacy was guaranteed because 
research data and addresses and names were kept separate. Questionnaires were 
sent by post by the Inspectorate itself. The questionnaires contained unique coded 
usernames and passwords, giving respondents the opportunity to complete the 
questionnaire online. It was stressed that people were entirely free to decide 
whether or not to complete the questionnaire and they could return the 
Total number of patients’ complaints made to 
the inspectorate between the 1st of August 2012 
and the 1st of November 2012: 343 
Questionnaires sent to patients 
whose complaint was handled: 92 
Questionnaires sent to patients whose 
complaint was not handled: 251 
Response: 54 
(net 62%) 
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questionnaire to the researchers anonymously. It was explicitly stated that their 
individual answers to the questionnaire would not be revealed to the Inspectorate. 
The researcher kept a list of respondent codes that were also printed on each 
questionnaire, and the Inspectorate kept a list with the same codes and the 
associated names and addresses. This allowed response rates to be monitored and 
reminders could be sent by the Inspectorate to non-responders. The list of codes 
was destroyed after 6 months. 
 
Statistical analyses 
Statistical analyses were conducted using the software program STATA version 13 
(Stata-Corp., College Station, Texas, USA). Background characteristics of the study 
population were compared to the characteristics of the Dutch population [37]. 
Population characteristics and nature of the complaints are presented 
descriptively. Differences in severity of physical injury between the two groups 
(those whose complaints were and were not handled) were calculated using t-tests 
to compare means. 
Exploratory factor analysis (principal component analysis) with varimax rotation 
was carried out to identify latent relationships between the expectation variables. 
Communalities, eigenvalues, scree plots, explained variance and factor loadings 
were examined to determine the factor structure. The Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin (KMO) 
test and Bartlett’s test of sphericity were conducted with the purpose of confirming 
the adequacy of the sample for this analysis. Items with a factor loading ≥0.40 were 
included in scales. Reliability of the scales was assessed using Crohnbach’s alpha. 
New variables were created for the scales to calculate mean scores of importance. 
Missing values, which were mostly related to respondents who completed the 
short questionnaire, were left out. Differences between the scores of the groups 
whose complaints were and were not handled were analysed using t-tests. 
Differences were considered significant if p < 0.05. Percentages of which 
expectations are actually met according to the respondents were calculated by 
adding scores 3 and 4 of each variable. 
  
 
Patients’ perspectives on the role of their complaints in the regulatory process 63 
Results 
 
The response rate to the questionnaire was 54%. Basic study population 
characteristics are shown in Table 1. Background characteristics are not available 
for all respondents. Slightly more than half of the respondents were female. 
Relatively more respondents were aged 40–64 than in the Dutch population at 
large. The study population consisted of relatively more well-educated people and 
relatively few people with ethnic backgrounds other than Dutch. 
 
Table 1 Background characteristics of the respondents (n = 127–131) 









Gender 128   
Female 70 55 51 
Male 58 45 49 
Age 129   
18-39 16 12 34 
40-64 79 61 45 
65 and older 34 26 21 
Educational level 127   
Low (none primary school or pre-vocational 
education 
30 24 30* 
Middle (secondary or vocational education) 37 29 40* 
High (professional higher education of university) 60 47 28* 
Unknown  - 2 
Ethnicity 131   
Dutch 127 97 79 
Other 4 3 21 
*These percentages apply to the Dutch population aged 15–65 in 2012. 
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Nature and subject of complaints 
Table 2 shows the type of care that complaints made to the Inspectorate were 
about. Three types of care were complained about most often: 22% about nursing 
homes and residential care, 19% about hospital care and 19% about mental health 
care. Fewer than 15% of the complaints were about care provided by general 
practitioners, care for disabled patients, care in private clinics, care involving 
medical technology, home care, dental care, community care, drug therapy or 
physical therapy. 
 
Table 2 Type of care that complaints made to the Inspectorate were about 
Type of care complaint is about N = 133 (%) 
Nursing homes/residential care 22 
Hospital care 19 
Mental care 19 
Drug therapy 14 
General practitioner 11 
Care for disabled 8 
Private clinic 7 
Medical technology 5 
Home care 4 
Community care 2 
Physical therapy 1 
Other 18 
 
Four of ten (39%) respondents submitted complaints concerning interpersonal 
conduct, and 37% of the complaints involved medical treatment (Table 3). 
However, almost all complaints about interpersonal conduct were submitted in 
combination with another subject. One of five respondents complained about a 
lack of information, quality of nursing care or collaboration between care 
providers. Other complaints concerned the complaints procedure of the care 
provider, organizational aspects or sexual harassment. A substantial proportion of 
respondents used the ‘other’ category and the accompanying option for an open 
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Table 3 Subject of complaints made to the Inspectorate 
Subject of complaint N = 133 (%) 
Interpersonal conduct 39 
Medical treatment 37 
Information or education 23 
Nursing care 22 
Collaboration between care providers 22 
Complaints procedure 14 
Organizational aspects 10 
Sexual harassment 9 
Other 38 
 
In more than half of the cases (52%), another person was involved in the complaint 
than the complainant themselves, for instance spouse, child, parent or grandparent 
(not in table). 
The severity of the physical injury caused differed significantly between the two 
groups: respondents whose complaints were handled reported an average of 2.9 
on a 5-point scale, while respondents whose complaints were not handled reported 
an average of 2.1 (not in table). 
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Box 1 Examples of complaints by respondents (handled and not handled), 
 derived from open answer option 
Not handled: 
Poor hygiene on the nursing ward. Cleaners who do not understand the word ‘cleaning’. Nurses who 
do not wash their hands. 
Tubes with blood were left unattended in the hallway. 
Medication that my cardiologist says I have to use (because of a metal cardiac valve) was not 
delivered. As a result, I had to go to the hospital urgently with the ambulance because of heart 
problems. 
Errors were regularly made with medication, wrong dose of insulin, wrong antibiotics, for example 
after switching the type of antibiotics, the old one was given. It seems as if the referrals do not 
happen. 
Cardiologist kept practicing although he was banned. Patients were not informed. 




Wrong insulin injection, several times. Wet pyjamas, not changed 3 times a day [...] Eating times 
forgotten, food and drinks left for days [...] 
That pregnyl could not be obtained through the regular channels, but through web shops for 
bodybuilders. 
The call made by a child to 911 was not accepted three times. After twelve hours, I alerted 911 again. 
Then, they reacted. 
Title misuse, fraud. 
Aggressive cleaning products are within reach for the clients at bath times. 
 
 
Expectations from submitting complaints to the Inspectorate 
Table 4 shows the factor analysis conducted for the expectation variables. The 
KMO test of sampling adequacy and Bartlett’s test of sphericity were used for 
confirming the adequacy of the sample for the analysis. The obtained values were 
0.832 and 0.000, respectively. The factor analysis produced three meaningful 
scales, clearly distinguishing between different perspectives. The first scale refers 
to the consequences for the care provider (6 items, a = 0.85, explained variance 
65%). The second scale refers to the public domain: the quality of health care in 
general (4 items, a = 0.77, explained variance 25%). The third scale refers to the 
individual domain: the benefits of complaining for the person that made the 
complaint (4 items, a = 0.79, explained variance 9%). Two items were excluded 
from the scales because they seem to be more general and less tangible 
consequences of making a complaint to the Inspectorate. One of them, ‘to prevent 
the complaint from remaining indoors’ (avg score of importance: 2.9), did not fit in 
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any of the scales. The other one, ‘to ensure the complaint to be taken up at a 
higher level’ (avg score of importance: 3.3), cross-loaded on two of the three 
scales. Table 4 also shows average scores of importance according to respondents 
of the specific expectations and the three scales developed. Furthermore, the 
expectations are shown separately for the two groups (complaint handled vs. not 
handled). Expectations regarding the dimension ‘benefits for quality of care in 
general’ were considered most important by respondents, followed by 
expectations regarding ‘personal benefits’. Expectations regarding ‘specific 
consequences for the care provider’ were considered to be least important. A 
significant difference was only found between the two groups for one item 
(financial compensation for the damage to be offered). 
 
Experiences when submitting complaints to the Inspectorate 
Figure 2 shows which aspects respondents felt had been achieved by making their 
complaint to the Inspectorate. A distinction was made between respondents 
whose complaints were handled by the Inspectorate and those whose complaints 
were not. Large differences were seen between the two groups. Respondents 
whose complaints were handled indicated that aspects were achieved more often 
than respondents whose complaints were not handled. About 50% of the 
respondents whose com- plaints were handled indicated that aspects regarding the 
dimension ‘benefits for quality of care in general’ were achieved. Fewer than 40% 
indicated that aspects regarding the other two scales were achieved (except ‘doing 
your duty’ – an aspect that respondents have more control of – which was 
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Figure 2 Percentages  of  what  is  actually  achieved  according  to  respondents  (items  were  
 measured  on  a  four-point  scale (no to yes). Percentages presented in this figure 
 are based on scores 3 and 4 of each variable 
  
0 20 40 60 80 100
...doing my duty by making a
complaint
…the department of the care 
institution being closed 
…the care provider in question being 
punished 
…a hard-hitting conversation being 
held with the care provider in question 
…the care provider in question being 
banned from working 
…financial compensation being offered 
for the damage 
…the damage being repaired 
…the same thing being prevented from 
happening to me again 
…my problem being solved 
…my sense of justice being restored 
…the safety of healthcare being 
improved 
…the quality of healthcare being 
improved 
…the same thing being prevented from 
happening to others 
…the care institution having learned 
from my complaint 
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Discussion 
 
Several countries, including at least the UK and the Netherlands, are struggling with 
accountability issues when dealing with patients and their complaints [1, 3, 4, 28-
30]. This article contributes by giving insights into what role patients themselves 
expect their complaints to have in the regulatory process. Complaints of patients in 
this study were mostly about nursing homes, hospital care and mental health care. 
Most prevalent subjects of complaints were the medical treatment and 
interpersonal conduct, although the latter most often in combination with another 
subject. The self-reported severity of the physical injury was significantly higher 
among patients whose complaints were handled by the Inspectorate. By reporting 
their complaint to the Inspectorate, patients aim to improve quality of health care. 
However, a minority felt this has been accomplished. 
 
Expectations 
Three main dimensions became apparent in what patients with complaints expect 
from a regulator: expectations regarding consequences for the care provider in 
question, personal benefits and benefits for quality of health care. Mean 
importance of the expectation scales was measured on a 4-point scale (1 = not 
important, 4 = most important). This means that a score of 1.5 would be the 
neutral point on the scale and every score above 1.5 can be considered important. 
Most items were therefore considered important by respondents to some extent, 
but gradations can be distinguished. Expectations regarding improving quality of 
care were considered most important by respondents. Furthermore, personal 
benefits and consequences for the care provider were seen as less important. 
Particularly rigorous consequences are less favoured by respondents, which is in 
line with the stick or carrot principle of the theory of responsive regulation [14]. 
The expectations largely correspond to what people expect of other complaints 
procedures, although slight variations can be observed. Complainants to complaint 
boards indicated that personal benefits were more important compared to 
complainants to the regulator. The same applied to complainants to disciplinary 
boards: consequences for the care provider were considered more important 
compared to what is important for complainants to the regulator [21, 24]. 
The majority of the complaints by the study population (73%) are not handled 
by the Inspectorate. The self-reported severity of physical injury in complaints that 
are not handled is lower than for complaints that are handled by the Inspectorate. 
 
72 Chapter 3 
The Inspectorate and complainants’ estimates of the severity of physical injuries 
seem to correspond. However, no differences were found between the 
expectations of the two groups. This means that despite the severity of physical 
injury involved in the complaint, complainants’ perceptions of the relevance of 
complaints differ from what the regulators perceive. People feel that their 
complaint indicates deeper structural problems that can recur. Sharpe and Faden 
[9] have already argued that current patient safety evaluations tend ‘to reflect a 
narrowly clinical interpretation of harm that excludes non-clinical or non-disease-
specific outcomes that the patient may consider harmful’. As seen in other studies 
[38-41], these results stress the importance of recognizing that lay people have 




As in other studies about complainants’ expectations [22, 23], this study found a 
gap between what complainants expect and what is achieved by submitting their 
complaint. For many respondents, it was unclear whether submitting their 
complaint had led to improvements, although this was their main driving force 
behind making a complaint. Although it is not surprising that what is achieved 
differs widely between the two groups, it should be noted that the group whose 
complaints were handled also felt that little was achieved by reporting to the 
Inspectorate. Previous research among complainants to hospital complaint boards 
revealed that most patients were not kept informed about the measures taken in 
response to their complaints [22]. These results stress the need for complaint 
handlers to invest more in feeding back information to complainants about what 
actions were taken as a result of their complaint. 
The respondents in this study seem to feel a sense of duty to make their 
complaints. They want to contribute to the improvement of quality of care and 
prevent recurrence. This indicates that they feel that they are a stakeholder in the 
process of improving health-care quality and want to be involved. Other research 
among patients who experienced medical errors shows that those patients often 
have strong opinions and views about patient safety, accountability and system 
reforms [7, 25]. 
Negative experiences of patients internationally created the demand for 
reforming safety cultures at care institutions. However, research suggests that 
those experiences have been neglected in patient safety reforms, due to power 
 
Patients’ perspectives on the role of their complaints in the regulatory process 73 
imbalances that exist between patients and care providers [7, 11]. 
 
Using complaints for regulation 
In this study, the complaints also concerned the ‘softer’ or non-clinical aspects of 
caring, such as interpersonal conduct. Patients provide ‘soft intelligence’ – 
information about blind spots that care providers are unaware of [5] – and the 
added value that this has for traditional monitoring systems such as incident 
reporting systems and regulatory visits has been proved [20]. However, as the 
majority of the complaints in this study were not handled because the regulator is 
not there to deal with individual complaints, consideration should be given to 
whether complaints could be used more effectively for regulating health-care 
quality systematically. Research has demonstrated that most medical errors never 
result in a complaint, so cases where individual complaints are submitted provide a 
valuable window on patient safety in general [18, 19]. Actually, the Mid 
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Public Inquiry showed that individual 
complaints provided important signals for dramatic system failures [4], and it was 
recommended that complaints should be included in the regulatory process [8]. In 
addition, it has already been stressed that setting up continuous and non-sporadic 
public participation mechanisms and long-term learning commitment are essential 
for good regulatory design and would ensure accountability [1, 14-17]. 
 
Strengths and weaknesses 
The response rate in this study was modest, even after sending two reminders and 
a shortened questionnaire. There is therefore a risk of response bias. Non-response 
analysis was not possible because no characteristics of the non-respondents are 
available, in part due to meticulous privacy regulations. Some respondents 
contacted us with questions about the study. Others indicated that completing the 
questionnaire made them uncomfortable because it revived the situation that the 
complaint was about. This could be an important reason for the non-response. 
Another reason could be that filing the complaint itself had already cost much 
effort, making people reluctant to participate. 
The study population was not large; however, power was sufficient for the 
statistical analyses. Furthermore, the study population is older and more highly 
educated than the general Dutch population. This might be explained by the fact 
that this specific group feel more empowered to make their complaint to the 
regulator. Another observation is that respondents often chose the ‘other’ answer 
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category and used the option of adding details about their complaint in open 
answer categories. This emphasizes the complexity and diversity of the complaints, 





Complaints by patients and the use of complaints for regulation of health-care 
quality are widely discussed topics in many countries. We were, however, 
concerned to note that no research has been carried out on what patients with 
complaints expect from a regulator. Patients with complaints and the Dutch 
Health-care Inspectorate share a common goal: improving the quality of health 
care. Patients feel that they are a stakeholder in the process of regulating health-
care quality. The Inspectorate is not there to handle individual complaints. Patients 
who file a complaint with the Inspectorate seem to be aware of this, as evidenced 
by the low need expectations regarding personal satisfaction among patients who 
made complaints. The self-reported severity of physical injuries caused was lower 
among complaints that were not handled, which is in line with the severity-based 
assessment of the Inspectorate. However, patients’ perceptions of the relevance of 
their complaint differ from what the regulators perceive. Furthermore, only a 
minority felt that their complaint led to improvements, which was the primary 
reason for patients making complaints. To improve this, the value of complaints for 
regulation could be disclosed at an aggregate level. Regulators should move away 
from traditional standardized procedures and favour more responsive and strategic 
approaches for responding to complainants. This approach needs to go beyond 
assessing against exclusively clinical standards to identify the range of social 
problems associated with complaints about health care. 
Long-term learning commitment through public participation mechanisms can 
have the effect of enhancing accountability and improving the detection of 
problems in health care. It is therefore worthwhile to explore which specific forms 
(including the use of complaints) are most desirable to the public, most suitable 
and provide a valuable addition to the regulatory process. A thorough examination 
should be made of what information complaints by patients contain and what they 
can contribute to existing monitoring systems. How to collect and utilize 
complaints data to improve the quality of health care at the system level is a 
challenge that it would be worth exploring. 
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After some high profile incidents in several countries, the attention for the 
reporting and use of patients’ complaints by healthcare quality regulators is 
increasing. However, there are no standardised techniques for analysing  
complaints, covering a wide array of healthcare sectors. Moreover, research on 
complaint analyses (including reliability analyses) is scarce. We aimed to provide a 
taxonomy for healthcare quality regulators, in order to encode complaints, and 
empirically test that taxonomy to determine its reliability. 
 
Methods 
An existing taxonomy from Reader et al. was developed into a taxonomy that is 
more broadly applicable to the regulatory setting of a wide array of healthcare 
sectors (18 different sectors). A sample of 364 complaints received by the Dutch 
Healthcare Inspectorate was selected to further develop and test the taxonomy by 
two raters. Percentage agreement and Cohen’s kappa was calculated to determine 
inter-rater reliability of the taxonomy. 
 
Results 
The final taxonomy consists of 3 domains, 6 main categories and 29 subcategories, 
and a separate domain for complex complaints that include more than three 
themes. Reliability of four main categories was substantial (quality & safety, human 
rights, organisational & institutional problems, complex complaints), and reliability 
of two main categories was moderate (communication, timing & accessibility). The 
mean kappa of the taxonomy on main category level was 0.64 (range 0.50-0.75). 
 
Conclusions 
The taxonomy turns out to be a substantially reliable instrument for encoding 
patients’ complaints about a broad diversity of healthcare sectors. An explanation 
for moderate kappa values could be that assessment of complaints is subjective 
and many complaints are multifactorial and unstructured. In contrast with other 
patient safety studies focused on adverse events, this taxonomy is able to capture 
the ‘softer’ or non-clinical aspects of caring that are important to patients. 
Standardised coding of patients’ complaints permits consistent and reliable 
documentation, which could help make regulators more accountable.  The 
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taxonomy could be used by regulators for analysing patients’ complaints, 
transforming this from a regular compliance activity into opportunities for quality 





In several countries, some high profile incidents signalled by patients have been 
highlighted in the media. Criticisms expressed were often directed at regulators’ 
failure to respond to patients’ complaints. Attention for the use of patients’ 
complaints for regulating healthcare quality has therefore increased [1-5]. 
Complaints often mention aspects that are not detected by traditional monitoring 
systems [6-10]. In the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust scandal case, for 
example, individual complaints indicated dramatic system failures [11]. In the 
evaluation of this case, it was recommended that a greater role should be given to 
complaints within the regulatory process [2]. The Care Quality Commission has 
expressed commitment to pay more attention to patient complaints within its 
regulation policies [12]. In the Netherlands as well, the regulator was criticised for 
not responding adequately to complaints. The Dutch Healthcare Inspectorate 
receives approximately 1400 complaints from the general public every year of 
which the majority are only received and not handled by the inspectorate (for more 
information, see box 1) [13]. However, politicians and the Dutch ombudsman 
stated that patients and their complaints should be involved in regulation policies 
in order to reflect their needs and problems [14, 15]. Similar developments can be 
seen in other countries such as Australia and the UK, where awareness for public 
participation and including complaints in regulation policies is increasing [1, 2, 12, 
16-19]. 
 
Using complaint datasets 
Aggregated analysis of complaint datasets by regulators could serve several goals. 
It would add to the range of regulatory tools used for monitoring and improving 
healthcare systems [20]. Complaints concern not only adverse events and 
incidents, but also include a variety of problems that patients think should be 
prevented from recurring and can be learned from [21]. Furthermore, reporting 
about complaint data to society could contribute to the public accountability of 
regulators, because it might give patients reason to feel more confident about how 
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their complaints influenced the healthcare system [20, 21]. However, there are no 
standardised techniques for analysing complaints by patients in terms of regulating 
patient safety and covering a wide array of types of healthcare [22, 23]. Besides, 
research into complaint analyses, including reliability analysis which is standard in 
research into adverse events and their contributory factors of, is as yet scarce [24-
26]. We therefore investigated the possibility of providing such a reliable 
standardisation technique in terms of a taxonomy for the use by healthcare quality 
regulators in practice, in order to encode patients’ complaints about various 
healthcare sectors (see box 1) and use those for regulatory purposes on aggregate 
level, complementary to the handling of individual complaints. Furthermore, we 
empirically tested the taxonomy in order to determine its reliability, using the 
Netherlands as a case study. 
 
Testing a taxonomy 
Recently, Reader et al. (2014) developed a taxonomy for standardising the analysis 
of patient complaints, with the aim of supporting research and practice in analysing 
information reported in patient complaint letters. In his article, 59 studies on 
complaints from primarily hospital patients were analysed. These were conducted 
in various countries [27, 28], including the Netherlands, covering about 88,000 
complaints in total. The taxonomy differentiates between clinical, management 
and relationship domains. This classification corresponds to sociological theories 
about conflicts between the macrosystem and life world within medical systems 
[29], human factors theory on how humans interact with complex systems [30], 
and dialogical and intersubjectivity theories on the relation between people’s 
perspectives and how those are shaped [31]. The three domains are subdivided 
into seven main categories (quality, safety, institutional issues, timing & access, 
communication, humaneness/caring, patients’ rights) and those are subdivided 
into 26 subcategories. Reliability and usability of the taxonomy was not assessed, 
but the authors recommended those assessments [23]. Therefore, in this study, we 
took Reader’s taxonomy, and further developed it and assessed its reliability. To 
make it reliable and applicable for the use by an Inspectorate some adaptations 
were needed. Firstly, it is based mostly on complaints in hospitals, whereas the 
Dutch HealthCare Inspectorate supervises a wide array of different healthcare 
sectors (see box 1). Secondly, the taxonomy was not developed with regulation 
policies in mind, this required the addition of a few sub-categories, referring to the 
upholding of specific legislation.  
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Box 1 Complaint handling by the Dutch Healthcare Inspectorate 
In the Netherlands, the Dutch Healthcare Inspectorate is the appointed body for supervision 
and regulation of the quality of healthcare. It is an independent part of the Ministry of 
Health, Welfare and Sports. Both care providers and the public can report incidents or lodge 
complaints with the Inspectorate. The Inspectorate receives about 1500 complaints of 
patients about all healthcare sectors a year [32]. The following care providers are involved: 
medical specialist somatic care/hospital care, mental healthcare, inpatient elderly care,  care 
for disabled persons, pharmaceutist, dental care, general practitioner, private 
clinic/independent medical centre, alternative care, paramedical care/rehabilitation, home 
care, child welfare care, forensic healthcare, emergency care, manufacturer/medical 
technology company, public healthcare, integrated care (cross-sectoral), and manufacturer 
medicines/pharmaceutical company. However, it is not the Inspectorate’s statutory task to 
handle complaints from individual patients unless the complaints refer are structural or very 
severe [33]. The Complaint Act (introduced in 1995) requires all healthcare providers to 
install easily accessible independent complaint committees.   
Previous research showed that patients’ motivations for reporting their complaints to the 
Inspectorate are primarily to improve quality of healthcare and prevent the problem from 
happening to others. Furthermore, patients seemed to be aware of the fact that the 





Selection of complaints 
All complaints received by the Dutch Healthcare Inspectorate from the general 
public are recorded in a software program. Complaints received between 
1 August 2012 and 31 October 2012 were studied, resulting in a total sample of 436 
complaints. Complaints are usually made in writing (by letter, e-mail, or a 
standardised form on the Inspectorate’s website). This document was regarded as 
the initial complaint and used for extracting data for this study. 
Complaints made by professionals (often employees of a healthcare provider), 
complaints for the Disciplinary Board, complaints not about healthcare, or 
complaints in a language other than Dutch (because of the risk of interpretation 
difficulties) were excluded. This concerned 77 complaints. Five complaints were 
added to the dataset because the complaint letter included two different parts 
about different care providers. The final sample thus contained 364 complaints, 
including all healthcare sectors in the Netherlands. 
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Coding of the complaints 
Additions to the taxonomy of Reader et al. were made firstly based on the 
researchers’ knowledge of the field of work of the Dutch Inspectorate, and earlier 
research among complainants at the regulator [21]. 
Two raters (RB and an external rater) coded 364 complaints received by the 
Dutch Healthcare Inspectorate using content analysis. A detailed instruction for the 
raters was set up in order to obtain a homogenous assessment procedure. 
Extensive preparation of raters is widely acknowledged to be an important 
condition for a valid assessment process. Rater preparation included extensive 
discussion of the assessment framework, helping raters to recognise evidence and 
distinguish different categories [34]. The instructions and the taxonomy were first 
tested using 50 initial complaints. They were then adapted based on the 
experiences of the raters. 
The remaining complaints were coded in three more sessions. The two raters 
assessed and coded the complaints independently. The raters made notes about 
themes that were difficult to code using the taxonomy and other problems that 
were encountered during coding. 
After each session of coding, the percentage agreement and Cohen’s kappa were 
calculated; differences were discussed by the raters and the category system was 
revised and adapted as necessary.  
The taxonomy achieved its definitive form after coding of 162 complaints. The 
last 197 complaints were coded by the two raters using the final taxonomy. The 
first 167 complaints were then recoded by the two raters using the final taxonomy, 
and final kappa values were calculated.  
 
Coding procedure 
A fixed order for coding was provided to ensure that all categories were 
systematically considered. It was determined that a maximum of three themes per 
complaint could be encoded, as this was found to be a sufficient number of themes 
for most of the complaints. Montini et al. found that patient complaints averaged 
1.5 codes, ranging from 1 to 9 codes per complaint [22]. Similarly, Reader et al. 
found an average of 1.49 issues per complaint, with a range of 1.05 to 3.19 [23]. 
Therefore, the maximum of three codes per complaint, taking into account our goal 
of an aggregated overview of complaints, seemed justified. Furthermore, this 
would keep the coding process and statistical calculations manageable. If a 
complaint contained more than three themes, it was coded as a ‘complex 
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complaint’. Themes within complaints were coded using the order of the 
taxonomy; if applicable, first, themes within the clinical domain were coded, 
second themes within the relationship domain, and third themes within the 
management domain. Furthermore, the most specific categories within a domain 
were moved upwards within the taxonomy, so that the raters were encouraged to 
consider the more specific categories first.  
 
Statistical analyses 
Statistical analyses were conducted using STATA version 13. New variables were 
created to determine the frequencies (at least once) of the main categories within 
the complaints that each rater coded. Inter-rater reliability was analysed by 
calculating percentage agreement and a Cohen’s kappa (κ) statistic for each main 
category. The kappa statistic is the most commonly used measure for reliability. 
The kappa was developed to adjust for guessing by raters, but the assumptions it 
makes about rater independence and other factors are not well supported. It 
therefore may lower the estimate of agreement. However if raters have had 
training and guessing is not likely to exist, presenting the two measures should be 
safe [35]. 
 
The following standard for interpreting the magnitude of kappa was used [36]: 
≤ 0.0  Poor 
0.01 – 0.20  Slight 
0.21 – 0.40  Fair 
0.41 – 0.60  Moderate 
0.61 – 0.80  Substantial 
0.81 – 1.00  Almost perfect 
 
Frequencies of the main categories within complaints were calculated, whereby 
prevalent categories that were agreed upon in complaints were counted as 1 (i.e. a 
category is applicable to a complaint according to both raters); non-prevalent 
categories that were agreed upon were counted as 0 (i.e. a category is not 
applicable to a complaint according to both raters); and prevalent categories that 
were not agreed upon (i.e. a category is applicable according to one rater) were 
counted as 0.5. 
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Privacy 
The complaint letters were encoded in the offices of the Inspectorate, in order to 
prevent further distribution of personal information of complainants. The raters 
signed a confidentiality agreement. Personal information about the complainants 





Characteristics of the complaints 
Of the 364 selected complaints, 113 complaints (31%) were handled by the 
Inspectorate, 248 (68%) were not, with no information available for 3 complaints 
(1%). Most complaints were sent by e-mail (45%). About a quarter (27%) were sent 
using a specific form on the Inspectorate’s website, and 24% of complaints were 
sent by letter. The remaining complaints were presented by phone or fax, or no 
information was available.  
Examples of text fragments from complaints that were coded are shown in 
Box 2. The complaints often included multiple subjects.  
 

















“The family does not receive adequate information about developments in good time, […] 
medication is either not administered or it is done too late or incorrectly. [...] Staff are 
deployed for tasks for which they are untrained or not fully trained. [...] There is a structural 
shortage of skilled staff and they often work with flexible workers who have little experience 
in healthcare.” (care for disabled persons) (Subcategories involved: “medication errors”, 
“insufficient or unqualified personnel” and “incorrect, incomplete, or missing information”) 
 
“While they were busy with the preparations, my wife was asked to sign a declaration [...]. 
Under the circumstances, she had no knowledge of the content of this declaration and had 
not been informed about possible complications. In the subsequent visit [...] I asked about 
the possible complications. They could not give us an answer.” (private clinic, minor medical 
procedure to face) (Subcategories involved: “incorrect, incomplete, missing information”, 
and “consent”) 
 
“[…] I went to see my GP because of serious persistent stomach pain. A gastric acid blocker 
was subscribed. After various visits to my GP and keeping on insisting for four months, I was 
referred for colonoscopy. Colon cancer was diagnosed.” (GP) (Subcategories involved: 
“errors in diagnosis/triage”) 
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The taxonomy 
The original taxonomy of Reader et al. (2014) was adapted (see table 1 at 
appendix).  
The final taxonomy consisted of 3 domains, 6 main categories and 29 
subcategories, and a separate domain for complex complaints that included more 
than three themes. Table 1 shows the final taxonomy, where the symbols indicate 
changes made to the original taxonomy. Several specific reasons can be given for 
the adaptations made. Some subcategories were added to make the taxonomy 
applicable to care sectors other than hospitals, such as mental healthcare, 
pharmaceutical care and elderly care. For instance, a new theme that emerged in 
complaints by patients admitted to mental healthcare was “coercion and 
compulsory admission”.  
Some main and subcategories were combined because they overlapped or 
because it was difficult for the raters to distinguish between the two themes. For 
instance, the subcategories of the two main categories ‘communication’ and 
‘humaneness/caring’ in Reader’s taxonomy, were often overlapping. The same 
applied for ‘access and admission’ and ‘delays’. In addition, it was difficult for the 
raters to make a clear distinction between the main categories ‘quality’ and 
‘safety’, which is also related to the multifactorial nature of the complaints. 
Some domain and (sub)category names were reformulated to make them clearer 
and to reflect the underlying subcategories. For instance, the patients’ rights 
category was reformulated to cover human rights, because we concluded that 
complaints concerned not only patients’ rights but also fundamental human rights. 
Another example is the term “patient journey” in the taxonomy of Reader et al., 
which appeared to be rather vague. This was reformulated into “coordination and 
alignment problems”. 
Some (sub)categories were extended. For example, “medication errors” was 
extended to cover “medication” (i.e. not only medication errors but all kinds of 
problems with medication). In addition, “preference policy” was added to this 
subcategory (because insurers in the Netherlands determine which medication 
brands they reimburse, which means that patients may receive other medication 
brands from their pharmacists than they request and than they are used to). New 
themes that frequently emerged were added as new (sub)categories such as 
“inadequate record keeping” and “failure of equipment and materials”. 
Furthermore, a new subcategory “immoral/incorrect behaviour of the organisation 
or individuals within the organisation” was added to indicate cases of for instance 
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fraud, selling illegal medication, or illegal webshops. 
Furthermore, several subcategories were added covering specific legislation 
that the Inspectorate supervises.  For instance, the Inspectorate supervises 
compliance with the clients’ right to complain Act, an Act that obliges care 
providers to provide an easily accessible complaints procedure for patients. A 
subcategory was therefore added, “insufficient compliance with legislation/ 
regulations/protocols/guidelines and insufficient safeguarding of patients' rights”. 
Another Act that the Inspectorate supervises is the Individual Healthcare 
Professions Act (wet BIG), which obliges all care providers to register in order to 
provide certainty about qualifications to practice their profession. The subcategory 
“title misuse” was therefore added. 
Lastly, most descriptions of the subcategories were strengthened. 
 
Inter-rater agreement and reliability of the taxonomy 
Inter-rater agreement, reliability and 95% confidence intervals are shown for the 
final 197 complaints and the total number of 364 complaints that were coded with 
the final taxonomy (Table 2). The two ‘other’ main categories have been left out of 
the analysis, because those were scarcely used by the raters (6-10 times per rater 
per category). However, for use in practice it was considered to be useful to keep 
those categories in the taxonomy. 
The mean kappa value at the level of the six main categories as calculated for 
the final 197 complaints coded using the final taxonomy was 0.61 (range 0.45-
0.69). The final mean kappa value at the level of the six main categories as 
calculated for all 364 complaints was 0.64 (range 0.50-0.75). Kappa values of four 
main categories were deemed to be substantial. Kappa values of two main 
categories (communication and timing & accessibility) were seen as moderate. The 
mean kappa at the level of domains for all 364 complaints was 0.65 (substantial, 
range 0.61-0.69, 85% agreement avg.). The mean kappa at the level of 
subcategories for all 364 complaints was 0.56 (moderate, range 0.13-0.92, 95% 
agreement avg.). One rater assigned an average of 1.9 codes to each complaint; the 
figure for the second rater was 2.0. This means that on average 2 codes were 
assigned to each complaint. The “quality and safety” category was most prevalent 
(51%) in the complaints followed by “organisational and institutional problems” 
(38%) and “communication” (24%).  
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Table 2 Cohen’s kappa, percentages for inter-rater agreement on the final 197 
 complaints coded using the final taxonomy and the total 364 of 
































































Internationally, attention for public participation and the use of complaints in 
healthcare quality regulation policies is increasing [1, 2, 12, 16-19]. Most existing 
complaint taxonomies focus primarily on hospitals [22, 23]. However, there are no 
taxonomies for analysing complaints in a wide array of healthcare sectors on an 
aggregated level for regulatory purposes. Analysis of complaint datasets by 
regulators would add to the range of regulatory tools used for monitoring and 
improving healthcare systems [20]. Furthermore, reporting of complaint data by 
regulators could contribute to the public accountability of regulators [20, 21, 37]. In 
this study, an existing taxonomy developed by Reader et al. (2014) was further 
developed and tested in order to provide a taxonomy applicable to eighteen 
different healthcare sectors and to encode and use patient complaints for 
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regulatory purposes in practice. 
 
Reliability of the taxonomy 
In contrast to other studies of complaints analyses, inter-rater reliability was 
calculated in this study for the domains, main categories and subcategories of the 
taxonomy. The average reliability on domain and main category level of the 
taxonomy was substantial. Four main categories were also classified as having 
substantial reliability. One category had a moderate kappa value (communication) 
and one category (timing & accessibility) had a nearly substantial kappa value. The 
mean kappa value at subcategory level was moderate, which may perhaps have 
been caused by the large number of subcategories [36].  
Lower inter-rater agreement could be due to a lack of the knowledge or 
information needed for determining the subject of a complaint, or could depend on 
the backgrounds of raters. Assessment of complaints, notwithstanding extensive 
preparation, will always remain subjective [25].  
Research into inter-rater reliability of adverse events analysis has shown that 
higher inter-rater agreements are found when assessments are based on explicitly 
defined criteria [24]. However, other authors who conducted analyses of 
complaints have argued that patients do not necessarily differentiate their 
experiences into separate clinical or relational components. It is often an 
interrelated cascade of problems that eventually leads to a complaint being lodged 
[22]. This was also seen in this study. Many complaints were multifactorial, 
unstructured and included multiple subjects which are also related to the diversity 
of the eighteen different healthcare sectors that were included. Defining strict 
criteria for the coding of the complaints was therefore difficult. This could be 
another factor contributing to the moderate kappa values. 
It was decided to code a maximum of three categories within each complaint 
and code complaints with more than three codes as ‘complex’. This might have 
pushed the complexity of patients’ experiences to the background. These 
complaints might need retrospective in depth analyses in order to accurately 
explain and map the complex reality behind a complaint. However, in other studies, 
complaints averaged 1.5 code [22, 23], and given our goal of aggregately reporting 
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Implications of the taxonomy for regulation  
From the regulation and learning perspectives, merely recording complaints is of 
limited value. Standardised coding of patient complaints by regulators makes 
consistent and reliable documentation, analysis and reporting possible. Because of 
the three-level structure, aggregated analyses and more detailed (qualitative or 
quantitative) analyses at the subcategory level are possible. The taxonomy can for 
example be used for studying relationships between subjects in specific healthcare 
settings. 
The taxonomy could serve as an instrument for regulators, transforming 
handling complaints from a regular compliance activity into opportunities for 
standardisation, international comparison, learning, and quality improvement [20, 
23].  It could help regulators to respond more effectively to complaints and inform 
patients what impact their complaints have on quality of care [21]. A strength of 
this taxonomy is that it includes ‘softer’ or non-clinical aspects of caring that are 
important to patients, while taxonomies on adverse events are often limited to 
exclusively clinical aspects. 
This study was confined to one sample of complaints. The collection of future 
samples provide an opportunity for future monitoring and pattern recognition of 
problems experienced by patients on healthcare sector, regional and national level.  
For the use of the taxonomy for regulatory purposes, it is recommended that 
efficient ways should be found of assessing the urgency of the complaints so that 
action can be taken if required. In order to keep track of new emerging topics or 
specific problems that require rapid responses (e.g. PIP-implants) but that do not 
fall within standard categories, it is recommended that the taxonomy should be 
used dynamically and should be updated frequently.  
 
Strengths and limitations 
A strength of this study is that it draws upon previous research that supports 
theoretical and methodological development of this research base.  
The taxonomy reached its final form after coding 167 complaints. Those 167 
complaints were then coded again using the final taxonomy. The raters were 
already familiar with those complaints, which may have influenced the final kappa 
values. When calculating kappas, no account was taken of the fact that a maximum 
of three categories could be chosen. For each main category, we analysed whether 
the category occurred at least once in the complaints for each rater (yes-or-no 
judgement). Each main category was considered separately in the analyses, 
94 Chapter 4 
completely independently of the other categories. If the maximum of three themes 
had not been set beforehand, it could be assumed that the raters would take each 
category and determine whether it applied to a complaint. This would mean that 
the calculated kappa values are overestimated. The addition of the “complex 
complaint” category partly overcomes this problem. 
Complaints can be submitted to the Inspectorate in various ways: using a 
specific form on the Inspectorate’s website, by e-mail, or by post. However, the 
form on the website only allows a limited number of words. This meant that the 
length of complaint reports differed, and lengthier complaints were often more 
complex and difficult to code. 
For practical and ethical (privacy) reasons, we were unable to highlight texts 
within the complaint letters and import them into a software programme for 
qualitative analyses. Nevertheless, it was possible to collect some relevant quotes 
from the complaints. Furthermore, no data was available on the type of care sector 
and the subjects of complaints on a yearly basis, which meant that we were unable 






An existing taxonomy for the analysis of complaints in healthcare was developed 
further into a taxonomy that is applicable to a wide array of healthcare sectors and 
for the use by healthcare quality regulators. The taxonomy appeared to be 
substantially reliable. An explanation for moderate kappa values could be that 
assessment of complaints is subjective and many complaints are multifactorial, 
unstructured and very diverse. In contrast with other patient safety studies focused 
on adverse events, this taxonomy is able to capture the ‘softer’ or non-clinical 
aspects of caring that are important to patients.  
Standardised coding of patients’ complaints permits consistent and reliable 
documentation, which could help make regulators more accountable. The 
taxonomy could be used by regulators for analysing patients’ complaints, 
transforming this from a regular compliance activity into opportunities for learning, 
quality improvement and better patient satisfaction.  
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Classifying patients’ complaints for regulatory 

















Bouwman, R., Bomhoff, M., Robben, P. and Friele, R. Classifying patients’ 
complaints for regulatory purposes: a pilot study. Journal of Patient Safety 




It is assumed that classifying and aggregated reporting of patients’ complaints by 
regulators helps to identify problem areas, to respond better to patients and 
increase public accountability. This pilot study addresses what a classification of 
complaints in a regulatory setting contributes to the various goals. 
 
Methods 
A taxonomy with a clinical, management, and relationship domain was used to 
systematically analyse 364 patients’ complaints received by the Dutch regulator. 
 
Results 
Most complaints were about hospital care, mental healthcare, and elder care. 
About certain sectors such as emergency care, little numbers of complaints were 
received. The largest proportion of complaints concerned the clinical domain 
(51%), followed by the management domain (47%) and the relationship domain 
(42%). 
In elder care, clinical domain complaints were more prevalent (65%), than in 
hospital care (56%), and mental healthcare (41%). In complaints about mental 
healthcare, the relationship domain was the most important  (65%). The 




Problem areas within different healthcare sectors could be identified by classifying 
the complaints. It provided insight in the regulator’s own practices, which are 
aimed at public accountability. However, there are several limitations. Aggregated 
analyses were not possible in sectors with low numbers of complaints. 
Furthermore, the information remains rather superficial, and a standardized 
detailed system of reporting among agencies is needed. In order to assess which 
complaints need regulatory action, an in depth analysis, utilizing standardized 
methodology and criteria, of specific complaints is needed. Improving responses to 
patients requires more than merely aggregated reporting of complaints.  
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Introduction 
In research, it is argued that current approaches to healthcare quality regulation 
tend to reflect a narrow clinical perspective that excludes the patients’ perspective 
[1-6]. In addition, some large-scale incidents in several countries, such as the Mid 
Staffordshire NHS trust scandal, where patients signals were ignored, have further 
inflamed this debate [7, 8]. Regulators in various countries have therefore 
expressed a greater commitment to use patients’ complaints [9-15].  
There are differences between countries in what role  complaints currently 
have in regulation. In Finland for example, patients can file complaints to the 
regulator who then judges the legitimacy of the complaint [16, 17], while in other 
countries such as the UK and the Netherlands, individual complaint handling is not 
the primary task of the regulator. Signals derived from individual complaints are 
often used to monitor the performance of individual care providers [9, 10, 18]. 
Internationally, researchers agree that aggregated analysis and reporting of 
adverse events including complaints of patients, by care providers and regulators is 
required [19-24]. Organizations could treat patient complaints  similar to adverse 
events, by early detection, systematic analysis, learning and prevention of for 
instance malpractice risks [20, 25-27]. 
A recent study by Reader et al. (2014) therefore attempted to develop a 
taxonomy with the aim of classifying and reporting on patients’ complaints at the 
hospital level [19]. According to the authors and other scholars, such aggregated 
analyses and classification of complaints would serve various goals. First, 
aggregated complaint analysis would give a chance to proactively identify (system-
wide) problem areas that point to poor care and risk areas [19, 23, 28]. Secondly, it 
could help respond more effectively to individual patients and their complaints and 
give them a voice in regulation [19, 20, 22, 28, 29]. Thirdly, it could increase 
accountability of care providers and regulators to the government and the public 
for their actions [9, 23, 29]. 
Systematically classifying and analysing complaints by regulators is not common 
yet [9, 20, 29], while it would provide a first step towards using patients’ 
complaints for regulatory purposes.  
This pilot study therefore aimed to classify one sample of complaints about all 
healthcare sectors received by the Dutch Healthcare Inspectorate using a 
taxonomy. We aimed to explore what information can be extracted from a 
classification of complaints and to what extent this information contributes to the 
various goals.  
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The following study questions were formulated: 
• Can problem areas be identified by classifying and aggregated reporting of a 
sample of complaints? 
• Can classifying complaints help to respond more effectively to patients and 
their complaints and provide them a voice? 
• How could classifying complaints contribute to public accountability of 
regulators?  
 
The Dutch situation is used as a case study (more information Box 1). 
 
Box 1 Information about the Dutch Healthcare Inspectorate 
The Dutch regulatory system and complaints 
In the Netherlands, the regulator of healthcare quality is the Dutch Healthcare Inspectorate. 
It is an independent part of the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sports. The Inspectorate’s 
policies are, as in many countries and different industries, based on the theory of responsive 
regulation of Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) [1]. This theory assumes that the relationship 
between the regulator and regulated parties is based on co-operation and trust. Regulation 
based on distrust would only lead to more penalties being imposed and therefore requires 
more capacity on the part of the regulator and ultimately leads to higher societal costs. 
Responsibilities are therefore first laid down at the regulated parties. 
Information about the quality of care is analysed by the Dutch Inspectorate in order to 
signal potential risks. Information is collected in various ways including system-based 
supervision (monitoring of internal quality systems and governance arrangements), 
performance indicators, reporting of incidents (by the public or care providers), detection of 
prosecutable facts, and thematic supervision (selection of relevant themes which will be 
investigated further). 
The Inspectorate receives about 1500 complaints annually from patients about all 
healthcare sectors [2]. However, complaints are only investigated by the Inspectorate if they  
meet the following specific criteria: severe deviation from the applicable professional 
standards by professional or other employees within the institution, severe failure or the 
absence of an internal quality system at an institution, severe harm to health or a high 
probability of recurrence of the problem. [3]. As in other countries, the Dutch Inspectorate 
was criticized in politics and by ombudsmen for failing to respond to patients and their 
complaints [4, 5], and has therefore stated a commitment to give a greater role to the 









Complaints received by the Inspectorate between August 2012 and November 
2012 were selected, resulting in a total sample of 364 complaints. Complaints made 
by professionals, about a sector other than healthcare, or written in a language 
other than Dutch were excluded. Complaints were received by letter, e-mail or 
through a digital form on the Inspectorate’s website.  
 
Systematic complaints analysis 
A taxonomy was used to conduct a systematic content analysis and quantification 
of complaints. This taxonomy is based on the original taxonomy of Reader et al. 
(2014) [19]. This taxonomy was adapted to the Dutch regulatory setting and 
reliability was analysed in another study (Bouwman et al., Submitted). Several 
reasons can be given for the adaptations made. Some main and subcategories were 
combined because they overlapped. Some domain and (sub)category names were 
reformulated or extended to make them clearer and to reflect the underlying 
subcategories. Furthermore, several subcategories were added making the 
taxonomy applicable to care sectors other than hospitals, such as mental 
healthcare and covering specific legislation that the Inspectorate supervises.  For 
instance, the Inspectorate supervises compliance with the clients’ right to complain 
Act, that obliges care providers to provide an accessible complaints procedure for 
patients. The taxonomy differentiates between the clinical (+ care, cure), 
management (+ organization, logistics, planning) and relationship (patient-care 
provider, communication) domains, which are grouped into 6 main categories 
(quality & safety, communication, human rights, organizational & institutional 
problems, timing & accessibility, complex complaints) and 29 subcategories. We 
tested the reliability of the taxonomy because the aim was that the taxonomy 
should be used in practice by the Inspectorate’s employees of in order to encode 
complaints homogenously. The complaints were categorized and assigned into 
various taxonomy codes by two raters. The average reliability of the taxonomy at 
the level of main categories was considered substantial (κ=0.64). The mean kappa 
at the level of subcategories was moderate (κ=0.56).  
Our goal of using the taxonomy was to create an aggregated overview of the 
subjects of complaints and workable system for complaint handlers for reviewing 
complaints from 18 health care sectors (i.e. hospital care, mental health and elder 
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care). Complaints from these sectors were classified into the three domains of 
clinical, relationship and management. Each domain was divided into main and 
subcategories of complaint themes (see Table 1). The content and themes in each 
complaint were analyzed and classified into a complaint subcategory in the 
appropriate domain. It was therefore determined that a maximum of three themes 
per complaint could be coded. Montini, et al. (2008) found that patient complaints 
averaged 1.5 themes, ranging from 1 to 9 themes per complaint [21]. Similarly, 
Reader et al. (2014) found an average of 1.49 issues per complaint, with a range of 
1.05 to 3.19 [19]. The maximum of three therefore seemed justified. In addition, if 
it was not possible to assign a maximum of three themes to one complaint, it was 
encoded solely as a ‘complex complaint’. Other information that was available to 
be extracted from the data was whether the complaint was investigated further by 
the Inspectorate, the type of care provider involved, and whether the complainant 
was the patient or someone else. 
 
 
Table 1 List of the domains (bold), main categories (italic)  and subcategories of the 
 taxonomy 
Clinical, care & cure domain 
Quality & safety 
Safety incidents 
Medication/medication errors/preference policy 
Errors in diagnosis/ triage/diagnostic assessment/medical judgement/assessing urgency 
Inadequate record keeping 
Failing equipment / material 
Title misuse 
Quality of care, skill and performance/ improper or unprofessional behaviour / clinical 
treatment 
Coordination / alignment problems 
Other, viz 
 - Table 1 continues -  
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- Table 1 continued -  
Relationship patient-care provider domain 
Communication 
Incorrect/incomplete/missing information/shared decision making 
Unprofessional response to complaint 






Coersion and compulsory admission… 
Other patient's and human rights  
Other, viz 
Management, organisation, logistics, planning domain 
Organisational & institutional problems 
Inappropriate / incorrect behaviour of the organization or individuals within the organization 
Unhealthy, poor or unsafe environment / building or supporting services 
Finances, invoicing, billing, costs, patient’s own contribution 
Insufficient / unqualified personnel or (supporting) resources present 
Insufficient compliance with legislation / regulations / protocols / guidelines and insufficient 
safeguarding of patients' rights 
Inadequate organization/ logistics /bureaucracy /governance 
Timing & accessibility 





Very complex problems 
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Statistical analyses 
Statistical analyses were conducted using the software program STATA version 13. 
New variables were created to determine the frequencies (at least once) of the 
domains, the main categories and subcategories within the complaints. To 
determine the frequency, occurring categories that were agreed upon in 
complaints were counted as 1 (i.e. a category is applicable to a complaint according 
to both raters), non-occurring categories that were agreed upon were counted as 
0, and categories that were not agreed upon were counted as 0.5. A Venn diagram 
was constructed to assess the overlap of the three domains. 
Types of care provider involved in the complaint classified by the two raters were 
compared. Only if differences were found, it was compared to the care provider 
type as initially classified by the Inspectorate itself. If one of the raters matched the 
classification of the Inspectorate, that type of care provider was chosen. If all three 
classifications mismatched, it was classified as ‘unclear’. The same applies for 
whether the complainant was the patient or someone else. 
Chi-squared tests were carried out to explore differences between numbers of 
complaints investigated further within healthcare sectors. Results were considered 
significant if p<0.05. 
 
Privacy 
The complaint letters were encoded in the offices of the Inspectorate, in order to 
prevent further distribution of personal information of complainants. The raters 
signed a confidentiality agreement. Personal information about the complainants 





In order to explore what types of information can be extracted from classifying the 
complaints and what this contributes to the various goals, we analysed the 
complaints at different levels. We first analysed numbers of complaints per care 
sector. We then analysed the complaints at the domain, main category and 
subcategory levels of the taxonomy. For the three healthcare sectors with the 
highest number of complaints (hospital care, mental health and elder care), we 
conducted some more detailed analyses. In the discussion section, we will address 
how this information contributes to the various goals described in the introduction. 
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To illustrate the content of complaints patients reported to the Inspectorate, 
some text fragments from the complaints in the various care sectors are shown in 
Box 2. As can be seen, complaints are often complex and multifactorial and contain 
detailed information. On average complaint themes were categorized into two 
complaint subcategories. 
 
Box 2 Fragments of complaints in different care sectors 
“In the nursing home where my mother lived, the conditions are unhygienic. My mother's 
room smelled of urine, there was dust under the beds and the bathroom was filthy. [...] My 
mother's pressure sore was taken care of in this dirty room, on the dirty bedding. The care 
providers wore gloves but no aprons and they wore their hair loose. After two weeks, the 
wound was infected.” (elderly care) 
“While they were busy with the preparations, my wife was asked to sign a declaration [...]. 
Under the circumstances, she had no knowledge of the content of this declaration and had 
not been informed about possible complications. She signed the declaration in good faith. In 
the subsequent visit [...] I asked about the possible complications. They could not give us an 
answer.” (private clinic, minor medical procedure on the face) 
“My mum […] slipped off the toilet. She pushed the alarm button and then had to wait for 15 
minutes before someone came. […] She broke her hip. It was decided (without consulting 
me) that X-rays were not needed. An operation is not seen as important because she cannot 
walk anyway.” (elderly care) 
“Tuesday-Wednesday-Thursday night: night shift staff are deployed who cannot assist with 
artificial respiration of a patient.” (care for handicapped patients) 
“I’ve heard that a fellow patient of mine has been in isolation for 5 months now. He is a 
vulnerable man who gets confused quickly. I blame it on clinic negligence because […] the 
man was confused because of medication intoxication” (mental healthcare) 
 
Complaints per care sector 
Most complaints were about hospital care (22%), mental healthcare (17%), and 
elder care (12%) (Table 2). In half the complaints, the complaint was issued by the 
patient themselves. In 56% of the complaints about hospital care, the complaints 
were issued by the patient. In mental healthcare this was 67%. In elder care and 
care for disabled patients, almost all complaints (98% and 92%) were about 
someone else, who was mostly a relative. In total, 31% of complaints were 
investigated further by the Inspectorate. 
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Table 2 Care sectors the complaints were about, numbers of complaints that were 
 investigated further by the Inspectorate, & number of complex complaints for 
 each care provider 





Total 364 (100%) 113  57 
Medical specialist somatic care / hospital 
care 
79 (22%) 19  13 
Mental healthcare 62 (17%) 11  10 
Inpatient elderly care  44 (12%) 16  9 
Other 28 (8%) 11 7 
Care for disabled persons 27 (7%) 18  10 
Pharmacist 24 (7%) 8  0 
Dental care 18 (5%) 3  1 
General practitioner 17 (5%) 5 2 
Private clinic/independent medical centre 12 (3%) 5  2 
Unclear 12 (3%) 2  0 
Alternative care 7 (2%) 5  0 
Associated care professions/rehabilitation 7 (2%) 1  1 
Home care 7 (2%) 3  2 
Child welfare care 7 (2%) 3  2 
Forensic healthcare  6 (2%) 0 0 
Emergency care  2 (1%) 1  0 
Manufacturer/medical technology company 2 (1%) 2 0 
Public healthcare 2 (1%) 0 0 
Integrated care (cross-sectoral) 1 (0%) 0 0 
Manufacturer of medicines/ pharmaceutical 
company 
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Complaints on domain level 
Figure 1 shows a Venn diagram of the overlap between the three domains of the 
taxonomy. The clinical and relationship domains have the greatest overlap (14%), 
followed by the clinical and management domains (13%). All three domains overlap 
in 8%. Furthermore, the relationship domain occurs alone least often (9%) in the 
complaints.  
 
Figure 1 Venn-diagram of the overlap of the three domains 
 
To gain insights into the regulator’s decisions about complaints, we analysed the 
number of complaints investigated for each domain of the taxonomy (Figure 2). 
More information about the current process for determining which complaints to 
investigate can be found in Box 1. Within the clinical domain, significantly more 
complaints were investigated (37%, p=0.02) by the regulator compared to the 
other categories (26%-30%).  
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Figure 2 Percentages of complaints investigated and not investigated per domain 
 
* Significant difference between complaints that concern the specific domain compared to the 
complaints that concern the other domains, p-value<0.05 (far right column) 
 
Complaints at the main category and subcategory levels  
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the complaints over the six main categories and 
29 subcategories. Of the 364 complaints, the largest proportion concerned the 
main category “quality & safety” (187, 51%). Within this main category, the 
subcategories that were most prevalent were “quality of care, skills and 
performance, improper or unprofessional behaviour or clinical treatment”, and 
“safety incidents”. 
Almost four out of ten (138, 38%) complaints concerned the main category 
“organizational & institutional problems”. Within this main category, the most 
prevalent subcategories were “inappropriate/incorrect behaviour of the 
organization or individuals within the organization”, and “unhealthy, poor or 
unsafe environment/building or supporting services”. Only a small proportion 
within the management domain concerned the main category “timing and 
accessibility” (34, 9%). 
Communication issues were present in about a quarter of the complaints, of 
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decision making” and “not listening, not taking patient seriously, rude attitude”. 
Within the category “human rights” (77, 21%), “coercion & compulsory 
submission” was the most prevalent subcategory, followed by “abuse/sexual 
misconduct”. 
Complaints issued by the patients themselves were significantly more often 
about human rights compared to complaints issued by someone else. For the other 
main categories, no significant differences were found. 
 
Complaints on domain level in three sectors with most complaints 
For the three healthcare sectors with the highest number of complaints (hospital 
care, elder care and mental health), differences in the occurrence of the domains 
were analysed (Figure 4). The clinical domain occurred in all sectors, but significant 
differences were found (p=0.006). In elderly care, it was more prevalent (65%) than 
in hospital care (56%) and mental healthcare (41%). In mental healthcare, the 
relationship domain occurred significantly more often (65%, p=0.008) than in the 
other sectors. These complaints mostly concerned human rights issues. The 
management domain was most prevalent (49%) in elder care, this was not 
significantly different from the other healthcare sectors. In figure 5, absolute 
numbers of complaints for each domain in the three healthcare sectors are shown. 
It is also shown how many of those complaints were investigated further by the 
Inspectorate, to see in detail what decisions were made by the Inspectorate. In 
mental healthcare, in total, fewer complaints (18%) were investigated than in 
hospitals (24%) and elder care (36%) but this did not differ significantly. In general, 
relatively more complaints within the clinical domain were investigated, and these 
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Figure 3 Absolute numbers of occurrences of main categories and subcategories 
 within the complaints, divided into the three domains   
* the number of the complaints that concern a specific subcategory may not add up to the exact 
number of complaints in the main categories because they were included if the main category was 
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Figure 4 Percentages of occurrence of domains within the complaints in three 
 sectors with most complaints 




Figure 5 Absolute numbers of complaints in each domain for each healthcare 
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Discussion 
 
In this pilot study, a sample of patients’ complaints received by the Dutch 
Healthcare Inspectorate was classified using a taxonomy that was adapted from 
Reader et al. to the regulatory setting. From a regulatory perspective, we examined 
what information can be extracted by classifying and quantifying the complaints 
and whether this information meets the goals that were set in the literature. The 
results are discussed with reference to those goals [9, 19, 20, 22, 29]. 
 
Identifying problem areas and quality and safety issues  
Classifying complaints makes it possible to structure and document the often 
complex and unstructured complaints into interpretable and easy-to-report 
categories. The analysis provided information at a national level and care sector 
level.  
This pilot study was confined to one sample of complaints received by the 
Dutch Healthcare Inspectorate within three months, providing a first step towards 
creating a central overview of complaints. At the national and care sector level, it 
was possible to identify problem areas. Slight shifts of patterns were seen in the 
problems that patients reported in different healthcare sectors. The patterns were 
quite clear for characteristics of the cure and care sectors. For instance, in elder 
care, patients point to organizational problems more often than in other sectors. 
However, identifying problem areas and patterns is only possible if sufficient 
numbers of complaints are received for each sector. For instance, in home care and 
emergency care, too few complaints were received for this analysis. Moreover, 
assuming that complaints reported by patients are only a ‘tip of an iceberg’, we 
cannot be sure that the complaints reported are representative for all patients’ 
experiences in healthcare. 
Furthermore, the classification supports basic analyses, but does not accurately 
explain and map the complex reality behind a complaint. The information that the 
analysis provided remains rather superficial. This makes it difficult to assess which 
complaints need regulatory action. Important details and contextual information 
described in the complaints are crucial for determining the severity of a complaint. 
The same phenomenon has already been described in the case of incident reporting: 
while the main principle of reporting incidents was to identify and prioritize 
significant risks, in practice incidents are only counted in order to monitor 
performance of care providers, removing the opportunity for broader learning [30, 
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31]. Classification of complaints can be seen as a first step, helping to set priorities. 
The second step would be analyses of the content of complaints that were selected 
in the first step in-greater depth. Furthermore, helping the learning processes 
requires not only classifying and quantifying, but also social processes involving the 
regulators, complaint investigative agencies and care providers. 
 
Giving patients a voice  
The analysis gives insights into what aspects of healthcare are relevant for 
improving healthcare quality, according to the patients. It provides contextual 
information allowing further consideration of how to incorporate patients’ 
perspectives into healthcare quality regulation. Formally, the Inspectorate further 
investigates patients’ complaints if they point to severe or structural problems [32]. 
The results show that only a selection of complaints, often including a clinical 
component, are investigated further by the Inspectorate. However, other research 
has shown patients have different perceptions of the relevance of their complaint 
for healthcare quality [29]. Furthermore, as observed in other studies, patients 
have differing views about factors relating to healthcare quality and safety [33, 34]. 
Patients often assess the care received on a broad spectrum of aspects going 
beyond exclusively clinical markers, such as the interpersonal skills of the care 
provider [35] and how care is organized [36].  
If regulators want to give patients a voice and use complaints in their work, they 
may therefore need to broaden their perspective of the factors that contribute to 
healthcare quality. 
 
Responding to complaints 
Patients’ dissatisfaction with responses to their complaints is often associated with 
an expectation gap [29, 37-39]. Other research shows that patients find it 
important to prevent the problem from recurring by reporting their complaint to a 
regulator. They want to be kept informed about the effect of their complaints on 
quality of care. However, they lack confidence in the effects their complaints have 
[29]. It would therefore seem that mere aggregated reporting of complaint data is 
insufficient to meet the patients’ expectations. The aggregated overview of 
complaints could be used for publicly reporting what effects complaints have on 
the healthcare system [20, 29, 40]. However, a clearer understanding of the 
expectation gaps that arise between complainants and regulators is still needed in 
order to achieve solutions that improve responses to complaints and patient 
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satisfaction.  
Increasing public accountability  
This study provided an opportunity to gain insight in the regulator’s own practices 
and recognize its own blind spots. It creates a bigger picture of which complaints 
are selected by the Inspectorate for further investigation and which not. Quality 
issues were investigated more often by the Dutch regulator, which is in line with its 
statutory task [32]. However, differences are seen between the healthcare sectors 
in the numbers of complaints investigated. Furthermore, some themes and 
subjects that patients reported, such as safety incidents and abuse, are addressed 
more frequently than others. This information could help in making evaluation 
procedures and decisions more homogenous and consistent, and improve public 
accountability. The Inspectorate could consider whether it is desirable that certain 
subjects are not addressed.  
It is also interesting to consider the results in the context of other complaint 
investigative agencies and organizations. One interesting finding is that the 
Inspectorate received complaints about elder care, while other research has shown 
that patients in elder care hardly ever lodge complaints [22, 41]. They do not want 
to be seen as ‘difficult’ [41]. The Inspectorate is, thus, perceived to be more 
accessible by patients in elder care than other complaint options.   
There will still be an important challenge, as clarification is needed about the 
most appropriate roles for care providers, complaint investigative agencies and 
regulators regarding the monitoring of and responding to complaints.
 
Future research 
With our relatively small study sample, we were not able to conduct more complex 
analyses. A further study should examine whether future follow-up samples of 
complaints allow for comparisons over time that point to emerging problems as 
experienced by patients. Furthermore, it is recommended that other information 
sources are linked to the aggregated complaint data, such as numbers of incidents 
reported by care providers. This will allow patterns of non-reporting to be detected 
and more precise comparisons between the performance of different care 
providers to be made. In other research, it has been shown that different reporting 
systems such as incident reporting, risk management reports, patient complaints 
and malpractice claims, all produce substantially different, incomplete but 
complementary pictures of patient safety. Under-reporting is a major issue, as 
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sometimes 95% of adverse events are not reported [42]. Systems for  achieving a 
detailed understanding of the full range of things that go wrong at the population 
level are largely undeveloped [23]. 
Additionally, the predictive value of complaints could be further studied in 
order to clarify the value of using complaints for regulatory purposes [25, 27]. 
Examples: the relationship between complaints and mortality rates, incidents, 
patient satisfaction or regulatory measures against care providers could be 
analysed [43]. 
 
Strengths and weaknesses 
A unique aspect of this study is that it includes complaints about various healthcare 
sectors, while other studies on complaints often focus on one sector, which is 
mostly the hospital sector [19, 39, 44].  
A strength of this study is that an evidence-based and substantially reliable 
taxonomy was used.  
No basic characteristics such as age, gender and ethnicity, of the complainants 
were available, because they were hard to extract from the often unstructured 
complaint data.  
It should be noted that classifying complaints is a labour-intensive activity. 
Furthermore, future analyses using the taxonomy require extensive rater 
preparation and practice as this is widely acknowledged to be an important 





This pilot study reveals that a complaints classification makes it possible to 
structure and document the often unstructured complaints into interpretable and 
easy-to-report categories. If complaint numbers are sufficient, the classification 
allows problem areas within different healthcare sectors to be identified. It also 
gives insights into the regulator’s own practices and blind spots, which could help 
the regulator’s public accountability. The overview of complaints could also be 
used for publicly reporting what effects complaints have on the healthcare system. 
However, there are several limitations on meeting the goals that are targeted 
by a complaints classification. Because the classification reduces the complexity of 
the complaints, the information remains rather superficial. In order to assess if the 
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complaints need regulatory action, an in-depth analysis of emerging issues is still 
needed. All complaints should have detailed standardized information. Detailed 
information about the severity of the complaints, may show a severe lapse in 
safety, which may be enough to initiate a policy change. Associated to this, criteria 
for which complaints are eligible for investigation should be clearly set.  However, 
without some form of standardized reporting of complaints, there is no way to 
monitor what patients experience in healthcare and give them a more consolidated 
voice in the regulatory practice. Standardization of detailed complaint information 
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Internationally, healthcare-quality regulators are criticized for failing to respond to 
patients’ complaints. Patient involvement is therefore an important item on the 
policy agenda. However, it can be argued that there is a discrepancy between the 
patients’ perspective and current regulatory approaches.  
This study examines whether a discrepancy exists between the perspectives of 
patients and regulators on healthcare-quality. 
 
Methods 
A questionnaire was sent to 996 people who had registered a complaint with the 
Dutch Healthcare Inspectorate in order to measure expectations of and 
experiences with the Inspectorate. A taxonomy was used to classify the nature of 
their complaints into the clinical, relationship or management domains. 
 
Results 
More complaints about clinical issues (56%, p=0.000) were investigated by the 
regulator than complaints about organizational (37%) and relational issues (51%). 
Patients with complaints about management issues less often indicated (13%, 
p=0.002) that healthcare is improved by making their complaint than patients with 
complaints about clinical or relationship issues did (22-23%). Patients who reported 
about relational issues with care providers attached more importance to issuing 




The predominant clinical approach taken by regulators does not match the 
patients’ perspective of what is relevant for healthcare quality. In addition, patients 
seem to be more tolerant of what they perceive to be clinical or management 
errors than of perceived relational deficiencies in care providers. If regulators want 
to give patients a voice, they should expand their horizon beyond the medical 
framework.   
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Introduction 
 
Several countries such as New Zealand, the UK and the Netherlands are facing 
problems with public trust in healthcare quality regulation [1-5].  It is argued that 
current patient safety approaches tend to reflect a narrow medical perspective that 
excludes the patients’ perspective, creating a discrepancy between the two [6-11]. 
In addition, some large-scale incidents such as the Mid Staffordshire NHS trust 
scandal, where patients complaints were not responded to, have further inflamed 
this debate [5, 12]. When evaluating that case, it was recommended that openness 
and transparency about concerns must be ensured and that a greater role should 
be given to complaints within the regulatory process [13]. The Care Quality 
Commission has expressed a commitment to pay more attention to patients’ 
complaints in its regulation policies [14]. In other countries, similar developments 
can be seen. Regulators have expressed a greater commitment to improving 
responses to complaints and giving patients a greater voice [4, 13-17].  
However, if regulators want to involve patients and their complaints in their 
policies, a clearer understanding of the discrepancies between the two 
perspectives that seem to arise is needed, either in terms of issues that are 
considered relevant or in terms of providing information on the effects of reporting 
a complaint. This could help create solutions that improve responses to complaints 
and patient satisfaction.  
This study examines if there are discrepancies between the perspectives patients 
and regulators and what they imply. We studied to what degree the evaluation 
procedures and responses of a regulator to complaints of various natures ((clinical 
(e.g. related to purely medical subjects) and non-clinical (e.g. related to 
organizational or relational subjects)) presented by patients match the patients’ 
perspectives on the relevance and perceived effects of their complaints. 
Complaints received by the Dutch healthcare quality regulator (more information in 
Box 1) are used as a case study.  
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We aim to answer the following questions: 
 
• Is there a difference in patients’ expectations of a regulatory authority 
between patients with complaints that are clinical and non-clinical in 
nature? 
• Which complaints (clinical and non-clinical in nature) are considered to be 
relevant by the regulator for further investigation and improvement of 
healthcare quality and does this match the patients’ perspective? 
• How do patients with clinical and non-clinical complaints perceive the 
effects of their complaints on healthcare quality and does this match their 
expectations?  
 
Box 1 information about complaints about healthcare in the Netherlands 
The Dutch Healthcare Inspectorate is mandated by the Ministry of Health, Welfare and 
Sports to regulate and monitor healthcare quality. It is not the statutory task of the 
Inspectorate to handle complaints by individual patients. Other research already showed 
that patients are aware of that [18]. Responsibility for handling of patients’ complaints lies 
primarily with the care providers, where patients can complain directly at complaint officers 
or boards. Complaints are only eligible for further investigation by the Inspectorate when 
complaints point to structural or very severe problems. The criteria are severe deviation 
from the applicable professional standards by medical professionals or other employees 
within the care institution; severe lack or failure of an internal quality system at a care 
institution; severe harm to health; a high probability of recurrence; or when care providers 
do not comply to the Clients’ Right to Complain Act [19]. This Complaints Act obliges care 
providers to install easily accessible independent complaints committees. The aim of such a 
committee is to focus explicitly on the legitimacy of the patient's complaint. Research has 
however shown that many patients are dissatisfied after this procedure [20].  
The Inspectorate receives approximately 1500 complaints annually from patients of which 
the majority are not investigated further by the Inspectorate, given its remit [21]. However, 
it was argued that the Inspectorate does not take patients seriously, and should value 
patients’ complaints as signaling deeper problems [5, 12, 22-24]. It was stated in political 
debates that the patients and their complaints deserve more attention and should be 
involved in regulatory policies in order to reflect patients’ perspectives [12, 22, 23]. In order 
to improve responses to complaints, an independent contact point for the general public 
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Methods 
 
This study draws upon newly collected data and data and instruments used in 
previous research [18]. A taxonomy was used to determine the nature of the 
complaints. Furthermore, we submitted a survey to patients who reported 
complaints to the Inspectorate, to measure their expectations and experiences 
with reporting their complaint. Information about which complaints were 
investigated further by the Inspectorate gave us insights into the relevance of 
complaints for healthcare quality from the regulator’s perspective. 
 
Selection of the study population 
A survey was sent to all people (996) who submitted a complaint to the 
Inspectorate between August-November 2012 or between April-August 2013. The 
selection of two different periods was helpful in preventing contextual factors 
(such as media exposure after incidents) having too much influence on patients’ 
perceptions of the Inspectorate. Furthermore, numbers of respondents to analyze 
differences between subgroups within the study population would be sufficient.  
 
Several inclusion criteria were formulated: 
- The complaint must have been submitted by a member of the public/patient 
(or relative), not a care provider 
- The complaint must be about healthcare (so general questions or 
complaints about the Inspectorate itself were excluded) 
- If a complaint was further investigated by the Inspectorate, the investigation 
of the Inspectorate had to be closed, and the complainant had to have been 
informed about the closure by letter, so as to minimize the risk of 
respondents assuming that their response would have an impact on the 
handling of their complaint. 
An employee of the Inspectorate ensured the complaints met the inclusion criteria. 
Two reminders were sent. After those, the response rate was 44%. An abridged 
survey was therefore sent to non-responders.  
In total 67 respondents dropped out because their addresses were incorrect, 
the person had moved, or was deceased. 33 people who filled out the survey were 
left out of the analyses because they were included in a special intervention by the 
Inspectorate in which extra attention was given to the complainant, which may 
have influenced their experiences when reporting the complaint.  
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The survey 
The design of the survey about complaints was driven by the theory of procedural, 
distributive and interactional justice [25]. Information about the development of 
the survey can be found elsewhere (see reference) [18]. 
The survey comprised three parts: (1) characteristics of the person and 
complaint (subject and severity of physical injury); (2) people's expectations when 
reporting to the Inspectorate; and (3) experiences with reporting. An open answer 
option was given to elucidate the subject of the complaints. Severity of any physical 
harm caused was measured on a five-point-scale (1=no physical- 5=death). The 
questions were in the form of statements for which respondents could indicate the 
importance of the specific statement. Immediately afterwards, respondents were 
asked how much they felt that these statements actually applied (experiences). 
Respondents’ expectations making the complaint (from ‘not important’ to ‘most 
important’), and experiences with the reporting (from ‘no’ to ‘yes’) were measured 
on four-point scales [18]. 
 
Taxonomy 
A taxonomy was used to conduct a content analysis of the complaints. This 
taxonomy was developed and reliability analyses were conducted for it in another 
study, using another complaint sample than used in the current study. The earlier 
study aimed to develop a standardization technique for complaint analyses 
covering all healthcare sectors and the setting of regulation.[Bouwman, Bomhoff, 
Robben, Friele; submitted]. The taxonomy differentiates between the 
clinical/care/cure domain, management/organization/logistics/planning domain, 
and patient-care provider relationship/communication domain. Those domains are 
used for grouping 6 main categories and 29 subcategories. The average reliability of 
the taxonomy, analyzed by using the ratings of two raters, at the level of the main 
categories was substantial (κ=0.64). The taxonomy is given in the appendix. 
The answers of the respondents to the questions and the open answer options 
about the nature of the complaints were used to classify each complaint within up 
to three domains, main categories and subcategories of the taxonomy (by the first 
author). This means that up to three domains, main categories and subcategories 
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Statistical analyses 
Statistical analyses were conducted using the software program STATA version 13. 
Background characteristics of the study population were compared against the 
characteristics of the Dutch population [26] and are presented descriptively. 
Prevalence of the domains, main categories and subcategories was analyzed by 
counting whether they occurred at least once within the complaints. A Venn 
diagram was made to show the overlap between the domains. Differences in 
severity of physical injury between the two groups (complaints that were/were not 
investigated) and scores of importance of expectations between the three domains 
were calculated using t-tests. Percentages of which expectations were actually met 
(experiences) according to the respondents were calculated by adding scores 3 and 
4 together for each variable. Differences in those experiences between the three 
domains, plus some detailed analyses of the subcategories of the taxonomy, were 
calculated using chi-squared tests. The expectations and experience items were 
split across three scales, based on a factor analysis conducted in a previous study 
[18]. Differences were considered significant if p<0.05. Cases with missing values 
were left out of the analyses. 
 
Ethics statement 
The study protocol was presented to an external Medical Research Ethics 
Committee which concluded that formal ethical approval for this study was not 
required under Dutch law, as the study does not involve a medical intervention 
(METC protocol no. 13-018/C). Privacy was guaranteed because research data and 
personal information of respondents were kept separate. Surveys were sent by the 
Dutch Inspectorate by post. It was stressed that it could be returned anonymously 
to the first author. It was explicitly stated that their individual answers would not 
be revealed to the Inspectorate. The first author kept a list of respondent codes 
that were also printed on each survey and the Inspectorate kept a list with the 
same codes and the associated names and addresses. This allowed response rates 
to be monitored and reminders to be sent to non-responders by the Inspectorate. 
The lists were destroyed after 6 months. 
No personal information or medical information of the respondents was used in 
this study. 
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Results 
 
First, we describe the background characteristics of respondents, types of care 
providers and the nature of the complaints, plus the severity of physical injury 
related to the complaint. We then focus on what the respondents expected of 
reporting their complaints to the Inspectorate, and if differences exist depending 
on the nature of the complaint. After that, we describe which complaints were 
relevant for further investigation by the Inspectorate, and how the respondents 
with complaints of various natures experienced those responses by the 
Inspectorate. 
 
Background characteristics of respondents and nature of their complaints 
The response was 54% (N=503, (51% excluding 33 respondents who were included 
in the intervention)). Basic study population characteristics are shown in Table 1. 
More than half of the respondents were female. Relatively more respondents were 
aged 40–64 than in the Dutch population at large. The study population consisted 
of relatively highly educated people. 
 
Table 1 Background characteristics of the respondents compared to the Dutch 
 population 
 N (Respondents)** % Dutch population 
(aged 18 and older) 
2013 % [26] 
Gender 353   
Female 134 62% 51% 
Male 219 38% 49% 
Age 353   
18-39 45 13% 34% 
40-64 221 63% 45% 
65 and older 87 25% 21% 
 - Table 1 continues -  
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- Table 1 continued -  
 N (Respondents)** % Dutch population 
(aged 18 and older) 
2013 % [26] 
Educational level 342   








97 28% 40%* 
High (professional 















* These percentages applied to the Dutch population aged 15 to 65 in 2012. 
** The total number of respondents may differ because some respondents did not fill out all questions 
or only completed the short survey. 
 
Table 2 shows the types of care that the complaints were about. Most complaints 
concerned hospital care (23%), nursing homes (18%) and mental healthcare (18%). 
A relatively large proportion of complaints concerned the ‘other’ answer option 
(20%). Examples of the answers are occupational doctors, haptonomist and 
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Table 2 type of care the complaints are about and absolute numbers of 
 complaints investigated further within the care sector 
Type of care complaint is about # complaints N=363 # investigated 
Hospital care 84 (23%) 25 
Nursing homes/residential care 67 (18%) 35 
Mental healthcare 65 (18%) 19 
Drug therapy 38 (10%) 8 
General practitioner 35 (10%) 10 
Medical technology 35 (10%) 18 
Care for the disabled 31 (9%) 15 
Dental care 33 (9%) 15 
Private clinic 19 (5%) 8 
Home care 13 (4%) 4 
Community care 7 (2%) 0 
Physical therapy 2 (1%) 1 
Other 72 (20%) 28 
 
What patients find relevant for healthcare quality 
Figure 1 shows the total number of complaints reported by patients per domain. 
The clinical domain occurred most often (64%) and overlapped almost equally with 
the other two domains. The management and relationship domains were present 
in four out of ten of the complaints, with a mutual overlap of 7%. Only 4% of all 
complaints were about all three of the domains. To illustrate a complaint about the 
clinical domain, a patient described a safety incident as: “Got a metal on metal hip. 
[…] Had high concentrations of cobalt and chromium in my blood.” To illustrate a 
complaint about the relationship domain, a patient described a complaint about 
communication: “Insufficiently informed by attending physician […] about possible 
consequences of placing a prosthesis.” 
An example of a complaint about the management domain is: “Admitted as a 
heart patient in the weekend. Unit was left unstaffed because of staff shortage.”  
No significant differences were found in the prevalence of the domains within 
the complaints with regard to age, gender and educational level (not in Table). 
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Figure 1 Venn diagram of distribution of domains occurring in the complaints 
 reported by patients (excluding complex complaints (4%)) 
 
Patients’ expectations of the inspectorate 
Table 3 shows the average scores of importance for patients’ expectations when 
reporting complaints, given separately for the three domains. For most 
respondents it was most important that reporting their complaints leads to 
benefits in terms of quality of care.  
Patients with complaints in the relationship domain had significantly higher 
expectations of specific consequences for the care provider in question compared 
to the other two domains (p=0.006). They felt it is important that the inspectorate 
should have a hard-hitting conversation, and that the care provider should be 
punished or banned from working. Detailed analyses showed that especially 
patients who reported about care providers not listening/not taking seriously, 
about rude attitudes or abuse found it more important that sanctions should follow 
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Table 3 Average scores of importance for specific outcome expectations 
 and scale-scores distributed over the three domains 










I made my complaint to the Inspectorate 
because I wanted… 
N=179-207 N=113-132 N=110-124 
Benefits for quality of healthcare in general 3.52 3.58 3.52 
the care institution to learn from my 
complaint 
3.39 3.51 3.49 
to prevent it from happening to others 3.61 3.70 3.56 
to improve the quality of healthcare 3.51 3.58 3.56 
to improve the safety of healthcare 3.51 3.51 3.51 
Personal benefits 2.68 2.89* 2.62 
to restore my sense of justice 2.72* 3.15* 2.64* 
a solution to my problem 2.81 3.01 2.78 
to prevent it from happening to me again 2.82 2.84 2.79 
the damage/harm to be repaired 2.41 2.72* 2.36 
Specific consequences for care provider 2.51 2.70* 2.43 
financial compensation for the damage/harm 
to be offered 
1.87 1.96 1.63* 
the care provider in question to be banned 
from working 
2.22 2.50* 2.10 
the inspectorate to have a hard-hitting 
conversation with the care provider in 
question 
2.79 3.03* 2.78 
the care provider in question to be punished 2.04 2.47* 2.04 
the department of the care institution to be 
closed 
1.58 1.73 1.65 
to do my duty by making a complaint 2.89 3.04 2.75* 
* significant difference between complaints that involve at least the specific domain compared to the 
complaints that do not. 
** The expectations were divided into three scales (benefits for quality of healthcare in general; 
personal benefits; specific consequences for care provider) based on a factor analysis conducted in a 
previous study.18 
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Relevance of the complaints according to the Inspectorate 
In order to analyze what relevance in terms of healthcare quality the Inspectorate 
assigned to complaints, we distinguished two groups within the sample: patients 
whose complaints were  investigated further by the Inspectorate (n=185, 39%) and 
those whose complaints were not (n=285, 61%). No significant differences were 
found between the average score of self-reported severity of physical injury in 
investigated (2.5 avg.) and non-investigated complaints (2.3 avg.). 
Figure 2 shows the total number of complaints for each single domain and 
those overlapping two or three domains, and the number of investigated 
complaints. Most complaints concerned the clinical domain, and a greater 
proportion of clinical complaints were investigated by the Inspectorate (56%, 




Figure 2 total number of complaints for each single domain, number of 
 complaints overlapping two or three domains and number of 
 investigated complaints 
 
In addition, the average score of severity of physical injury in complaints about the 
clinical domain was significantly higher (2.8, p=0.001, not in Table) than in the 
other domains. In-depth analyses of the subcategories showed that complaints 
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coded as safety incidents and title misuse were investigated significantly more 
often than the other complaints (p=0.001-0.05, not in table). Figure 2 also shows 
that fewer complaints were handled when a complaint concerns a second and/or 
third domain besides the clinical, or when it concerns exclusively the relationship or 
management domain (or both of those). 
 
Patients’ experiences with the inspectorate 
Table 4 shows the experiences patients had with reporting their complaint and the 
responses of the Inspectorate. For the items on the benefits for quality of 
healthcare, patients complaining about management issues reported significantly 
fewer positive experiences compared to the other patients (p=0.002-0.01). Detailed 
analyses show that these effects mostly concern complaints about finances, 
inappropriate behavior, insufficient/unqualified personnel, and insufficient 
compliance with legislation/directives (p=0.01-0.04).  
Positive experiences are obviously related to whether complaints are 
investigated: patients with complaints that were investigated more often report 
that their complaint led to benefits for quality of care (p=0.000-0.005, not in table).  
 
Table 4 (scale) percentages of experiences of complainants , distributed over the 
 three domains. Items were measured on a four-point scale (no to yes). 










Making my complaint to the Inspectorate 
led to… 
N=167-194 N=103-119 N=99-116 
Benefits for quality of healthcare in 
general 
23% 22% 13%* 
…the care institution having learned from 
 my complaint 
22% 24% 17% 
…the same thing being prevented from 
 happening to others 
29% 26% 15%* 
…the quality of healthcare being 
 improved 
23% 23% 13%* 
…the safety of healthcare being improved 25% 22% 13%* 
 - Table 4 continues –  
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Personal benefits 14% 13% 12% 
…my sense of justice being restored 18% 20% 16% 
…my problem being solved 15% 15% 16% 
…the same thing being prevented from 
 happening to me again 
22% 20% 14% 
…the damage/harm being repaired 5% 5% 4% 
Specific consequences for care provider 22% 23% 18%* 
…financial compensation for the 
 damage/harm being offered 
2% 3% 3% 
…the care provider in question being 
 banned from working 
11% 8% 9% 
…a hard-hitting conversation being held 
 with the care provider in question 
18% 18% 11% 
…the care provider in question being 
 punished 
8% 10% 6% 
…the department of the care institution 
 being closed 
8% 6% 7% 
…doing my duty by making a complaint 79% 80% 72% 
* significant difference between complaints that involve at least the specific domain compared to those 
that do not. 
** The experience items were divided into three scales, based on a factor analysis conducted in a 





This study examined whether there are discrepancies between the perspectives of 
patients and regulators and what those imply. We focused on what relevance 
regulators and patients attach to complaints of different natures, what patients 
with different complaints expected of the regulator, and how the regulator reacted 
to different complaints. 
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Mismatch between what patients and regulators find relevant for healthcare 
quality 
Formally, the Inspectorate further investigates patients’ complaints if they are 
severe or point to structural problems in healthcare [19]. However, this study 
shows divergence in the criteria playing a role in what the Inspectorate considers 
relevant. Complaints with a clinical component are more often the subject of 
further investigations by the Inspectorate, while management and organizational 
problems, such as insufficient or unqualified personnel or non-compliance with 
legislation, seem to be less relevant to the Inspectorate when assessing problems 
encountered by patients. However, according to patients, a broader scope of 
aspects of quality of care are relevant and can be learned from. This illustrates the 
mismatch between the ‘biomedical’ agenda of medico-legal bodies and ‘life-world’ 
agendas of patients [27]  and refers to what is an ongoing discussion in research; 
the medical model being dominant and a leading determinant in constructing or 
reconstructing the context of medical harm, adverse events, complaints and 
patient safety [7-11, 28]. It has often been argued that the current definition of 
medical harm excludes the non-disease-specific or non-clinical aspects that the 
patient may consider harmful [7, 8, 11]. In fact, patients often evaluate the care 
received on non-clinical aspects, such as the interpersonal skills of the care 
providers [29] and how care is organized [30]. Furthermore, what constitutes an 
adverse event according to patients refers not only to the original event but also to 
a broader array of aspects such as the aftermath of the event and how they were 
treated [7]. 
These experiences suggest that if the regulators do want to give patients a voice 
in their policies and acknowledge the patients’ perspective, a broader perspective 
should be adopted rather than relying heavily on a narrow medical model or letting 
the ‘clinical view’ dominate.  
 
Regulator responds less effectively to patients who reported organizational issues 
The results show that patients with complaints about organizational aspects felt 
less often that their complaint had an effect on quality of care. This is obviously 
explained by the fact that fewer complaints about organizational issues are 
investigated further by the Inspectorate. However, no differences were seen 
between the nature of the complaint and the relevance for quality of care that 
patients attached to their complaint. Patients therefore seem to think that there is 
also a learning potential from organizational problems for care providers and the 
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regulator. 
Bismark (2015) argues that medico-legal agencies are often focused too much 
on handling complaints in a procedurally correct way [31]. The results seem to fit 
with this reasoning; complaints about organizational issues do not seem to fit in 
the established processes and procedures of the Inspectorate, which could limit 
effective responses to patients, really hearing their voice and providing what they 
need.  
Furthermore, it could be questioned why organizational problems are deemed 
to be not structural and considered less relevant for the quality of care by the 
Inspectorate. In addition, patients may have a better view of these types of 
problems in healthcare than regulators do during for instance regulatory visits and 
inspections.  
 
Surprising results about expectations when complaint concerns relational 
deficiencies 
For most patients, regardless of the nature of their complaint, it is most important 
that their complaint has an effect on healthcare quality. Personal benefits or 
consequences for care providers are less important. Nevertheless, unexpected but 
interesting differences are observed regarding the nature of complaints, and what 
patients want from reporting their complaint to the regulator. Patients with 
complaints that concern relational capabilities of care providers attach more 
importance to sanctions against the care provider in question than other patients 
do. Furthermore, this study shows that those patients find it very important that 
their sense of justice is restored. These findings are similar to what was found in 
other studies. Research has shown that communication subjectively perceived by 
patients as unsatisfactory was the main factor that made them decide to initiate 
legal proceedings [32]. Levinson et al. [33] found that physicians who received no 
complaints were those who provided information, asked the patient’s view, and 
used humor.  
Research among the Dutch public showed that the majority agree with a soft 
approach of imposing measures by regulators in cases of poor quality of care [34]. 
However, patients thus seem to be less tolerant of perceived relational deficiencies 
of care providers than of what they perceive to be clinical or management errors 
[29]. Regulators could take this into account when inviting patients to report their 
complaints and manage their expectations if they approach them. It could 
additionally be debated whether regulators should play a role in addressing care 
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providers in cases of relational deficiencies. Lastly, these results could be an 
important indicator for care providers that they should be aware of their relational 
(and in particular listening) skills. And, openness, apologies and appropriate action 
after adverse events are essential to patients [35,36]. 
 
Strengths and limitations 
A strength of this study is the large sample size.  
The response rate in this study was modest, even after sending two reminders and 
an abridged survey. There is therefore a risk of response bias. One consequence 
could be that the results of this study are not fully representative of the group of 
people who complained to the regulator. Non-response analysis was not possible 
because no characteristics of the non-respondents were available, in part due to 
the meticulous privacy arrangements. Research shows that non-respondents are 
more likely to be members of minority groups and lower educated groups [37]. No 
characteristics were available of the respondents who returned the abridged 
survey either.  
Some respondents indicated that completing the survey made them 
uncomfortable because it revived the situation that the complaint was about. This 
could be an important reason for the non-response. Another reason could be that 
filing the complaint itself had already cost a great deal of effort, making people 
reluctant to participate. The study population is older and more highly educated 
than the general Dutch population. This might be explained by the fact that this 
specific group feel more empowered to complain to the regulator. 
The complaints were classified using the taxonomy by only one author, do to time 
constraints. Therefore, there could be a risk of misclassification bias. Nevertheless, 
the taxonomy has already shown to be substantially reliable.  
It is unclear whether the results of this study also apply to other regulatory 





There is a mismatch between the patients’ and the regulator’s perspectives. 
Whereas the clinical view dominates in the regulator’s perspective, patients believe 
that a broader scope of contextual, organizational and relational aspects of quality 
of care is relevant. This clinical view limits effectively responding to patients by the 
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Inspectorate, really hear the patients’ voices and provide what they need. 
The nature of complaints affect patients’ expectations from reporting their 
complaint to the regulator. Patients are less tolerant when their complaint 
concerns relational deficiencies in care providers than when they perceive it to be a 
clinical or management error. It could be debated whether regulators should play a 
role in addressing care providers for their relational deficiencies. Furthermore, 
these results could be an important indicator for care providers that they should be 
aware of their relational skills (in particular listening to patients). 
To conclude, if regulators want to include the patients’ perspective in their 
policies, they should expand their horizon taking account of the needs and 
expectations of patients, rather than relying too much on the medical model. 
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In a number of countries, regulators have been criticized after high-profile incidents 
in healthcare where patients’ complaints were not addressed [1-4]. As a result, 
there has often been a political debate about the high expectations society has of 
regulators, and calls for stricter supervision and more attention to patients’ 
complaints from regulators have often been expressed by the media [5-7]. 
Regulators in various countries in different sectors have therefore expressed 
greater commitment to involving the public more in their regulatory policies and 
improving responses to complaints [1, 7-12]. This is in line with broader 
international trends of democratization in healthcare [13, 14]. 
Little research has been performed on the expectations and perspectives of the 
public about regulation of healthcare quality. Evidence from a very small body of 
research suggests that the public has other views and expectations of the role of 
the regulator concerning health and safety risks than governments or healthcare 
professionals [15, 16]. This means that it is important to know what their view 
entails and what is implied if regulators want to involve the public and patients 
more in their work. 
This thesis therefore assesses the discrepancies and similarities between the 
values and expectations of the different voices within the public domain, and the 
theories, concepts, policies and practices of healthcare quality regulation. This 
knowledge is needed in order to effectively align the regulators’ and public’s 
perspectives, and to assess different approaches for involving the public in 
regulation policy. Furthermore, the results of this thesis could help regulators 
respond more effectively to individual patients with complaints. 
The studies were carried out in the Netherlands, where the Dutch Healthcare 
Inspectorate is responsible for healthcare quality regulation. In the studies, 
different populations were approached using various methods in order to gain 
more understanding about the public’s and patients’ perspectives and compare 
them to the regulator’s responses to patients and the public. Questions about 
general concepts and theories underlying regulation policies were submitted to a 
sample of respondents who were representative of the general Dutch population. 
Furthermore, interviews were conducted and a questionnaire was submitted to a 
sample of people who had reported a complaint about healthcare to the Dutch 
Healthcare Inspectorate. Lastly, we performed content analyses on the complaints 
submitted by those people using a taxonomy designed for this study. This gave 
various insights in the public’s perspectives on differing aspects of regulation and 
quality of care. 
General discussion 155 
Main findings 
There are differences between the perspectives of the public and patients and that 
of the regulator. These differences were found on various dimensions. The 
perspectives can be grouped along four dimensions: 
 
1. Quality of care  
2. Responsibilities for healthcare quality 
3. Regulatory policies and strategies and their effects on quality of care 
4. Expectations of individual patients when reporting their complaint and the 
responses of the Inspectorate 
 
The differences between the perspectives for each dimension may provide 
important insights and reveal various fundamental implications for healthcare 
quality regulators who are considering  involving patients and the public more in 
their work. 
The results will be reflected upon, referring to the differences between patients 
and the regulator on the four dimensions. For each dimension, the theoretical 
assumptions and principles will be discussed first. Subsequently, the results of the 
studies will be described and placed in the context of other research. Finally, policy 
implications for each dimension will be suggested. 
 
1. Dimension: quality of care 
 
The principles behind patient participation in the evaluation of healthcare quality 
As described, the Inspectorate made a fundamental decision to involve the 
public’s/patients’ perspective more in the evaluation of healthcare quality. Several 
‘pragmatic’ assumptions have been made about the involvement of the public and 
patients in healthcare quality regulation. People are expected to participate 
actively in the public services they use, voicing their preferences and perspectives 
so that the services can respond to their needs [5]. In addition, public participation 
may have advantages that complement the current quality of information 
resources and may safeguard against the limitations and blind spots of those 
resources [6, 7, 8]. Participation mechanisms allow regulators to expand their 
supervision by using the public as a source of information and as agents for change 
[17]. 
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There are also some more theoretical assumptions about involving the public’s and 
patients’ perspectives in the evaluation of healthcare.  
An important theory that many regulators use for designing and developing 
their policies and strategies is the theory of responsive regulation [18]. This theory 
provides guidance about how the relationship between regulator, regulated parties 
and other stakeholders should be configured and how the regulator can determine 
which measures should be taken in cases of very poor quality. An important 
component of the theory of responsive regulation is ‘tripartism’, a democratic 
approach to regulation. In tripartism, a public interest group participates as a third 
group in the regulatory process, alongside the regulator and the regulated party: it 
is given power by being granted access to all the information that is available to the 
regulator, and by being offered a seat at the negotiating table for enforcement and 
compliance. It is proposed as a mechanism for empowering public interest groups 
and preventing conflicts of values between the different stakeholders [18-22]. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that giving the public a role means regulatory capture 
can be prevented [23, 24]. As regulators primarily interact with the party they 
supervise, ‘regulatory capture’ may easily lie ahead unnoticed; the term means that 
there is less of a separation between the regulator and the regulated party. The 
regulator is ‘captured’ in the sphere of influence of the regulated party, and the 
public’s interest could drop out of sight. This sometimes makes it difficult for the 
regulator to take firm measures [25]. The idea is that effective regulatory design 
involves other stakeholders such as patients and consumers, rather than treating 
the relationship with the regulated party as exclusively bilateral. When consumer 
interests are clear and articulable, they may provide relevant information and 
different perspectives that help counteract the regulated party’s influence [24]. 
 
Results for the patient’s perspective of what quality of care constitutes 
Content analyses of complaints show that a broad scope of aspects contribute to 
quality of care, according to patients.1 Complaints by patients relate to clinical, 
management/organizational, and relational aspects of care. Many complaints made 
by patients were multifactorial, unstructured and included multiple subjects. 
However, complaints with a clinical component are investigated further relatively 
far more often by the Inspectorate, whereas management and organizational 
problems, such as insufficient staff numbers or unqualified personnel or non-
1 See results in chapters 5 and 7 
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compliance with legislation seem to be less relevant to the Inspectorate when 
assessing quality of care. 
Another important observation is that slight pattern shifts were seen in the 
problems that patients reported in different healthcare sectors. The patterns were 
quite clear for characteristics of the ‘cure’ and ‘care’ sectors. In elderly care for 
instance, patients point to environmental and organizational problems more often 
than in other sectors. In hospital care, clinical issues such as diagnostic errors are 
reported more often. These findings seem logical at first, but when thinking about 
patient participation and designing participation mechanisms, policymakers should 
be aware of the different aspects that are relevant to patients admitted in different 
care sectors. 
 
Results in the context of theory and other research 
Our study illustrated a difference between the regulator’s and patients’ 
perspectives on what constitutes quality of care.2 The results reflected what is 
often discussed in other research: the differences between the ‘biomedical’ agenda 
of medico-legal agencies and the ‘lifeworld’ agendas of patients [26]. It has often 
been argued that the current definition of medical harm excludes non-disease-
specific or non-clinical aspects that the patient may consider harmful [27-29]. In 
fact, patients often evaluate the care received on the basis of non-clinical aspects, 
such as the interpersonal skills of the care providers [30] and how care is organized 
[31]. 
The biomedical model is often dominant and a leading determinant in 
constructing or reconstructing the context of medical harm, adverse events, 
complaints and regulating patient safety [27-29, 32-34], while for patients a 
broader context plays a role. If regulators are considering approaches for involving 
patients, these are important insights that should be taken into account. 
A small but growing body of research about public participation in regulatory 
policies gives important directions for how participation works out in practice. 
There seem to be pitfalls and difficulties when involving the public in regulation 
policies. 
Conflicts between perspectives of regulators and the public are sometimes 
perplexing. A study experimenting with involving patients as mystery guests 
showed that inspectors did not use the information delivered by the mystery 
guests because the way they evaluated quality and reported the findings did not 
2 See results in Chapter 6 
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match with practices used by the Inspectorate [8]. 
Another study by Rutz et al. in which adolescents were involved in policies of 
the Dutch joint Inspectorate for Youth and Youth Care found that the adolescents’ 
perspective was not only supplementary but also conflicted with the inspectors’ 
perspective. In the latter case, which may be more likely to happen in highly 
ambiguous situations, the participation process became also more difficult in 
practice [Rutz, S., van de Bovenkamp H., Buitendijk S., Robben P., de Bont A. 
Submitted]. The same was also seen in a study on involving the public in local 
safety projects for reducing crime and disorder, a different regulatory area. One of 
the problems observed was a mismatch between expectations and perspectives 
between the general public and professionals. People felt discouraged by 
bureaucratic issues that policy officers tend to erect in order to maintain their 
neutral role, and to let them do their work consistently and correctly. In addition, 
minority groups and other less privileged residents were comparatively 
underrepresented in the communal safety projects [35]. 
 
Implications for the Inspectorate 
It seems that the existing quality standards and frameworks that policy officers and 
inspectors use to assess quality in practice do not leave enough room for the 
public’s and patients’ perspectives. 
The Dutch Healthcare Inspectorate monitors the quality of care using medical 
standards frameworks and assesses quality of care using professional guidelines or 
standards, developed by the professional field itself. Matters raised by patients are 
not necessarily cases where the professional standard is at stake. Here we have 
two different and not necessarily overlapping standards frameworks: the patient’s 
and the regulator’s. In other words: the patient’s reality does not always equal the 
inspectorate’s reality with regard to healthcare quality. If regulators want to 
incorporate the patients’ perspective, the definition of quality of care used for 
regulation practices might not be wholly applicable and may differ for different 
(care and cure) healthcare sectors. They need to think about that different 
perspective and what it means to incorporate it in current regulation policies. It 
may lead to different standards frameworks, based on what patients find 
important. Processes may need to be arranged differently and it might require a 
paradigm shift on the regulator’s side. 
But, according to the theoretical assumptions, the existing differences between 
perspectives of patients and those of regulators on healthcare quality could be a 
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good reason to involve them in the first place. Including the different perspectives 
of patients may lead to disruption of the regulator’s routinely acquired picture as 
proposed with ‘tripartism’ and may therefore prevent regulatory capture [24]. 
More research is needed about what does and does not actually work, taking 
into account both the patients’ and regulators’ perspectives. 
 
2. Dimension: responsibilities for healthcare quality 
 
Principles and policies of responsibilities for regulation 
As described, the theory of ‘responsive regulation’ is an influential theory that 
many regulatory policies are based on. The basic idea of this theory is that the 
parties being regulated are considered to be trustworthy and intrinsically 
motivated by social responsibility. This vision is often described as ‘high trust, high 
penalty’ [18]. Regulation based on distrust would lead to more sanctions, more 
capacity requirements for the regulator and higher costs. Responsibility is 
therefore initially given to the regulated parties. This strategy corresponds to the 
international trend of government functions changing from the old “commanding 
and controlling” to “steering not rowing”, whereby responsibilities are shifted from 
the government to the field and new governing mechanisms are introduced such as 
marketization of public sectors [5, 36-38]. 
These are also ongoing trends in the Netherlands. Since the introduction of the 
Quality Act (1996) in the Netherlands, care providers have been given more 
responsibilities and are supposed to develop quality standards. These 
responsibilities also include handling individual complaints from patients about 
healthcare. The Dutch Healthcare Inspectorate is an independent part of the 
Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sports and is mandated to supervise and regulate 
healthcare quality. The Inspectorate supervises compliance with obligations 
imposed by legislation, assuming that care providers have an intrinsic motivation to 
act rationally and in a socially responsible way, according to the theory of 
responsive regulation. 
 
Results for the patients’ perspective on responsibilities 
To assess what the public’s views are on the distribution of responsibilities for 
quality, we presented them with several actors in healthcare and asked them to 
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rank them by how responsible they are for the quality of care.3 For comparison 
purposes, the same was asked for quality of food and quality of education.  The 
regulator was reckoned to have the most responsibility for quality of care by the 
majority of the Dutch general public. Next in ranking came the care providers, the 
minister, managers, colleagues of care providers, and finally the European Union. 
Patients were rated as bearing the least responsibility for quality of healthcare. 
The same results were seen for quality of food and quality of education in this 
study: the public placed the regulators at the highest position with regard to 
responsibility for quality. Furthermore, the bulk of the public assigned a high 
degree of responsibility to the groups actually carrying out the work in the three 
sectors such as care providers, teachers and  food preparation personnel. Students 
and their parents in the educational setting and consumers in the food service 
industry were seen as the least responsible for quality in the sector. 
Most people thus seem to consider the regulator as a powerful authority. From 
the studies that involved patients with complaints, the results point in the same 
direction. Many complainants indicated that they had already lodged their 
complaint somewhere else before reporting to the Inspectorate [39]. If they see no 
options for conciliation, patients may deliberately address their complaint to the 
regulator, who they expect to stand up for them. Patients who experienced 
problems in the relationship with their care provider in particular were seeking 
justice and wanted the care provider in question to be sanctioned.4 Patients thus 
seem to be less tolerant of perceived relational deficiencies of care providers than 
of what they perceive to be clinical or management errors [30] and they might see 
the regulator as a powerful authority that corrects care providers and thereby 
maintains justice. 
 
Results in the context of theory and other research 
With regard to responsibilities for quality of care, the ideas of the public differed 
from current underlying theories and concepts of regulation. 
The results of our studies showed that the majority of the Dutch general public 
partly support the idea of ‘high trust, high penalty’ from the theory of responsive 
regulation, as they attributed a high degree of responsibility to care providers. 
However, fundamental discrepancies between the perspectives of patients and 
regulators also became apparent from the studies: the predominant rhetoric of 
3 See results in Chapter 2 
4 See results in Chapter 6 
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decentralization of the responsibilities of regulators was not supported. 
 
There is a generalized idea among much of the public that the state regulator has a 
prominent role, as same patterns were observed regarding responsibilities in the 
healthcare, food and education sectors. 
The studies also show a kind of ambivalence among the public towards their 
own role in regulating healthcare quality. On the one hand, a study showed that 
the majority of people support public participation in regulation policies [40]. On 
the other, patients and the public considered themselves to bear least 
responsibility for the quality of care.5 The same results were seen in this study for 
quality of food and quality of education: the majority of the public placed 
themselves on the lowest position with regard to responsibility for quality. 
This ambivalence is also seen in other research [41]. When everything goes well 
and it is business as usual, people do not expect much government interference. 
The public seem to endorse the principle of their own responsibility and want to be 
left free in what they do. But they choose government responsibility in concrete or 
‘risky’ situations, when they are not well informed and/or when they are 
(emotionally) involved [42]. For instance, they want on the one hand that “more 
should be left to the people themselves” but also want criminality to be tackled by 
the government. To quote Bouttellier, “Do not stand in my way, but discipline my 
neighbour”, or “Take care of me, but watch out for the others” [43].  
 
Policy implications: active patients? 
The results about the public attributing themselves a restricted role in the 
responsibility for the quality of healthcare contrast with the goals of the reform of 
marketization in healthcare towards more ‘active patient choice’, more 
responsibility for patients and democratization in healthcare. 
Other research also showed that implementing concepts such as active patient 
choice and involving patients in decision-making processes in practice seems to be 
difficult [44, 45]. 
For instance, a study on how the assumptions about active patient choice turn out 
in practice shows that comparative information seems to have a relatively limited 
influence on the choices patients make. Patients base their decisions on a variety of 
characteristics of healthcare providers. There is no such thing as a ‘typical patient’. 
Different patients make different choices in different situations, determined by a 
5 See results in Chapter 2 
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complex interplay of characteristics of patients and providers [45]. 
 
Another study showed that participation of patient organizations in formal 
decision-making, in order to empower them and democratize healthcare processes, 
is easier said than done. Patient organizations can participate in management 
processes but often have no influence on the important decisions about 
administrative subjects. Bottlenecks are the limited capacity, limited professional 
knowledge and limited representativeness of patient organizations [44]. 
The results of our study indicate that the majority of the public do not favour 
intensive or active methods of participation in regulation and therefore may not act 
as expected by policy makers. The majority of the public see others taking 
representative roles for them. This suggestion requires further research, which 
should include the public’s and patient’s perspectives. 
Research into patients’ participation in regulatory policies is still in its infancy. 
Nevertheless, the starting position should be that we do know the real purposes 
and added value of involving the public and patients in regulation. It should not be 
seen as a cure for all the problems regulators face. Including patients and their 
complaints, and responding effectively to them is one form, but many other forms 
can be considered. It is important to know what different forms of patient 
participation in regulation contribute to existing practices and to the various goals 
that are expected to be met by getting patients involved. Knowing that, it is also 
easier to determine in what form or mechanism patients and the public can be 
involved. 
Research can then be carried out firstly into what forms of participations 
patients and the public prefer, and those forms could be evaluated in practice. The 
opinions and roles of inspectors should also be taken into account. 
 
3. Dimension: regulation policies and strategies and their 
effects on quality of care 
 
Theoretical assumptions underlying regulatory strategies 
According to the theory of responsive regulation, strategies of regulation should be 
flexible, in synergy with the context of those being regulated, and based on 
dialogue. As described earlier, regulation based on trust will improve quality of care 
more effectively [18].  
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Single regulatory strategies are seldom effective [46]. The weaknesses of one 
strategy can be compensated by the strengths of another. A wide array of 
strategies such as monitoring performance indicators and targets, incident 
reporting systems, and stricter measures such as criminal penalties should together 
contribute to the effectiveness of regulation. Regulatory compliance is encouraged 
using cooperation, persuasion, inspection and enforcement notices in the first 
instance, and secondarily by applying heavier measures in the case of riskier 
behaviour. This principle is also known as the ‘stick–and-carrot’ approach [18, 46]. 
The Dutch Inspectorate as described determines its strategies using the theory 
of responsive regulation. The Inspectorate pays regular visits, which become more 
frequent if care providers do not comply with quality standards. Both care 
providers and the public can report incidents or lodge complaints. However, the 
Inspectorate’s statutory tasks mean that it is not responsible for handling individual 
complaints. It only investigates complaints when they are structural or very severe. 
Information about the quality of care is collected and analysed to signal 
potential risks. 
 
Information sources include the following: 
- System-based supervision (monitoring of internal quality systems of care 
providers and governance arrangements) 
- Performance indicators 
- Reporting of incidents (by the public or care providers) 
- Detection of prosecutable facts 
- Thematic supervision 
 
The Inspectorate is authorized to use the following regulation and enforcement 
instruments: 
- Advice and incentives (consultation, campaigns) 
- Corrective measures (imposing improvement plans, intensified monitoring) 
- Administrative measures (command, advice to the Minister to issue a 
direction, penalty, administrative fine) 
- Measures under criminal or disciplinary law 
 
Results for the patient’s perspective on regulation policies and strategies 
In order to understand better what the public’s expectations and ideas of what 
effective regulation policies and strategies are, we assessed public opinion with 
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regard to measures that the regulator should take in cases of poor healthcare 
quality, and what information sources should be used to monitor quality of care. 
We found differences and similarities between current policies and the ideas of the 
public. 
The majority of the public indicated that the Inspectorate should firstly impose 
softer measures on care providers who fail to comply with quality standards, in the 
public’s opinion.6 For instance, 96% indicated that the Inspectorate should double-
check the care institution and 93% indicated that the Inspectorate should provide 
recommendations for improvements. This is in line with the regulator’s current 
policies. 
The same conclusions were found among patients with complaints when 
assessing what they expect after reporting their complaint. Particularly rigorous 
consequences for the care provider in question, such as sanctioning or banning 
from working, were less favoured by them when reporting their complaint. More 
important are the effects their complaints have on the healthcare system.7 
The majority of the public support the use of complaints from patients, the 
general public and care providers for regulatory purposes. The majority (93%) 
indicated that the Inspectorate could rely most on complaints made by patients’ 
associations. Fewer respondents (approximately half) agreed that the Inspectorate 
should rely on information provided by care institutions themselves, whereas this is 
the main source of information for many regulators. 
 
Results in context of theory and other research 
The majority of the public agree with the regulators’ gradual approaches of 
imposing measures on care providers who fail to comply with quality standards, 
which is in line with the proposed ‘stick-and-carrot’ principle of the theory. 
Furthermore, the majority of the public seem to have little confidence in the 
internal monitoring of quality by care providers and the use of this information for 
regulation, while this is the principal information source regulators use. 
These findings do not exactly reflect what was often argued in politics and the 
media: that society expects a stricter approach from the regulator in the case of 
incidents. Most of the public seem to have more nuanced opinions about what 
measures should be taken by a regulator. This also seems to depend on the 
situation, as research into risk as perceived by members of the public shows. 
6 See results of Chapter 2 
7 See results of chapters 3 and 6 
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Classical studies on the management of risks often state that our has society 
developed into a risk society over recent decades [47, 48]. It was thought that 
people overestimate risks and therefore require stricter government action. 
However, more recent studies have shown that the public are not risk-averse, but 
risk-realists: if they are well informed, they seem to accept risks to a certain extent 
and understand the responsibility of people themselves for risk prevention [42]. 
The majority of public are therefore realistic about what measures should be taken 
when things go wrong, but they see other information sources as more valuable for 
monitoring the quality of care. Relying on information collected by care providers 
alone could give a biased picture of the quality of care. The information could be 
complemented using other information sources more intensively, as proposed by 
the concept of ‘tripartism’ [24]. This could increase public confidence and 
accountability in healthcare and regulation. 
 
Policy implications: using complaints for regulation 
The majority of the public support the use of complaints for regulation; patients 
with complaints want their complaints to have an impact; and questions have been 
raised in several European countries about how patients’ complaints should be 
valued and have a place in the regulatory process [2, 3, 5, 18, 24, 36, 37, 40]. The 
use of patients’ complaints can be seen as a reduced form of tripartism whereby 
services become more responsive to and learn from their users. 
Analyses of complaints on a larger scale is not common yet [12, 49, 50], 
especially not by regulators. In this respect, we investigated what value complaints 
could have for the regulation of healthcare quality. Driven by the results of the 
other studies, we aimed to develop standardization techniques for the analysis and 
utilization of patients’ complaints for quality regulation at a higher level.8  
Aggregated reporting on numbers of complaints could be a first step for using 
of complaints for various purposes. Internationally, researchers agree that 
aggregated analysis and reporting on adverse events (including complaints from 
patients) by care providers and regulators is required [49, 51-54], because this 
would lead to ‘higher-level thinking and learning’; it would give a chance to 
proactively identify (system-wide) problem areas and quality and safety problems 
that point to poor care and risk areas [51, 54]. It could help regulators be 
accountable for their work and help make complaint evaluation procedures and 
decisions more homogenous and consistent. Furthermore, it could be a mechanism 
8 See results in Chapter 4 
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for publicly showing what effects complaints have on the care system [50, 55-57]. 
 
Our aggregated analyses of complaints showed that it was indeed possible to 
identify problem areas and quality and safety issues.9 These types of detailed 
information could help give a more precise picture of what patients experience in 
various care sectors. The aggregated overview of complaints could be used for 
publicly reporting what effects complaints have on the healthcare system and 
informing the public about the regulators’ work [49, 50, 58]. This could contribute 
positively to greater visibility of regulators; they are currently mostly only in the 
spotlight after incidents, and in a negative way. This could also help make 
evaluation procedures and decisions more homogenous and consistent, and 
improve public accountability. 
However, we also found some restrictions on the use of complaints, especially 
for regulatory purposes. 
The classification supports basic analyses, but does not accurately explain and 
map the complex reality behind a complaint. As the classification process reduces 
the complexity of the complaints, and excludes important details and background 
information, the information that the analysis provided remains rather superficial 
and makes it difficult to assess which complaints need regulatory action. 
In addition, classification of complaints is effective from an organizational and 
professional perspective. But the complaints are classified within categories 
developed from a professional perspective, which may bias the real thoughts and 
feelings of patients. 
However, without some form of standardized reporting of complaints, there is 
no way to monitor what patients experience in healthcare and give them a more 
consolidated voice in the regulatory practice. Furthermore, standardization of 
detailed complaint information could promote sharing between care providers, 
complaints boards and regulators, as well as encouraging learning processes. 
There could be further assessment of whether aggregated analysis of 
complaints could be valuable for the regulation of healthcare. It would be possible 
to study whether future follow-up samples of complaints allow for comparisons 
over time that point out emerging problems experienced by patients. The 
predictive value of complaints could be studied further, for instance analysing the 
relationship between complaints and mortality rates, incidents, patient 
satisfaction, or regulatory measures against care providers.  
9 See results in Chapter 5 
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It would also be possible to study what value complaints add to existing incident 
reporting systems. Furthermore, it is recommended that other information sources 
should be linked to the aggregated complaints data, such as incident reporting, risk 
management reports, patient complaints and malpractice claims. Whether patterns 
of non-reporting are detectable should be assessed. Moreover, integrative systems 
for achieving a detailed understanding of the full range of things that go wrong at 
the population level are largely undeveloped [54]. 
 
4. Dimension: expectations of individual patients when 
reporting their complaint to the Inspectorate 
 
Policies on handling individual complaints by patients 
There are differences between countries in what role patients’ complaints 
currently have in healthcare quality regulation. In Finland for example, patients can 
file complaints with the healthcare quality regulator which then judges the 
legitimacy of the complaint [59, 60], while in other countries such as the UK and 
the Netherlands, individual complaint handling is not the primary task of the 
regulator. Signals derived from individual complaints are often used to monitor the 
performance of individual care providers [7, 12, 61]. As the responsibility for 
effective complaint handling is often given to the care providers, they often install 
specific complaints boards or bodies where patients can lodge their complaints [12, 
53, 57, 62]. Other possibilities for patients to lodge their complaints are for 
instance disciplinary boards or ombudsmen [62]. 
In the Netherlands, it is possible for patients to register complaints about 
healthcare with the Inspectorate. The statutory tasks of the Inspectorate do not let 
it give individual judgements about complaints. Instead, it uses complaints for 
general risk analyses. Complaints are only eligible for handling by the Inspectorate 
and further investigation if they meet the following specific criteria: (i) severe 
deviation from the applicable professional standards by professional or other 
employees within the institution, (ii) severe failure or the absence of an internal 
quality system at an institution, (iii) severe harm to health or a high probability of 
recurrence of the problem [63]. If the complaint meets any of these criteria, the 
Inspectorate first asks the care provider in question to investigate the problem, in 
line with the theory of responsive regulation. If necessary, the Inspectorate starts 
its own investigation. If the complaint does not meet any of the criteria, the 
Inspectorate must ensure that the complainant receives information about other 
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options for obtaining a judgement [63, 64]. The Inspectorate receives 
approximately 1500 complaints from patients every year of which the majority are 
not handled by the Inspectorate, given its statutory task [64]. 
 
Results for patients’ expectations when reporting their complaint to the regulator 
Our study shows that patients with complaints have different perceptions than the 
regulators of how relevant their complaint is for healthcare quality. Three main 
dimensions became apparent in what patients with complaints expect from a 
regulator: expectations regarding consequences for the care provider in question, 
personal benefits and benefits for the quality of healthcare.10 Expectations 
regarding improving the quality of care were considered most important by 
respondents. Furthermore, personal benefits and consequences for the care 
provider were seen as less important. 
Many patients regard their complaint as a structural problem or something that 
could happen again to others, expecting to improve the quality of care by reporting 
their complaint and feeling that things should change. However, most complaints 
are considered by the Inspectorate not to be structural or not severe enough to be 
eligible for further investigation. 
The results of our studies also show that patients with complaints about 
organizational aspects felt less often that their complaint had an effect on quality 
of care.11 This is obviously explained by the fact that fewer complaints about 
organizational issues were investigated further by the Inspectorate. However, 
patients believe those complaints are structural and think that there is also a 
learning potential from organizational problems for care providers and the 
regulator. 
 
Results in the context of other research 
When comparing different complaints procedures with different goals such as 
individual complainant satisfaction or disciplinary complaints procedures, 
complainants seem rather unanimous in what they expect of the procedures. For 
most people, it is important that their sense of justice is restored and that the 
problem is prevented from recurring [55-57, 65]. Aspects of procedural justice, 
such as diligence, impartiality, understanding and respect are also important to 
complainants. Research shows that those aspects are mostly well organized in most 
10 See results in Chapter 3 
11 See results in Chapter 6 
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complaints procedures, including the Inspectorate’s [39, 57] 
It is not the Inspectorate’s task to handle individual complaints. Patients who 
file a complaint with the Inspectorate seem to be aware of this, as evidenced by 
the low need expectations regarding personal satisfaction among patients who 
made complaints. They want to contribute to the quality of care. However, the 
majority of complainants believe that no changes are made in response to their 
complaint [57, 65, 66]. Patients’ dissatisfaction with responses to their individual 
complaints is often associated with an expectation gap [50, 55-57]. Bismark (2015) 
argues that medico-legal agencies often focus too much on handling complaints in 
a procedurally correct way. This approach may have “dulled the senses”, resulting 
in responses that are rather “pro forma” instead of focusing on meeting patients’ 
expectations [53]. 
 
Implications for the Inspectorate 
People seem to be aware of the task of the regulator. However, giving patients the 
possibility of reporting complaints also requires effective responses to them, 
including arranging the aspects of procedural justice. However, the results again 
stress the importance of recognizing that lay people have their own diverse 
interpretations of what their complaints mean for patient safety and these may 
conflict with current evaluation methods. The standardized procedures for 
responding and determining what complaints are structural or severe and the 
expectations and perceptions of patients about their complaints are not well 
aligned. Regulators should move away from traditional standardized procedures 
and favour more responsive, strategic and tailored approaches for responding to 
complainants. Patients’ needs and expectations when reporting a complaint should 
be considered carefully, and they should be individually informed about the effects 
their complaints have on the healthcare system. 
The expectations and experiences of patients from complaints procedures have 
been studied thoroughly over recent years and numerous efforts have been made 
to improve complaints procedures. However, learning from complaints (as is the 
case with incident reporting systems [67]) is lagging behind. Facilitating learning 
processes requires not only classifying and quantifying, but also social, participative 
and interactive processes at regulators and care providers. Regulators could pay 
more attention to how healthcare providers respond to complaints by patients and 
how they implement improvements indicated by complaints. 
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Methodological reflection 
Strengths and limitations have already been described for each individual study. 
Only the most important ones will therefore be described here. 
In addition to the general public, patients and their complaints were included in 
this study to gain more insight into the patients’ perspective on healthcare quality. 
Patients with complaints actively express their experiences with healthcare. They 
are therefore relatively easy to track for research purposes. 
Studying their expectations and experiences provided rich insights into what 
patients find important, their perspectives on healthcare quality, what they expect 
from a regulator and how they experienced the responses to their complaints. 
Studying complaints even gave us important insights into the regulator’s 
perspective on healthcare quality. However, it must be stressed that patients with 
complaints tend to be female, somewhat older and better educated than average. 
This might be explained by the fact that this specific group feel more empowered 
to make their complaint to the regulator. In addition, females have shown to use 
healthcare more often than males in the Netherlands [68]. The results are 
therefore not representative of all patients or of the general public. They also 
cannot be directly translated to all other forms of patient participation. 
Furthermore, various studies have shown that different opinions were found within 
subgroups among the public, such as younger people or less well educated people. 
This should be taken into account when involving the public in regulation policies. 
The response rate among patients with complaints in this study was modest, 
even after sending two reminders and a shortened questionnaire. The same applies 
to the response rates from the Dutch Consumer Panel. There is therefore a risk of 
response bias. Non-response analysis was not possible because no characteristics 
of the non-respondents are available, in part due to extensive privacy regulations. 
It was difficult to encourage people to fill out the questionnaire and increase the 
response rate. 
Some respondents contacted us with questions about the study. Others 
indicated that completing the questionnaire made them uncomfortable because it 
revived the situation that the complaint was about. This could be an important 
reason for the non-response. Another reason could be that filing the complaint 
itself had already taken a lot of effort, making people reluctant to participate. 
Another observation is that respondents often chose the ‘other’ answer category 
and used the option of adding details about their complaint in open answer 
categories. This emphasizes the complexity and diversity of the complaints, which 
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are not easy to subdivide into standard categories. 
Lastly, for the use of complaints for regulatory purposes in practice, it should be 
noted that receiving, classifying and recording complaints is a labour-intensive 
activity. A thorough examination is need of which types of complaint information 
are coded. Furthermore, future analyses using the taxonomy require extensive 
rater preparation and practice. Rater preparation in content analysis is widely 
acknowledged to be an important condition for a valid assessment process [69]. 
 
Conclusions 
This thesis provides more insights into what it would really mean if the 
Inspectorate truly wants to introduce the patients’ and public’s perspectives in its 
work. In addition to some concrete findings about the differences between the 
perspectives of patients and regulators on the four dimensions (quality of care, 
responsibilities, regulation strategies and expectations of individual patients with 
complaints), the main conclusion is that involving patients in regulation is a great 
challenge. It calls for fundamental changes and a paradigm shift on the regulator’s 
side. 
The current assessment frameworks and definitions of quality of healthcare 
that regulators use may not provide sufficient tools for incorporating the voice of 
patients in the practice of regulation. If regulators want to involve patients, it is 
important to pay more attention to organizational factors, relational aspects, and 
other ‘softer’ aspects of healthcare, as well as medical professional standards with 
regard to quality-of-care standards.  
This means that the Inspectorate needs to work with another policy agenda, 
and it may require other regulation strategies. Furthermore, patients could be 
involved not only in the process of evaluating quality of care, but also in the 
development of regulation strategies and assessment frameworks. 
However, the different perspectives of patients only stress the importance of 
listening to them carefully as this could prevent regulatory capture; it provides a 
more complete picture and broadens the horizons of inspectors. It could be difficult 
to bring into practice, but setting up continuous and non-sporadic public 
participation mechanisms and the long-term learning commitment of regulators 
are essential for good regulatory design. 
A low profile, or only being visible during crises, contributes to the vulnerability 
of regulators. Reporting publicly about its work – not only on patients’ complaints 
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but also on other subjects – could contribute to the Inspectorate’s visible profile 
and public accountability in a positive way, as well as reducing its vulnerability. 
The ball is now in the Inspectorate’s court for the decision on how to proceed 
with the challenge of involving the public and patients more in its regulation 
policies. 
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Introduction 
Regulators in a number of countries have been criticized after high-profile incidents 
in healthcare. The criticisms often focus on their soft approach and on them 
ignoring patients’ complaints. The regulators in various countries have therefore 
expressed a greater commitment to involving the public and patients more in their 
policies and improving responses to complaints. This is in line with broader 
international trends of democratization in healthcare. 
 
This thesis provides insights into the perspectives of the public and patients, and 
into what it would mean if regulators involve the public and patients more in their 
work. This knowledge is needed for effectively aligning the regulators’ and public’s 
perspectives, and assessing different approaches to involving the public in 
regulation policies. Furthermore, the results of this thesis could help regulators 
respond more effectively to individual patients with complaints. 
 
The studies were carried out in the Netherlands, where the Dutch Healthcare 
Inspectorate is responsible for healthcare quality regulation. In the studies, 
different populations were approached with various instruments in order to get a 
better more understanding of the public/ patient perspective and compare this to 
the regulator’s perspective. The strategies of the studies, the study populations and 
the objectives are shown in the table below. 
 
Objective Strategy Study population 
Insights into opinions of the 
public on concepts of 
regulation1 
Question about general 
concepts of regulation 
Respondents representative 
of the Dutch population 
Understanding the 
expectations and 
experiences of people who 
submitted complaints to the 
Inspectorate2 
Interviews and survey People who reported a 
complaint to the 
Inspectorate 
Perspectives of patients on 
quality of care and 
usefulness of complaints for 
regulation3 
Development of taxonomy 
and content analyses 
Content of complaints 
1 Chapter 2 
2 Chapters 3 and 6 
3 Chapters 4 and 5 
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Main findings 
The most important finding of this thesis is that there are differences between the 
perspectives of the public and patients versus that of the Inspectorate on four 
dimensions: 
 
1. Quality of care  
2. Responsibilities for healthcare quality 
3. Regulation policies and strategies and their effects on quality of care 
4. Expectations of individual patients when reporting their complaint to the 
Inspectorate 
 
1. The patients’ perspectives on quality of care differ from the Inspectorate’s 
perspective 
To analyse the patients’ perspective on quality of care, we conducted content 
analyses on their complaints. In addition, we assessed which complaints were 
relevant according to the Inspectorate and were investigated further by them. 
Complaints with a clinical component were the subject of further investigations by 
the Inspectorate relatively much more often, whereas patients have other 
perceptions of quality of care. Their vision of quality of care is often based on a 
broader scope of aspects. As well as clinical aspects, organizational and relational 
aspects of care play a role. Another observation is that slight shifts of patterns were 
seen in the problems that patients reported between different healthcare sectors. 
For instance, patients in elderly care experience organizational problems more 
often, whereas in mental healthcare problems concerning patients’ rights are more 
often encountered by patients. 
The Dutch Inspectorate receives approximately 1500 complaints from patients 
each year of which the majority are not handled by the Inspectorate. 
It is possible for patients to register complaints about healthcare with the 
Inspectorate. The statutory tasks of the Inspectorate do not let it give individual 
judgments about complaints. Complaints are only eligible for handling by the 
Inspectorate and further investigation if they point to a severe or structural 
problem. Other complaints bodies such as complaint officers at care providers are 
supposed to deal with individual complaints. 
The differences in the perspectives of patients and the Inspectorate reflect 
what has often been discussed in other research: the differences between the 
‘biomedical’ agenda of medico-legal agencies and the ‘lifeworld’ agendas of 
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patients. The medical model is often dominant and a leading determinant in 
constructing or reconstructing the context of medical harm, adverse events, 
complaints and regulating patient safety, while this does not always reflect how 
patients experienced it.  
This raises the question of whether and how the Inspectorate will/can give the 
patients’ perspective a place in its work. 
The Dutch Healthcare Inspectorate monitors the quality of care using medical 
standards frameworks and professional guidelines. The patients’ perspective is not 
always included in those guidelines and standards, and should be given a clearer 
place in the regulator’s framework. 
 
2. Patients see regulators as having most responsibility for quality 
To assess how the public see the division of responsibilities for quality of care, we 
asked them how much the various parties involved, including the Dutch 
Inspectorate, are responsible in their opinion for quality of care. We included 
equivalent questions concerning quality regulation in the food service industry and 
in education, in order to assess whether public opinion is unique to the health 
sector or if it represents more common attitudes regarding responsibilities.
The Inspectorate was seen as having the most responsibility for quality of care by 
the general Dutch public, followed by the care providers, the minister, managers, 
colleagues of care providers, and finally the European Union. Patients were rated 
as bearing the least responsibility for quality of healthcare. 
The same results were seen for quality of food and quality of education in this 
study: the public placed the regulators first with regard to responsibility for quality. 
Students and their parents in the educational setting and consumers in the food 
service industry were seen as the least responsible for quality in the sector. 
The Inspectorate bases its policies on the theory of ‘responsive regulation’. This 
theory is used by many regulators to design and develop their policies and 
strategies. The theory provides a basis for establishing how the relationship 
between regulator and regulated parties should be configured and how the 
regulator can determine what measures should be taken in cases of very poor 
quality of services. The basic idea of the theory is that the regulated parties are 
considered as trustworthy and intrinsically motivated by social responsibility. 
Strategies of regulation should be flexible, in synergy with the context of those 
being regulated, and based on dialogue. This vision is often described as ‘high trust, 
high penalty’. Regulation based on distrust would lead to more sanctions, more 
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capacity requirements for the regulator and higher costs. Responsibility is therefore 
firstly laid at the regulated parties’ door.  
The results showed that the majority of the general Dutch public support the 
idea of ‘high trust, high penalty’ in the theory of responsive regulation, as a lot of 
responsibility was assigned to care providers. However, there is a generalized idea 
among the public that the state regulator has a prominent role.  
An important component of the theory of responsive regulation is ‘tripartism’. 
In tripartism, a public interest group such as a patients’ or consumers’ association 
participates as a third group in the regulatory process along with the regulator and 
the regulated party at the negotiation table that ensures enforcement and 
compliance.  
It is assumed that giving the public a role can prevent regulatory capture, the 
effect in which there is a reduced distance between regulator and regulated party. 
The regulator is ‘captured’ by influence of the regulated party, and the public 
interest could be lost from sight. Consumer interests that are clear and articulable 
may provide relevant information and different perspectives that help counteract 
the regulated party’s influence.  
Furthermore, tripartism can be seen as a democratic way of giving patients and the 
public a voice in regulation. This is in line with broader developments of 
democratization in healthcare.  
However, the studies show a kind of ambivalence among the public towards 
their own role in regulation of healthcare quality. This ambivalence is also seen in 
other research. When everything goes well and business is as usual, people do not 
expect much government interference. The public seem to endorse the principle of 
their own responsibility. But they choose government responsibility in concrete or 
‘risky’ situations, when they are not well informed and/or when they are 
(emotionally) involved. For instance, people do want something to be done when 
incidents occur in healthcare. 
The results indicate that the majority of the public do not favour intensive or 
active methods of participation in regulation. They see others taking representative 
roles for them, for instance patients’ organizations. At the same time, patients’ 
expectations of the role of regulators in the area of quality and safety are high. 
 
3. The public support the regulator’s soft approach 
In order to gain a greater understanding about the public’s expectations and ideas 
of what effective regulation policies and strategies are, we assessed the public’s 
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opinions with regard to measures that the Inspectorate should take in cases of 
poor healthcare quality. 
The majority of the public indicated that the Inspectorate should firstly impose 
softer measures on care providers who fail to comply with quality standards. The 
same conclusions were found among patients with complaints when assessing 
what they expect from reporting their complaint. Particularly rigorous 
consequences for the care provider in question, such as punishment or banning 
from working, were less favoured by them when reporting their complaint.  
This is in line with the regulator’s current policies based on the theory of 
responsive regulation. Single regulatory strategies are seldom effective, according 
to the theory. Weaknesses of one strategy can be complemented by strengths of 
another. A wide array of strategies such as monitoring performance indicators and 
targets, incident reporting systems, and stricter measures such as criminal 
penalties should together contribute to the effectiveness of regulation. Compliance 
is encouraged using cooperation, persuasion, inspection and enforcement notices 
in the first instance, and secondarily by applying heavier measures in the case of 
riskier behaviour. This principle is also known as the ‘carrot-or-stick’ approach.  
In the Netherlands, care providers are expected to set up internal quality 
systems to monitor their own results quality of care. This information is also shared 
with the Inspectorate. The Inspectorate pays regular visits, which become more 
frequent if care providers do not comply with quality standards. Information about 
the quality of care is collected (e.g. using risk indicators and investigations of 
incidents) and analysed to signal potential risks. 
We also asked the public’s opinion about those information sources for 
monitoring quality of care. The majority of the public support the use of complaints 
by patients, members of the public and care providers for regulatory purposes. 
However, the majority of the public seem to have little confidence in the internal 
monitoring of quality by care providers and the use of this information for 
regulation, whereas this is in fact the dominant information source the 
Inspectorate uses. 
 
4. Patients have other interpretations of the concept ‘structural’ than the 
Inspectorate 
The results showed that there is a discrepancy between what individual patients 
expect from reporting their complaints and the policies of the Inspectorate. Many 
patients regard their complaint as a structural problem or something that could 
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happen again to others, while most complaints are considered by the Inspectorate 
not to be structural or severe enough to warrant further investigation. For many 
patients, this is difficult to understand. 
It is not the Inspectorate’s task to handle individual complaints. Patients who 
file a complaint with the Inspectorate seem to be aware of this, as evidenced by 
the low need expectations regarding personal satisfaction among patients who 
made complaints. However, if patients are given the possibility of reporting 
complaints, effective responses to them are also required.  
Not only is a careful, respectful and impartial response needed, but the 
Inspectorate also needs to explain in understandable language why a complaint is 
not being investigated further. In addition, there could be active support to help 
patients find alternative options for lodging their complaints. 
Individual complainants should be actively informed about what has been done 
with their complaint, both in cases where the Inspectorate has investigated the 
complaint and where it has not. 
 
Conclusions 
This thesis provides insights into the opinions of the public about regulation and 
what it would mean if the Inspectorate truly wants to introduce the patients’ and 
public’s perspectives in its work. In addition to a number of concrete findings about 
the differences between the perspectives of patients and regulators, the main 
conclusion is that involving patients in regulation is a great challenge. Their voice 
could act as a ‘game changer’ and a paradigm shift on the Inspectorate’s side may 
therefore be needed. However, the different perspectives of patients only stress 
the importance of listening to them as this could prevent regulatory capture, as 
expressed in the concept of tripartism. 
The current assessment frameworks and definitions of quality of healthcare 
that the Inspectorate uses may not provide sufficient tools to incorporate the voice 
of patients in the practice of regulation. It is important for the Inspectorate to pay 
more attention to organizational factors, relational aspects and other ‘softer’ 
aspects of healthcare, in addition to medical professional standards for quality of 
care. Patients and their representatives could be actively involved in those 
developments. 
People who reported complaints to the Inspectorate feel they are a stakeholder 
in the process of improving healthcare quality and want to be involved. However, 
there is a difference between the interpretations that patients and the 
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inspectorate have of the term 'structural'. It is important that these two 
interpretations are brought into line with one another, in order to prevent 
frustration among patients. There should be greater clarity about how decisions are 
made about which complaints are investigated further. Lastly, patients should be 
individually informed about the effects their complaints have on the healthcare 
system. 
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Inleiding 
In verschillende landen, waaronder Engeland, Australië, en Nederland, is er 
regelmatig forse kritiek op overheidstoezichthouders in de gezondheidszorg. De 
kritiek richt zich op hun ‘zachte’ aanpak bij incidenten en het negeren van klachten 
van patiënten. Toezichthouders willen patiënten daarom een grotere rol geven in 
hun beleid. Zo ook de Inspectie voor de Gezondheidszorg (IGZ) in Nederland. De 
Inspectie is verantwoordelijk voor het toezicht op de kwaliteit van de Nederlandse 
gezondheidszorg. 
Onder andere de Nationale Ombudsman heeft kritiek geleverd op de Inspectie 
en bepleit dat de Inspectie meer rekening moet houden met het burger- en 
patiëntenperspectief. Net als in het vorige Meerjarenbeleidsplan geeft de Inspectie 
daarom in haar nieuwste Meerjarenbeleidsplan 2016-2019 de patiënt een 
belangrijke rol in het toezicht. De Inspectie wil patiënten en hun naasten 
intensiever  betrekken bij het toezicht en mede vanuit hun perspectief een oordeel 
vormen over  de kwaliteit en veiligheid van de zorg. 
Dit proefschrift geeft inzicht in het  burger- en patiëntenperspectief op toezicht 
en kwaliteit van zorg en de consequenties van het betrekken van patiënten bij het 
toezicht. Doel van het onderzoek is een bijdrage te leveren aan een goede 
afstemming tussen de perspectieven van toezichthouders en burgers. Op basis van 
onderzoek onder burgers en patiënten, en onderzoek naar de manier waarop de 
Inspectie in Nederland klachten van burgers behandelt, is inzicht verkregen in het 
perspectief van patiënten en burgers op toezicht en kwaliteit van zorg.  
Deze kennis kan bijdragen aan het effectief betrekken van patiënten bij het 
werk van de Inspectie en aan de manier waarop de Inspectie met patiënten en hun 
klachten omgaat. De aanpak van dit onderzoek, studiepopulaties en 
onderzoeksdoelen staan weergegeven in onderstaande tabel. 
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Doel Aanpak Onderzoekspopulatie 
Inzicht in visie van 






representatief voor de 
Nederlandse bevolking 
naar geslacht en leeftijd 
Verwachtingen en 
ervaringen van burgers 
met de Inspectie2 
Interviews en vragenlijst Personen die een klacht 
hebben gemeld bij de 
Inspectie 
Perspectief van patiënten 




en inhoudelijke analyses 
Inhoud van klachten 
 
Bevindingen 
Uit onze deelstudies komt naar voren dat de perspectieven van patiënten en 
burgers verschillen met die van de Inspectie. Deze verschillen uiten zich op vier 
dimensies: 
1. Kwaliteit van zorg 
2. Verantwoordelijkheden voor kwaliteit van zorg 
3. Strategieën van toezicht en de effecten daarvan op kwaliteit van zorg 
4. Verwachtingen van individuele patiënten bij het melden van hun klacht bij 
de Inspectie 
 
1. Het patiëntenperspectief op kwaliteit van zorg verschilt van die van de 
Inspectie 
Om het patiëntenperspectief op kwaliteit van zorg in kaart te brengen hebben we 
klachten van patiënten inhoudelijk geanalyseerd. Daarnaast hebben we onderzocht  
welke klachten als relevant werden geacht en nader onderzocht zijn door de 
Inspectie.  
Voor de Inspectie blijken vooral klachten over klinische aspecten relevant bij het 
beoordelen van de kwaliteit van zorg, terwijl patiënten andere percepties hebben 
van kwaliteit van zorg. Hun beeld van de zorg is vaak gebaseerd op een breder scala 
1 Hoofdstuk 2 
2 Hoofdstuk 3 en 6 
3 Hoofdstuk 4 en 5 
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aan verschillende factoren. Naast de klinische aspecten spelen ook 
organisatorische factoren en het contact met de zorgverlener een rol. Ook zagen 
we verschillen tussen zorgsectoren in de onderwerpen die patiënten bij de 
Inspectie aandragen. Zo ervaren patiënten in de verpleging en verzorging vaker 
organisatorische problemen, en komen in de geestelijke gezondheidszorg vaker 
problemen omtrent patiëntenrechten voor. 
De Inspectie ontvangt jaarlijks zo’n 1500 meldingen van klachten door burgers. 
Het merendeel wordt niet door de Inspectie onderzocht waarbij de klager wordt 
geadviseerd de klacht elders in te dienen. Burgers kunnen klachten melden bij de 
Inspectie, maar de Inspectie is niet verantwoordelijk voor individuele 
klachtbehandeling. De verantwoordelijkheid hiervoor ligt primair bij de 
zorginstellingen. Daarnaast hebben patiënten de mogelijkheid een tuchtklacht in te 
dienen of een beroep te doen op een geschilleninstantie of het civielrecht. De 
Inspectie onderzoekt meldingen van burgers alleen wanneer die wijzen op een 
structureel of ernstig probleem bij de zorgaanbieder.  
De verschillen in perspectieven die wij vonden sluiten aan bij eerder onderzoek: 
de mismatch tussen de ‘biomedische agenda’ van gezondheidssystemen en -
instituten en de ‘leefwereld’ van patiënten. Het medische model speelt een 
dominante rol bij het reconstrueren en beoordelen van medisch vermijdbare 
schade, klachten en patiëntveiligheid en -kwaliteit door inspecteurs. Dit sluit maar 
gedeeltelijk aan bij de opvattingen van patiënten.  
Dit roept de vraag op of en op welke manier de Inspectie dit 
patiëntenperspectief een plek wil/kan geven in haar toezicht. 
De Inspectie houdt toezicht op kwaliteit van zorg door professionele standaarden 
en normenkaders van het veld, het perspectief van de patiënt is hierin niet altijd 
meegenomen. Als de Inspectie de patiënt meer wil betrekken bij het toezicht zijn 
de huidige professionele normen niet toereikend en moet het perspectief van de 
patiënten een duidelijkere plaats krijgen in het normenkader. 
 
2. Patiënten zien de Inspectie als meest verantwoordelijk voor kwaliteit van 
zorg 
Om te onderzoeken wat de visie is van burgers over de verdeling van 
verantwoordelijkheden voor kwaliteit van zorg, hebben we hen gevraagd in 
hoeverre verschillende actoren, waaronder de Inspectie, naar hun mening 
verantwoordelijkheid dragen voor kwaliteit van de gezondheidszorg. Om dit in 
perspectief te kunnen plaatsen is hetzelfde gevraagd voor de Voedsel en 
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Warenautoriteit (VWA) op het gebied van voedsel en de Onderwijsinspectie op het 
gebied van onderwijs.  
De Inspectie werd als meest verantwoordelijk gezien voor kwaliteit van zorg. 
Daarna kwamen de zorgaanbieders, de Minister, managers, collega’s van 
zorgverleners en de Europese Unie. Patiënten werden als minst verantwoordelijk 
gezien. Dezelfde patronen werden gezien in de voedsel- en onderwijssector: de 
toezichthouders werden de meeste verantwoordelijkheid toebedeeld en leerlingen 
en consumenten de minste. 
De Inspectie baseert haar beleid op de theorie van ‘responsive regulation’. Deze 
theorie wordt door toezichthouders gebruikt voor de ontwikkeling van hun beleid 
en strategieën. De theorie geeft een onderbouwing voor de inrichting van de 
relatie tussen toezichthouder en ondertoezichtstaanden en de bepaling van welke 
maatregelen moeten worden genomen door toezichthouders in geval van slechte 
kwaliteit. Het idee achter deze strategie is dat het merendeel van de 
ondertoezichtstaanden te vertrouwen is en intrinsiek gemotiveerd is om het goede 
te doen en te handelen in het belang van de burgers/gebruikers. Kwaliteit van de 
dienstverlening is de verantwoordelijkheid van de aanbieders, die dat in veel 
gevallen ook waarmaken. Wantrouwen ondermijnt de professionele motivatie en 
verantwoordelijkheid en brengt hoge toezichtslasten met zich mee. Volgens de 
theorie van responsive regulation, zijn toezichtsstrategieën flexibel en gebaseerd 
op dialoog met de ondertoezichtstaanden. Deze visie wordt vaak omschreven als 
'high trust, high penalty'. 
Burgers lijken achter het idee van ‘high trust, high penalty’ te staan omdat ze 
zorgaanbieders ook een hoge mate van verantwoordelijkheid toebedelen. Maar ze 
zien wel een grotere rol voor de toezichthouder.  
Een ander belangrijk element in de theorie van responsive regulation is 
‘tripartisme’. Het idee achter tripartisme is dat een derde groep die de belangen 
van burgers behartigt aansluit bij het onderhandelingsproces tussen 
toezichthouder en ondertoezichtstaande, bijvoorbeeld een groep patiënten of 
consumenten.  
Tripartisme zou ‘capture’ (inkapseling) kunnen voorkomen. Bij ‘capture’ is er 
sprake van een verminderde afstand tussen toezichthouder en 
ondertoezichtstaande, waarbij de toezichthouder teveel beïnvloed wordt door de 
ondertoezichtstaande en daarbij het publieke belang uit het oog dreigt te verliezen. 
Bovendien kan door tripartisme het belang en het perspectief van de consument 
worden ingebracht in het toezicht. Tripartisme is een democratisch mechanisme 
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om burgers een stem te geven in toezicht. Dit past bij de bredere ontwikkelingen 
van democratisering in de zorg.  
Burgers staan echter ambivalent tegenover hun eigen rol bij het toezicht.  Zij 
zien voor zichzelf in de meeste gevallen geen primaire rol, maar verwachten eerder 
een bijdrage van een patiëntenorganisatie. Deze ambivalentie is vaker 
geobserveerd in ander onderzoek.  
Als alles gaat zoals gewoonlijk, ‘business as usual’, verwachten mensen niet 
teveel bemoeizucht vanuit de overheid. Ook onderschrijven mensen de principes 
van ‘eigen verantwoordelijkheid’ van burgers. Maar wanneer er concreet iets 
misgaat, en wanneer mensen niet goed geïnformeerd zijn of emotioneel betrokken 
zijn, kiezen ze voor een grote rol van de overheid. Men wil bijvoorbeeld wel dat er 
wordt opgetreden wanneer er iets fout gaat in de zorg.  
De resultaten van ons onderzoek  geven aan dat de meerderheid van de burgers 
niet de voorkeur geeft aan intensieve of actieve vormen van participatie in het 
toezicht. Tegelijk zijn de verwachtingen van patiënten over de rol die de Inspectie 
speelt op het terrein van kwaliteit en veiligheid hooggespannen. 
 
3. Burgers en patiënten onderschrijven een zachte aanpak door de Inspectie 
Om te begrijpen hoe burgers aankijken tegen verschillende toezichtsinterventies 
hebben we hen gevraagd wat er volgens hen voor maatregelen genomen moeten 
worden in gevallen van slechte kwaliteit van zorg. 
Het merendeel van de burgers gaf de voorkeur aan het inzetten van zachtere 
maatregelen, zoals advies of extra controleren van zorgverleners. Patiënten met 
een klacht deelden deze visie: men had de voorkeur voor het opleggen van 
zachtere maatregelen door de Inspectie, zoals een gesprek aangaan met de 
zorgverlener, in plaats van hardere, zoals het straffen van de zorgverlener. 
Dit sluit aan bij het beleid van de Inspectie gebaseerd op de theorie van ‘responsive 
regulation’.  
Combinaties van verschillende toezichtsinterventies zijn volgens deze theorie 
het meest effectief. Zwakke punten van één interventie kunnen worden aangevuld 
met sterke punten van een andere. Een breed scala aan interventies zoals het 
monitoren van prestatie-indicatoren, incident meldingssystemen, adviseren, 
stimuleren en bestuursrechtelijke en strafrechtelijke sancties  dragen gezamenlijk 
bij aan de effectiviteit van het toezicht. Naleving van de regelgeving wordt in eerste 
instantie aangemoedigd door het gebruik van ‘zachte’ maatregelen als 
samenwerking, advies en overtuiging, en in tweede instantie door het toepassen 
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van zwaardere maatregelen. Dit principe is ook bekend als ‘the stick or the carrot’.  
In Nederland worden zorgaanbieders geacht kwaliteitssystemen op te zetten 
waarbij zij hun eigen resultaten op kwaliteit monitoren. Deze informatie wordt ook 
aan de Inspectie geleverd. Er wordt op verschillende manieren informatie 
verzameld en geanalyseerd over kwaliteit van zorg, bijvoorbeeld door middel van 
risico indicatoren, en onderzoek naar meldingen van incidenten en calamiteiten 
door zorgaanbieders en burgers. Wanneer de kwaliteit van zorg niet op orde is, 
intensiveert de Inspectie het toezicht op de zorgaanbieder. 
Over deze informatieverzameling door de Inspectie hebben wij burgers ook hun 
mening gevraagd. Burgers moedigen het gebruik door het toezicht van informatie 
uit klachten van zowel zorgaanbieders, als burgers en patiëntenorganisaties aan. 
Minder vertrouwen heeft men in informatie verzameld door zorgaanbieders zelf, 
terwijl dit momenteel wel de meest gebruikte informatiebron van de Inspectie is. 
Burgers zijn het dus eens met de zachte aanpak van de Inspectie, maar hebben 
andere ideeën over de informatiebronnen voor het gebruik van toezicht. 
 
4. Patiënten hebben een andere interpretatie van het begrip structureel dan 
de Inspectie 
Onze studies laten zien dat er een discrepantie bestaat tussen wat klagers willen  
bereiken door hun klacht te melden en het beleid van de Inspectie. Veel patiënten 
zien hun klacht als een structureel probleem van een zorgaanbieder dat andere 
patiënten ook kan raken, terwijl de Inspectie de meeste klachten niet als 
structureel ziet en ze dus niet in behandeling neemt. Veel patiënten vonden dit 
lastig te begrijpen. 
Patiënten lijken zich er wel bewust van te zijn dat de Inspectie geen individueel 
klachtbehandelaar is. Ze melden zich ook niet bij de Inspectie om persoonlijke 
genoegdoening te krijgen. Maar, alsnog is het belangrijk dat er effectief wordt 
gereageerd wanneer patiënten hun klacht melden. Niet alleen moet er op een 
zorgvuldige, respect- en begripvolle en onpartijdige manier gereageerd worden, 
maar er kan ook door de Inspectie worden uitgelegd waarom een klacht niet wordt 
onderzocht in een voor de klager begrijpelijke taal. Daarnaast kan de klager actief 
geholpen worden bij het zoeken van alternatieven voor het indienen van een 
klacht.  
Individuele klagers kunnen actief geïnformeerd worden over wat er met hun 
klacht is gedaan, zowel in gevallen waarbij geen of juist wel onderzoek is gedaan 
door de Inspectie. 
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Conclusie 
Dit proefschrift geeft meer inzicht in de opvattingen van burgers over het toezicht 
en wat er moet gebeuren om het patiëntenperspectief daadwerkelijk in het werk 
van de Inspectie te introduceren. Naast een aantal concrete bevindingen over de 
verschillen tussen de perspectieven van patiënten en toezichthouders is de 
belangrijkste conclusie dat het betrekken van patiënten bij het toezicht een grote 
uitdaging is. Het inbrengen van het patiëntenperspectief kan fungeren als een 
‘game changer’. Het vraagt om een paradigmaverschuiving bij de Inspectie; 
bestaande werkwijzen en concepten komen in een nieuw licht te staan. Ondanks 
dat dit niet makkelijk zal zijn, benadrukken de verschillende perspectieven van 
patiënten het belang om naar hen te luisteren. Dit kan ‘capture’ voorkomen zoals 
voorgesteld met het ‘tripartisme’, en verbreedt het inspectieperspectief.  
De huidige toetsingskaders en definities van kwaliteit van de gezondheidszorg 
die de IGZ gebruikt,  en de huidige praktijk, bieden niet genoeg handvatten om de 
stem van de patiënten door te laten klinken. Het is voor de Inspectie van belang om 
meer aandacht te besteden aan organisatorische factoren, relationele aspecten, en 
andere aspecten van de gezondheidszorg, naast de medisch professionele normen. 
Patiënten en hun vertegenwoordigers kunnen bij deze ontwikkelingen actief 
betrokken worden.  
Patiënten die klachten melden voelen zich betrokken bij het proces van 
kwaliteitsverbetering in de zorg. Er is echter een verschil tussen hoe patiënten 
tegen het begrip ‘structureel’ aankijken en hoe de Inspectie hier tegenaan kijkt. Het 
is belangrijk dat deze twee perspectieven op elkaar worden afgestemd, om 
teleurstelling onder melders te voorkomen. Dit is geen eenzijdig proces: het is 
belangrijk dat de Inspectie in gesprek gaat met patiënten om ook beter aan te 
sluiten bij de definitie die patiënten geven aan het begrip ‘structureel’. Ook kan 
meer duidelijkheid worden gegeven over hoe besluitvorming over het al dan niet in 
behandeling nemen van meldingen plaatsvindt. Tot slot wordt aangeraden om 
patiënten die klachten melden bij de Inspectie te informeren over het effect van 
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